HEAD OF A WOMAN FROM A RELIEF

Greek, Classical Period, early 4th century B.C.
Pentelic marble, h. 4 3/4 in. (12 cm)

4520

This marble head has been broken from a large piece of sculpture worked in high relief. The angle of the relief is such that the head would have appeared in three-quarter view to the right. The face of this young woman is beautifully designed and realized: the contours of the cheeks and forehead run smoothly one into the other; the chin is firm and rounded, the nose long and finely cut, the eyes set at a perfect angle. The smooth, polished surface of the skin is emphasized by its juxtaposition with the rough and wavy hair, which is parted in the center of the forehead, drawn back, and tied in a knot on the neck.

This head is extremely Classical in style. The marble is Pentelic, like the marble of the Parthenon, and the head itself is very likely to have come from an Athenian grave relief. Such reliefs generally show either two or three figures: the dead person and one or more relatives. The figures are shown in attitudes of great stillness and silent, dignified grief. As with scenes on white-ground lekythoi, it is frequently impossible to decide who is the mourner and who the person mourned. It is certainly impossible to decide to which category this head belongs, for her downcast gaze would suit either.

Many would consider this piece the single most aesthetically pleasing and valuable article in Freud's collection. It is certainly the most truly Classical.

—LB

For a description of grave reliefs of this type, see M. Robertson, A History of Greek Art (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 365–72, pls. 121–24.
EROS

Greek, Hellenistic Period,
probably from Tanagra, c. 300–250 B.C.
Terracotta, h. 3 1/8 in. (8.5 cm)
3897

This Eros was made to appear suspended in flight, as is suggested by the pierced projection between his wings, and by his pose. His left leg is forward, wings raised, his right arm brought across his chest; his missing left arm was perhaps outstretched. Around his head is a narrow band, and draped across his lower body is a scanty mantle. A band, perhaps for amulets, crosses his chest from his right shoulder. On his feet are boots.
—L.B.

For this type, see F. Winter, Die Antiken Terrakotten (Berlin, 1903), III, part ii, pp. 320–22.
Eros

Greek, Hellenistic Period, 3rd–2nd century B.C.
Terracotta, h. 4 in. (10 cm)
3912

This childlike figure of Eros is shown with his right leg slightly forward. His wreathed head is set to one side, and both his arms are muffled in his mantle, which is drawn up to expose his genitals.

The clay of this figurine is red; it was originally coated in white slip. Traces of gold are visible at the top of the wings and on the wreath, blue on the mantle, and red on the hair.

Aspects of this figure, particularly the coy pose, the affected set of the head, and the sweet smile, cast doubt on its authenticity. If genuine, both the color and texture of the clay and the style of the figurine suggest it was made in Boeotia.

—LB

For a similar piece, see S. Mollard-Besques, Musée du Louvre. Catalogue raisonné des figurines et reliefs en terre-cuite grecs, étrusques et romains (Paris, 1963), II, pl. 62c, MYR 7.
This spectacular terracotta Eros is shown flying forward, his left leg in front of the right, his head turned to the right but both arms bent to the left. He appears to have been carrying something, for not only are his hands unfinished, but their attitude demands an object, possibly a lyre or other musical instrument, a common attribute of figures of this type. His whole posture is, in fact, remarkably contorted and complex.

The clay varies in color from pale orange on the body to deep pinkish red on the wings. Both wings carry a coroplast's monogram in the shape of a large kappa. The figurine was originally coated in white slip, now partly worn off. Traces of blue appear on the lower feathers of both wings, and traces of gold on the upper edge of the right wing only; traces of red may be seen on the hair and wreath.

—LB

Freud identified the basic life instinct as Eros, as opposed to Thanatos, and he described the evolution of civilization as "the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species" (SE, 21, p. 122). In defining Eros as the life instinct or the libido, Freud referred to the classical concept of love:

We are of the opinion, then, that language has carried out an entirely justified piece of unification in creating the word "love" with its numerous uses, and we cannot do better than take it as the basis of our scientific discussions and expositions as well. By coming to this decision, psychoanalysis has let loose a storm of indignation, as though it had been guilty of an act of outrageous innovation. Yet it has done nothing original in taking love in this wider sense. In its origin, function, and relations to sexual love, the "Eros" of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love force, the libido of psychoanalysis. (SE, 18, p. 91)

Freud's collection includes at least six statues of the god of love. Although this Eros held a musical instrument, others depicted in contemporary Hellenistic wall paintings carry bows—a reminder that Eros, in a fusion of the forces of aggression with the libido, causes his victims to fall in love by attacking them.

