Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm
Commentary No. 98, October 1, 2002
"The Battle of the
Resolutions"
The second U.S.-Iraqi war is undergoing its mobilizing skirmishes. It is the battle of the resolutions - two resolutions to be specific, one to be passed by the U.S. Congress and one to be passed by the U.N. Security Council.
The story starts somewhere in the early summer of 2002. At that time, the decision of the U.S. government to invade Iraq soon had clearly been taken. The hawks believed they had won entirely the internal U.S. battle. What they wanted was an invasion in October, without any resolutions. They didn't want resolutions for two reasons. They thought they might have some difficulty in getting the kind of resolutions they would find acceptable. But even more important, they wanted to show that they didn't need the resolutions, now or in the future. They wished to establish the principle that the U.S. government could and would engage in pre-emptive action anywhere at any time if they thought it desirable. And they wished to start the war in October to guarantee a Republican majority in both houses of Congress in the November elections.
To their surprise, the U.S. government ran into more opposition than they had expected - not only from the dubious allies (France, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, U.S. Democrats) but from more influential sources: the so-called "old Bushies" (that is, high-ranking Republican personalities); Rep. Armey, the Republican Majority Leader in the House; and a long list of very prominent retired generals (obviously speaking for the Army generals on active duty). In addition, Tony Blair explained that he was having a hard time pulling along the British public and British politicians. The pivotal figure, President Bush himself decided that he would have to stanch the outflow of support, and that the way to do this was by seeking the resolutions. The main internal arguments were threefold: a) the U.S. government could get the resolutions; b) Saddam Hussein would never agree to real inspections; c) the U.S. could then start the war in January, but with greater international and national support. January seems to be a deadline imposed by the U.S. military because of climate conditions in Iraq. If not January, then a postponement of at least 6-9 months beyond January. Furthermore, the fight for the resolutions, by putting the fire under the feet of the Democrats, would serve almost as well politically in November as an actual war.
So, in September, Bush made his speech to the United Nations, and called for the two sets of resolutions (U.N. and U.S. Congress). This decision was actually a minor victory for the Powell-army generals-"old Bushie" faction. That they were pleased and appeased can be noticed in the congratulatory op-ed piece that James A. Baker wrote immediately. That the hawks were less than pleased can be read in great detail in the article published just before the speech in the September issue of Commentary magazine by that old superhawk, Norman Podhoretz. The article is entitled "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine." It is a fascinating article and is worth reading carefully. It makes three points: (1) The Bush doctrine of preemptive action is terrific and is in the tradition of Ronald Reagan and not of Bush's father; (2) Bush (junior) has been good on these issues only since 9/11; (3) Bush seems to be wobbling now. The key sentence, in good American colloquial style, is: "That is not to say that the count is in yet whether Bush will walk the walk as well as he has talked the talk."
What Podhoretz has in mind in "walking the walk" is that, after Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush should take on not only Iran and North Korea but Syria, Lebanon, Libya and then Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority (even without Arafat). Podhoretz exempts Pakistan only because of the turn-around of Musharref, but if Musharref were to go, clearly Podhoretz would add Pakistan to the list. So, at least we know that the hawks are thinking of absolutely continuous warfare in the Muslim world (and no doubt beyond - Cuba anyone?).
Now what I can read, members of the U.S. Congress and members of the U.N. Security Council can read as well. Will they then pass the resolutions? Yes, of course, but that is not the battle. The battle is in the wording of the resolutions. And the battle is in how the battle is being fought.
In the U.S. Congress, the battle is being fought with a mix of intimidation and weaseling. The Bush camp is threatening the Democrats with a charge of appeasement or worse if they don't vote the resolution in the form the government wants. This has clearly worked, up to a point. The Democratic leadership has been anxious to agree on a resolution swiftly so that they can try to use the remaining time before the election to remind voters of other issues (the state of the economy, threats to social security, insurance for seniors needing medical prescriptions, etc.). But there is a lot of unease about the war out there among ordinary voters. Al Gore decided to stake his renewed campaign for the presidency by issuing a note of great caution about Iraq. He is being viciously denounced for this. Nonetheless, the speech was enough to encourage Sen. Kennedy (and others) to echo it, to get Tom Daschle to express public anger at Bush's attack on Democratic asserted lack of "concern for national security," and to encourage Rep. Bonior, No. 2 Democrat in the House, to fly off to Baghdad and to say, let's not rush to war yet. The result of all of this is that the original proposed resolution has been watered down slightly. It now will no longer give Bush sanction for any and all military actions but only for one in Iraq. That version will probably pass by very large majorities in a week or so, although there still may be wrangling over the wording.
The debate in the U.N. Security Council is probably more difficult for Bush. The U.S. wants a tight deadline on Iraqi disarmament and an authorization for war if that doesn't occur. Iraq has confounded Bush by saying he will accept inspectors, but it seems, only on the basis of the last (1998) U.N. resolution that the U.S. finds far below the acceptable norm. Hans Blix, on behalf of the United Nations, is in Vienna right now, negotiating for a return of inspectors, but of course on the basis of the existing U.N. mandate, that of 1998.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has been putting great pressure on the three doubtful veto-holding members - France, Russia, and China - to get them to accept (or at least not veto) what the British will propose (which is what the U.S. wants). So far, each of the three has issued statements that are ambivalent. France has said they absolutely do not want an authorization for war in the resolution, that such an authorization should be in a second, later resolution, once it is determined that Iraq has defied the first resolution. The French version would put off the war for a while. For it would take time to determine whether the first resolution was defied, and it would take agreement that it was. Therefore, a second resolution formula would move us beyond January, and thus into the fall of 2003. France, Russia, and China will have an eye on each other, and will probably in some sense synchronize their final positions. We cannot be sure of the wording of a U.N. resolution at this point. But even with enormous U.S. arm-twisting, it is probable that the U.N. resolution will be weaker than the U.S. wants.
So, what may we expect? A fairly strong U.S. Congress resolution, uncertain
electoral results in November, and an in-between U.N. resolution. And then
ambiguous responses by Saddam Hussein to whatever the U.N. tries to do. Comes
December, we shall be at the moment of choice. The world will not agree on
whether or not Hussein is fulfilling the U.N. resolution. And we are back at
whether the U.S. proceeds alone (probably with Great Britain). For the hawks,
it would be now or never. And they will push their hardest to go ahead in
January, with or without international sanction. President Bush will either be
their hero or their villain. I would bet he would prefer to be their hero,
whatever the longer-term consequences.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections
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