http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm
Commentary No. 73, Sept. 20, 2001
"Beware! The United States Might Prevail"
"If [bin Laden] thinks he can run and hide from the United States and our allies he will be sorely mistaken....We will prevail" (George W. Bush). There is an old peasant folk wisdom that says "beware of what you wish for; you may get it." I have little doubt that the United States can bomb Afghanistan, probably overthrow the Taliban, and possibly kill bin Laden. The U.S. may prevail. And then what?
We prevailed once before in Afghanistan. In the 1980's, the country had a Communist government. The U.S. was unhappy and sought to overthrow it. The U.S. succeeded. The result? The U.S. got the Taliban and bin Laden, whose organization is built on the foundation of CIA-trained veterans of the anti-Communist struggle in Afghanistan.
At the time, there were Communist governments in Bulgaria and Laos as well. The U.S. did not try to overturn them. Today, Bulgaria has a post-Communist government with the son of the former king as Prime Minister. Not an impossible scenario for Afghanistan. Today Laos, a very poor country, still with a Communist government, is limping its way into involvement in the world-economy. It is a threat to no one, not even the U.S. Not an unlikely scenario for Afghanistan. But in Afghanistan the U.S. insisted on prevailing.
How is the U.S. going to prevail now? A combination of U.S. military might and support from other countries. The U.S. has already announced that it is insisting that all countries in the Middle East and the Muslim world choose sides and support the U.S. unconditionally. Apparently, Pakistan has already agreed to do this. The U.S. policy in the region has been based on virtually unconditional support for Israel. But it has equally been based on supporting the twin towers of U.S. strength in the Islamic world, the regimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have different politics, different locations, and different histories. But they share two features. They are powerful and influential in the whole region and have served U.S. interests extremely well over the past decades. And the regimes in both countries are based on a coalition of support from pro-Western modernizing elites and an extremely conservative, popularly-based Islamic establishment. The regimes have maintained their stability because they have been able to juggle this combination. And they have been able to do so because of the ambivalence of their policies and their public pronouncements.
The United States is now saying, away with ambiguities. The U.S. may prevail, no doubt. But in the process, the regimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may find that their popular base is irremediably eroded. They may collapse, just like the Twin Towers in New York City. And if they do, just like the Twin Towers, they will bring down other smaller buildings and weaken the foundations of still more. The United States may regret the day when Assad, Khaddafi, Arafat, and even Saddam Hussein are no longer in power. Their successors may be far fiercer in their anti-Americanism, because their successors, unlike these persons, will no longer share modernist values with the United States.
Consider that this may have been bin Laden's plan. His own suicide mission may have been to lead the United States into this trap.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
Email this Commentary to a colleague
______________________________________________
Go to List of Commentaries