—FM

The body and legs of this Eros are almost certainly from the same mold as a figurine in the Louvre, MYR 60, see S. Mollard-Besques, Musée du Louvre. Catalogue raisonné des figurines et reliefs en terre-cuite greco, étrusques et romains (Paris, 1963), II, pl. 42b; the head and wreath resemble a similar figure, also in the Louvre (MYR 56, in Mollard-Besques, loc. cit., pl. 42e). For other similar figures, see F. Winter, Die Antiken Terrakotten (Berlin, 1903), III, part ii, pls. 342 and 344.
The goddess Artemis, huntress and patroness of wild creatures, is recognizable by her hunting dress of short tunic, mantle, and boots with turned-down flaps. She is shown in rapid movement to the right, her right arm flung out ahead, while her left, wrapped in the mantle, hangs at her side. On her head she wears a diadem. Her tunic is pressed back against her thighs as though blown by a violent wind, and it is fastened with a broad girdle at her waist; her mantle cascades over her arm. Her hair is drawn back and arranged in a bun, and the features of her face are very crudely rendered.

The clay of this figurine is bright red and very coarse. The decoration consists of white slip, with rose-madder on the mantle and near the hem of the tunic. The figurine was made in two molds, front and back, with the join visible at the side; the back is fully modeled, with a large, round vent.

In its style and also in the type of clay, this piece strongly resembles a figurine of unknown provenance in the British Museum, again representing Artemis, this time seated on an altar with her arm around a deer. The British Museum piece has been attributed to Myrina.

Images of androgynous, childless women intrigued Freud. Artemis, like Athena, is chaste and masculinized. Both are virgin goddesses of aggression: Artemis is goddess of the hunt, armed with arrows; Athena is goddess of war and holds a spear. It is interesting to note that whereas Freud interpreted the action in the Oresteia of Aeschylus as a turning from matriarchy to patriarchy (SE, 23, p. 114), the plot is set in motion by the rage of Artemis, and the play is brought to an end by the proclamation of Athena. So the brutal battles between the sexes and generations that are fought out among the human characters in this drama are, in fact, controlled by phallicized women who possess enormous power and who live, as it were, outside of human time.

—FM

For the British Museum example, GR 1884.11-10.1 (D 158), see H. B. Walters, A Catalogue of Terracottas in the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities at the British Museum (London, 1903), pl. xxvii.
Warrior figures of this type are commonly found as dedications in Umbrian and Etruscan sanctuaries, placed there presumably either in thanks for or in hope of victory. This slender, stylized figure of a warrior strides forward with left leg advanced and right hand raised to hold or throw a spear (now lost). He wears a helmet with a long crest, its details finely incised, and with upturned cheekpieces that reveal his rather crude features—large nose and eyes, small mouth, firm chin. His short cuirass is incised with decorative patterns; below is the skirt of his tunic, too short to cover his genitals.

—LB

Compare this figure with others such as British Museum Catalogue of Bronzes, no. 444, and Boston, MFA 52.186, from the Todi Group, illustrated and discussed by M. Comstock and C. Vermeule, in Greek, Etruscan and Roman Bronzes in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston (Boston, 1971), pp. 166–67, no. 191. For these warriors as a class, see E. Richardson, Etruscan Votive Bronzes (Mainz, 1983), pp. 192ff.
Thousands of Etruscan mirrors survive today, many engraved, like this one, with a scene from mythology or daily life. Many of the subjects are at least mildly erotic; favorites are scenes of female adornment, showing a mirror in use, and scenes of the goddess of love. The undecorated, slightly convex backs of bronze mirrors were highly polished to reflect well the images of their owners, who, evidence suggests, were principally women.

