Commentary No. 6, Dec. 15, 1998
"Weapons of Mass Destruction"
One of the major worries of the United States today is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. What this means is the U.S. in very anxious that countries who do not presently have nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons not acquire them. This concern has a long history.
In the First World War, mustard gas (a chemical weapon) was used extensively, inflicting much painful damage on soldiers but, as far as one can tell, not affecting seriously the outcome of the military conflict. One of the conclusions Western powers drew from this was that everyone would be better off from a mutual renunciation of chemical warfare. An international agreement was concluded to this effect, and was actually observed for the most part during the Second World War.
However, the Second World War saw a race between the Axis and the Allies for the creation of an atomic bomb. As we know, the United States won this race, and then used the bomb not against Germany but against Japan. The Japanese felt then, and many others share the view, that this decision was made because the Germans were Europeans and the Japanese Asians. During the war, there was also considerable research on biological weapons as well as chemical weapons. In 1945, the United States stood alone as a possessor of nuclear weapons, and had considerable knowledge about chemical and biological weapons. It decided to share its nuclear knowledge with its close ally, Great Britain, and then made it its urgent priority to stop all other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons.
The major military opponent of the U.S., the Soviet Union, spared no effort in acquiring first an atomic bomb, then a hydrogen bomb. By 1949, both sides in the Cold War had nuclear weapons, and this turned out to be less disastrous than everyone had claimed it would be. Analysts began to talk of mutual deterrence, a thesis that neither side would risk a real war because the response of the other side would be too terrible to contemplate. Whatever the validity of this analysis, the United States then turned its attention to trying to ensure that no fourth power would become a nuclear power. But first France, then China proceeded to acquire nuclear capacity, feeling obviously that they would not be taken seriously as a great power without it.
The United States learned to live with the reality of five nuclear powers, and turned its attention to make the process stop there. But then, India demonstrated that it could set off a nuclear reaction. And many other countries engaged in clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. There is good reason to believe that both Israel and South Africa achieved nuclear capacity (although the apartheid regime, as one of its last acts before turning over power to the A.N.C., renounced nuclear weapons). Many other countries are thought to be very near nuclear capacity: North Korea, perhaps Japan in East Asia; Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Algeria in the Muslim world; Brazil and Argentina.
The U.S. has pushed successfully for an international convention committing countries to no further "proliferation," but many of the likely candidates for nuclear candidacy have refused to sign the convention. One of their major arguments has been that they see no moral or political reason to guarantee existing nuclear powers a monopoly, and are asking for these countries also to renounce nuclear weapons before they commit themselves to doing this. This has been the position notably of India and Pakistan, both of whom demonstrated this year that they had nuclear weapons.
During the Iran-Iraq war, it seems that chemical and biological weapons were used, and then that they were potential weapons in the Gulf War. When Iraq lost this war, one of the conditions that was imposed on Iraq was the destruction of all its weapons of mass destruction. As we know, this has been extraordinarily difficult to enforce. In the negotiations of the U.S. and South Korea with North Korea, one of the objects of the U.S. has been to buy nuclear renunciation from North Korea. It seems doubtful that this has worked. The U.S. seems never to have placed similar pressure on Israel or apartheid South Africa. In any case, Israel is unrepentant, as are the various Arab countries who have been engaged in this nuclear quest. The only region of the world where U.S. pressure seems to have had some effect is Latin America, and even there one cannot be sure.
Stripped of all verbiage, the issue has been essentially one of power. Weapons of mass destruction make a difference in the warfare of the future. The U.S. has been using two arguments. One is that of sheer force. It will penalize countries which defy this demand. This works only up to a point. It doesn't work against close allies, who can afford to defy the U.S. and it doesn't work against hostile powers, who wish to defy the U.S. It works best on in-between cases like Argentina.
The U.S. also uses an implicit moral argument. The case it makes (to its own public first of all) is that the U.S. (and by extension Western powers in general) will use these weapons responsibly, that is, only as a last resort, whereas countries of other regions of the world cannot be trusted not to use them irresponsibly, against each other and against the U.S. This assumption of moral virtue compared to the dubious ethics of leaders of other regions does not go over very well in the world community of today. It reflects a moral arrogance that very little in the history of the twentieth century gives reason to credit.
So where are we then? The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been going on apace since 1945 throughout the world. The U.S. and other Western powers have of course been constantly investing in and improving their own stock of these weapons as well. There is absolutely no reason to believe that the pace of this expansion (both in terms of geography and in terms of the destructiveness of the weapons) will slow down in any significant way in the next 25 years.
Will this increase the likelihood of terrible destruction? The answer is yes and no. No, because one major effect will be precisely that of the Soviet a-bomb. There will be more likelihood of the spread of mutual deterrence. But yes, because the probability of so-called accidents will also grow: accidents due to mishaps, and accidents due to the inability of states to control middle-level personnel who control actual weapons. In addition, it is obvious that we are making great progress in miniaturization of these weapons, which therefore puts them every more rapidly at the disposition of non-state forces, both political rebel groups and criminal groups.
The solution to this reality is not evident. It is clear that the continued pressure of the U.S. government on other
governments not to obtain such weapons has in fact slowed down the process of proliferation but it has in no way stopped
it. It is very doubtful that continued pressure of this kind will do better. And the moral argument will seem ever thinner and
more overtly racist as the years go on.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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