Mirrors seem to have been an essential possession for any Etruscan woman of status. Scenes on the mirrors suggest that, for women, personal adornment, love, and fertility were closely associated with the idea of immortality of the soul. It is perhaps for this reason that so many mirrors accompanied their owners to the grave; most Etruscan mirrors have been found in tombs. Essential for a woman’s adornment in life, they were equally crucial for the survival of her soul after death.

The scene on this mirror consists of four figures, standing apparently on rocks. In the center is an armed warrior with his arm around the woman at his side. The warrior wears a helmet and a corselet, and a mantle hangs loosely around his arms. The woman is naked apart from a mantle falling around her hips, a necklace, and a headdress. Framing the scene on the left is another warrior, leaning on his spear, with his shield beside him on the ground. On the right is the goddess Athena, armed with helmet, spear, and shield.

The identity of the three characters to the left of Athena is not altogether clear. Two might represent the Dioscuri, the divine twins Castor and Pollux, and the third either their sister, Helen of Troy, or Venus. However, the proprietary gesture of the man beside the woman makes it perhaps more likely that the scene shows either the abduction of Helen by Theseus, accompanied by Peirithous, or the recovery of Helen after the sack of Troy by her husband, Menelaus, with another warrior. All these subjects are represented on Etruscan mirrors.

—LB

For an excellent survey of Etruscan mirrors, their origins, development, subject matter, function, and significance, see N. Thompson de Grummond, A Guide to Etruscan Mirrors (Tallahassee, 1982).
This container for perfumed oil, incense, or ointments, hollow cast in several parts, is in the form of two joining heads set back to back. The heads are those of a satyr and a maenad, male and female followers of Dionysos, god of wine. Satyrs are mischievous and amorous creatures, part-man, part-beast; maenads are their female counterparts, who symbolize impulse and abandon. Both heads are carefully modeled and finished. The maenad wears a twisted fillet around her hair, a band across her forehead, and a torque around her neck. Her features are plain but strongly marked—a straight nose, prominent eyes, large mouth, and full chin. The satyr's face is characteristically ugly, with sharply slanting eyebrows, deeply lined forehead, large ears, snub nose and curly hair, moustache, and beard. He also wears a twisted fillet around his head, and a bunch of grapes hangs in the center of his forehead. At the side where the two heads join is a cluster of grapes on a vine leaf.

Bronze vases such as this are fairly commonly found in Etruscan tombs of the third century B.C. Some may have been used to perfume the air, for many of them have chains, or, like Freud's, pierced lugs for the attachment of chains, by which they must have been suspended. Others may simply have held cosmetics. Some of these vases are shaped in the form of just one head, usually female, but very often they have the double-head arrangement seen here, and the most popular combination is of satyr and maenad heads. The attraction of this arrangement lay perhaps in its juxtaposition of opposites—beautiful and ugly, female and male.

—LB

Freud, the profound dualist, owned several two-faced figures. As early as 1899 he possessed a stone Janus head, and he kept this double-headed balsamarium on his desk in his later years. Dualism runs throughout Freud's thinking, appearing in such fundamental dichotomies as the pleasure principle versus the reality principle, Eros versus Thanatos, and libido versus aggression, and in Freud's notion of the dream mechanism of reversal—the representation of an idea by its opposite.

Likewise, central to this object is the notion of the basic bisexuality of all human beings, which Freud discussed in his fundamental work, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," of 1905 (SE, 7, pp. 135–243).

—FM

On these objects in general, with numerous excellent illustrations, see S. Haynes and H. Menzel, "Etruskische Bronzekopfgefässe," Jahrbuch des römisch-germanischen Zentralmuseums Mainz 6 (1959), pp. 110–27. For parallels, see British Museum Catalogue of Bronzes, nos. 756–58; and D. G. Mitten and S. Doeringer, Master Bronzes from the Classical World (Mainz, 1968), no. 225. A very similar piece was recently sold on the New York market; see Sotheby's Antiquities and Islamic Art, New York, May 29, 1987, lot 90.
Athena

Roman, 1st or 2nd century A.D.,
after a Greek original of the 5th century B.C.
Bronze, h. 4 1/4 in. (10.4 cm)
3007

This solid-cast figurine of Athena presents the goddess of wisdom and war in a frontal pose, with her left hand raised to hold a spear, now lost. In her lowered hand she carries a paten (libation bowl) decorated with a petal design. Her head is bent and turned a little to the right; her left leg is straight, the right bent at the knee in the classical contrapposto stance. She wears a helmet of Corinthian type set back on her head; the crest is long and reaches well below her shoulders. Her peplos is belted over the overfall and open down the right side; above it she wears her usual attribute, a rectangular aegis (breastplate) with featherlike scales and a crudely featured gorgoneion, a representation of the gorgon Medusa’s head, here lacking its usual fringe of snakes. The back of the figure is as carefully worked as the front, with the drapery falling in irregular columnar folds.

The overall style of this piece, combined with specific features such as the simplified form of the aegis and the decoration of the paten, suggests it is a Roman work, probably provincial, of the first or second century A.D.; the pose, however, very probably derives from a Greek original of the fifth century B.C.

—LB

Freud displayed his attachment to this bronze Athena, goddess of war and patron of the arts, by placing her in the center of his desk and by selecting her as the sole piece to be smuggled out of Austria in 1938, when the loss of his entire antiquities collection was threatened.

In a short manuscript dated 1922 (SE, 18, p. 273f), Freud discussed the sexual symbolism of the decapitated, serpent-pressed head of Medusa, which Athena customarily wears on her breastplate. According to Freud, decapitation represents castration, and the horrifying decapitated head of Medusa symbolizes the female genitals, which lack a phallus. He also noted that the horror of this image of castration is mitigated by the ring of snakes surrounding Medusa’s head because the snakes symbolically replace the penis. Freud described the head of Medusa:

This symbol of horror is worn upon her dress by the virgin goddess Athena. And rightly so, for thus she becomes a woman who is unapproachable and repels all sexual desires—since she displays the horrifying genitals of the Mother. Since the Greeks were in the main strongly homosexual, it was inevitable that we should find among them a representation of woman as a being who frightens and repels [a male] because she is castrated. (p. 274)

This statuette and Freud’s manifest attachment to it illustrate his commitment to a construction of female sexuality in terms of its relation to a male norm. Athena is a masculinized female whose lacks are manifest: her spear is missing, the Medusa on her breastplate displays no snakes, she has no phallus. In the last half century, Freud’s construction of the female gender in terms of the lack of a phallus has been much debated and revised (see below, Spitz, pp. 160–61, n. 46).

—FM

For an Athena of the same period and in the same pose, but of a slightly more sophisticated style, see P. C. Bol and T. Weber, Frankfurter Liebighaus: Bildwerke aus Bronze und Bein aus minoischer bis byzantinischer Zeit (Melsungen, 1985), pp. 125–29, no. 62, with a full discussion and bibliography of the type. For two similar but cruder Athena figurines of uncertain date in Sparta, see Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae (Zurich and Munich, 1981–), II, Athena 185, pl. 726.
Venus was the goddess of love and beauty in the classical world. Here, she stands in a relaxed position, her left foot just behind her right. Her head is turned slightly to her left; in her right hand she holds out a strand of her hair, while in her left hand she holds a mirror into which she stares. There is a diadem around her head, and her legs are covered by a garment draped below her hips and tied in a knot at the front. The goddess has narrow shoulders, a long torso, and small breasts. The contours of her body are simply but smoothly rendered.

Such statuettes are found in considerable numbers throughout the territory of the Roman Empire. This piece was probably made in a Roman province.

—LB

This Venus, holding a mirror, recalls Freud's notion that women are characterized by narcissism. The woman's cathectic of her whole body and her desire for it to be beautiful, he believed, was an attempt to compensate for the lack of a phallus. This Venus admiring herself in a mirror may have held special interest for Freud in his theorizing about women. In his essay “On Narcissism,” Freud states:

Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their choice of object [of affection]. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man's love for them. (SE, 14, pp. 88–89)

—FM

For one of many similar figures, see R. Fleischer, Die römischen Bronzen aus Österreich (Mainz, 1967), pls. 42–43, no. 74.
This fragment shows a sphinx seated against a deep pinkish orange background. At the bottom is a border of running scrolls between horizontal lines, all executed in dark brownish black. The sphinx sits upright, her long tail curling up behind her. Her raised left paw holds a spray of ivy leaves tied with a white ribbon. Her body is outlined in dark brown and filled in with white, now worn so that the pink background shows through. Areas of dark shading suggest the shadowy underside of her body and legs. Her hair is brown, as are her eyebrows, eyes, and mouth. Her hair is drawn away from her face and tied loosely at the back of her neck.

This fragment undoubtedly belongs to a larger composition; it seems highly likely that a second sphinx or other animal sat facing this one, perhaps holding the other end of the ivy chain. The context is hard to reconstruct; the figure could have belonged either in a mythological landscape painting or in an architectural scene. It is probably impossible to determine the original location of the fragment, but the style and coloring recall the paintings of the cities and villas of Campania of the first centuries B.C. and A.D.

—LB

This fragment comes from the right-hand end of the parapet that ran along the front of the gabled lid of a sarcophagus. The relief frieze represents the mourning Trojans carrying the ransomed body of their leader Hector. The story of the slaying of Hector by Achilles, in revenge for the death of his friend Patroclus at Hector’s hand, is part of the legend of Troy and is recounted in Homer’s Iliad. (Freud also owned the left-hand fragment of this frieze.)

After Patroclus’ funeral, the distraught Achilles dragged the body of Hector around Patroclus’ tomb at dawn for eleven days, refusing to yield the corpse to Hector’s grief-stricken father, Priam, king of Troy. This refusal constituted not only an unusually cruel revenge but was also a gesture that affronted the gods and custom, as a proper burial was essential to the hero’s entry into the afterlife. Eventually the gods resolved that Achilles should be made to relinquish Hector’s body to his family. Priam, accompanied by a single herald, drove through the night to the Greek camp with a cart full of treasure and made his way unobserved to Achilles’ tent. There he knelt before Achilles and asked him to think of his own father. Achilles, softened by his appeal, accepted the ransom and surrendered the body. So Hector was returned to Troy, where he was buried with due ceremony and mourning.

In this relief, the body of Hector originally would have occupied the central position. His body is of heroic proportion, about a third again as large as the other figures. It is carried by two Trojans, identified by their typical Phrygian caps. One Trojan stoops beneath the weight of Hector’s legs, and the other strains to support his trunk. Two Trojans walk in front, one carrying two vessels, and both looking back toward the body; on the far side walks a third Trojan. Behind the corpse comes an animated group of four figures: two women, a young
boy, and an older man. The disheveled women are shown in attitudes of extreme grief and despair, while the older man, more restrained, looks down at the young boy as if to comfort him. The scene on the sarcophagus fragment recalls Homer’s account of the arrival of the body of Hector in Troy (Iliad, 24.70ff).

It is tempting to identify the figures to the right of the corpse on the sarcophagus fragment as Hector’s parents, his wife, and their young son. However, three other known fragments—one possibly part of this sarcophagus lid (now lost), two others of the same subject—seem to indicate that when complete, the relief panel may have shown Priam on the left, kneeling before Achilles, with the body of Hector carried from the right toward the pair by a party of mourning Trojans. The vessels carried by the Trojan on the far left of the extant fragment could perhaps be seen as part of the ransom brought by Priam to Achilles. Such an arrangement confuses the logical sequence of events, for Priam had first to gain Achilles’ consent to his demand before the body could be delivered to Hector’s kinsmen, who in any case would have had no place in the Greek camp. One might argue further that the body should have been carried away from Achilles rather than toward him. However, for the artist to have neglected the strict demands of narrative in favor of juxtaposing the two most striking episodes in the story is hardly surprising.

The type of sarcophagus to which this fragment belongs and the style and subject of the relief suggest its date and that it was made in Rome. The Emperor Hadrian (A.D. 117–138) initiated a revival of Roman enthusiasm for all things Greek, and during the reigns of his successors, the Antonine emperors, the fashion for burial rather than cremation (which had previously been the custom) promoted the production of large numbers of expensively made sarcophagi, many of them decorated with scenes from Greek mythology. By commissioning such a coffin, some wealthy Roman, a senator perhaps, would demonstrate his familiarity with Greek religion, culture, and literature. Unlike many of the Greek myths represented on Roman sarcophagi, the ransoming of Hector is a highly appropriate subject for the decoration of a funeral monument: after a heroic life and death, the body is restored to its kin for the necessary rituals of mourning and burial.

—LB

The route by which this relief, which is in two fragments, came into Freud’s collection has been reconstructed by Dr. Alfred Bernhard-Walcher of the Vienna Kunsthistorisches Museum. See the letter from Dr. Bernhard-Walcher, working from notes of the late Fritz Eichler, former director of the Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna, to S. Neufeld, February 6, 1987, in the Freud Museum, London. Both fragments surfaced on the Rome antique market and, through several dealers’ hands, were brought to Vienna in the 1920s. The right-hand fragment was bought in 1930 by an unidentified woman, who must have given or sold it to Freud. The left-hand fragment was sold directly to Freud in 1930. On the left-hand fragment see C. Robert, Die Antiken Sarkophag-Reliefs (Berlin, 1890–1919), I, pt. 3, p. 551, no. 58 (i). On the third fragment (currently lost), see G. Koch, “Verschollene mythologische Sarkophage,” Archäologischer Anzeiger, 1976, p. 103, nos. 7, 8, and especially 6. For a discussion of the type of scene and references for the other extant fragments, see G. Koch and H. Sichtermann, Römische Sarkophage (Munich, 1982), p. 130 and n. 46.
UNGUENTARIUM

Roman, c. A.D. 150–250
Glass, h. 6¼ in. (15.5 cm)
3594

This free-blown glass perfume bottle varies in color from white to gray, with patches of iridescent blue and green. Its wide, flattened rim and slightly swelling mouth are set above a long, narrow neck, which flares out sharply into the wide, low body. The body is gracefully profiled; its underside is slightly concave.

This unguentarium was made in the eastern Mediterranean, possibly Cyprus.
—L.B.

For this type of bottle, see C. Isings, Roman Glass from Dated Finds (Groeningen, 1957), p. 98, form 82A; for similar examples, see J. Hayes, Roman and Pre-Roman Glass in the Royal Ontario Museum (Toronto, 1975), nos. 518H.
GRAPE FLASK

Roman, 3rd century A.D.
Glass, h. 5 ¼ in. (14.7 cm)
3550

This glass flask, which would have been used for perfume or oil, was made in a two-part mold with vertical seams. It is grayish green in color, with touches of bright iridescent green. It has a wide, flattened rim above a long neck, which rises from a collar set above the ovoid body; the underside of the flask is slightly concave. The surface of the body is decorated with an overall pattern of stylized "grapes," with a vine leaf set in the center top of each side. This flask was probably made in Syria or Palestine.
—LB

For similar examples, see J. Hayes, Roman and Pre-Roman Glass in the Royal Ontario Museum (Toronto, 1975), no. 91, or S. B. Matheson, Ancient Glass in the Yale University Art Gallery (New Haven, 1980), no. 279.
JAR

Roman, c. A.D. 50–150
Glas, h. 7 3/8 in. (19.5 cm)
4394

This beautifully shaped, round-bodied jar has a rim that is flattered on top and folded downward and outward. Of free-blow glass, green in color with brownish areas, it contains cremated human bones.

Jars of this shape are generally found in the western provinces of the Roman Empire, and it seems likely that they were manufactured in Italy, southern France, and Spain. They may have been used as storage jars in the house, but most of those found have contained cremations.

—LB

For the chronology, date, and find-places of similar jars, see C. Isings, *Roman Glass from Dated Finds* (Gröningen, 1957), pp. 86–87, form 67; for a similar example, see J. Hayes, *Roman and Pre-Roman Glass in the Royal Ontario Museum* (Toronto, 1975), no. 618, pl. 39 (from Vaison-la-Romaine, southern France).
BOTTLE

Roman, c. A.D. 100–150
Glass, h. 10 ¾ in. (26.2 cm)
3262

The body of this large bottle forms a straight-sided cylinder. It has a flat shoulder and slightly concave base. The neck is straight and vertical, and the rim was probably wide and flat. It is chiefly remarkable for its brilliant iridescent sheen; the underlying color is basically greenish gray, but it is streaked and swirled with mother-of-pearl, peacock blue and green, mauve, orange, pale blue, turquoise, gold, and red, all manifesting themselves in turn and in different combinations as the vessel is looked at under differing light.

This bottle was made in the eastern Mediterranean, possibly Cyprus.
—LB

The beauty of this bottle’s shape and color, and that of many other pieces in his collection, refutes Freud’s demurrals that he could not appreciate the formal qualities of art, but only its subject matter:

I may say at once that I am no connoisseur in art, but simply a layman. I have often observed that the subject-matter of works of art has a stronger attraction for me than their formal and technical qualities, though to the artist their value lies first and foremost in these latter. I am unable rightly to appreciate many of the methods used and the effects obtained in art. (SE, 13, p. 211)

—FM

For this shape, see J. Hayes, Roman and Pre-Roman Glass in the Royal Ontario Museum (Toronto, 1975), no. 209.
OIL LAMP

Roman, c. A.D. 40–80
Terracotta, ¾ x 4 ½ x 3 ½ in. (2.2 x 10.3 x 7.9 cm)
4238

Erotic scenes, both heterosexual and homosexual, are commonly found on lamps in the Roman period. On the discus of this lamp is a relief of a pair of lovers on a couch. The man lies on his back with his head on a cushion, while the woman sits on top of him facing right with her hand on her hip. Both are naked, except for the crumpled drapery covering the man’s right leg.

The clay is light brown, with a darker, unevenly applied brown slip. The lamp was made in two molds and joined at the shoulder. The nozzle, decorated with volutes, is rounded at the tip. The rounded shoulder is separated from the discus by three incised lines.

—LB

This intaglio is probably ancient and bears a pastoral scene of a shepherd with two goats lying in the shade of a tree, one on a pile of rocks. Such pastoral scenes are common on the engraved gems that most well-to-do Romans carried and used as seals; the subject probably appealed both to those who actually lived and worked in the country, and to those city-dwellers who liked to romanticize the joys of country life, the “caves and living lakes, sweet sleep below the tree” idealized by such poems as Virgil’s Georgics.

— LB

Freud’s practice of giving intaglio stones, which were set in rings, to his closest colleagues began in 1912, with the formation of the “Committee,” a group that included Freud, Karl Abraham, Sándor Ferenczi, Ernest Jones, Otto Rank, and Hanns Sachs; in 1919 Max Eitingon was added. The group rallied to support Freud and the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis in the face of defections by early followers, such as Adler and Jung, and criticism from outside the field. The idea of the support group, with the intriguing overtones of a secret society, was presented to Freud in a letter written by Ernest Jones. Freud responded:

What took hold of my imagination immediately is your idea of a secret council composed of the best and most trustworthy among our men to take care of the further developments of psychoanalysis and defend the cause against personalities and accidents when I am no more.... I know there is a boyish and perhaps romantic element too in this conception, but perhaps it could be adapted to meet the necessities of reality. (Freud to Jones, August 1, 1912)

The first meeting of the Committee occurred on May 25, 1913, and Freud celebrated the event by presenting each member with an ancient intaglio. Freud himself wore an intaglio ring engraved with a head of Jupiter.

In later years, after the original Committee had dissolved, Freud continued the spirit of this first presentation by giving intaglios to other supporters, including Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, Lou Andreas-Salomé, Ernst Simmel, and Arnold Zweig. The ring shown here was given to the German psychoanalyst Simmel in 1928. In a letter accompanying the gift Freud wrote:

Once upon a time these rings were a privilege and a mark distinguishing a group of men who were united in their devotion to psychoanalysis.... I renew the old custom with you.... Forms may pass away, but their meaning can survive them and seek to express themselves in other forms. So please don’t be disturbed by the fact that this ring signifies a regression to something that no longer exists, and wear it for many years as a memory of your cordially devoted Freud. (Freud to Simmel, November 11, 1928)

— FM

HEAD OF A BODHISATTVA

Chinese, Ming Dynasty, 15th–17th century
Cast iron, 9 1/2 x 6 5/8 x 5 1/4 in. (24.5 x 16.8 x 14.5 cm)
3151

This head probably comes from a standing figure of a Buddhist attendant, possibly a bodhisattva, a saintly and benevolent being who attends Buddha and, out of compassion, has chosen to forego nirvana until all others have attained it. The figure would have been placed in a Buddhist temple or monastery, possibly with another identical figure, the pair flanking a Buddha.

A serene expression adorns the bodhisattva’s relaxed face, with its downcast eyes and high nose. Typical of Buddhist figures, the head has long ears draped with ribbons or scarves. The hair is parted in the middle and falls in waves around the forehead, while at the back of the head, it is combed straight up. The bodhisattva wears a typical hat that resembles the shape of an Indian stupa, a shrine containing a fragment of Buddhist scripture or a holy relic. (The profile of the Chinese pagoda resembles the stupa because it developed from this Indian shrine.) Four rectangular holes around the base of the hat may be attachment points for an elaborate crown of pendants.

This head was cast hollow; the casting seams can be seen down the back of the head and at the sides under the ears.
—JP

For two similar cast-iron attendant figures, see Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Sculpture: The Avery Brundage Collection (San Francisco, 1974), p. 306.
HEAD OF A GUARDIAN FIGURE

Chinese, Ming Dynasty, 15th–17th century
Bronze, 6 3/4 x 5 7/8 x 6 3/8 in. (17 x 15 x 15.5 cm)

This guardian figure stares out at us with piercing eyes from beneath a knit and muscular brow. His teeth are bared; his face is framed with flamlike hair. Depicted in the style of the earlier Tang period, he has a single topknot and a three-pointed helmet ornament on his forehead. Evil spirits approaching the entrance to a sacred tomb or temple would be frightened away by this terrifying guardian.

This figure is possibly a durapala, a kind of Buddhist guardian always found in pairs protecting entrances. These Buddhist guardians are typically represented in a dramatic fashion, with fierce expressions, contorted limbs, and exaggerated musculature, in contrast to the calm, serene portrayals of Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

—JP

See Sotheby’s New York auction catalogue, March 16, 1984, lot 112, for a comparable example.
During the late seventh to early eighth century A.D., unglazed figures (míngqi) were placed in Chinese tombs to indicate the status and wealth of the deceased. Larger figures were formed in two-part molds, fired, and then covered in a whitish slip and overpainted with unfired polychrome colors. Bright and colorful figures of servants, officials, dancing girls, musicians, animals, grooms, and foreigners combined to present a picture of the cosmopolitan lifestyle of Sian, the Tang capital, at the time one of the most civilized and sophisticated cities in the world. Camels and horses were considered auspicious signs of material comfort, since they represented a connection with the Silk Route and all the luxuries and exotic goods that it implied.

Although this imposing terracotta figurine of a Bactrian two-humped camel is in the early Tang style of the early eighth century, and can be compared with an excavated piece dated A.D. 711 from the tomb of Yang Futing, it is in fact a modern forgery. During the 1920s and 1930s, many Tang tomb figures were dug up from the areas of the ancient Tang capitals of Sian and Loyang. They became very popular with Western residents in China and consequently were manufactured to meet an increasing demand. The chaotic political situation in the decades following the Chinese revolution of 1912 made it difficult to enforce checks on authenticity or export. Large numbers of these figures were produced and exported, to be bought by nonspecialist Western collectors such as Freud. An expert can tell this is a forgery by the applied paint, which flakes off easily and is an unconvincing imitation of the unfired colors of Tang figures.

—JP

On the piece excavated from the tomb of Yang Futing, see Kaogu, 1964, p. 6, pl. 1X, no. 3.
TABLE SCREEN

Chinese, Qing Dynasty, 19th century
Wood and jade; screen (without stand): 7 3/4 × 5 × 1 in.
(19.5 × 12.6 × 2.5 cm)
3001

This screen and its stand are carved from a reddish wood in an openwork decoration of leaf scrolls. The figure of a scholar carved in white jade is inset into the center of the screen.

Intended to create an atmosphere conducive to contemplation, such table screens found their place on the desk of a scholar, along with brush holders, ink stones, water droppers, brush rests, and other decorative objects associated with writing. Screens were carved with designs of trees, vines, and hillsides, encouraging the scholar to escape, in his thoughts, to an imaginary vista. Landscape screens had a connection with Daoism and the idea of transcending the realm of official duties for the simplicity of the natural world. The scholar's desk was often placed by a window looking over a traditional Chinese garden, which like the screens, reproduced the natural world in miniature form.

—JP

For examples of comparable table screens, see Sotheby's London auction catalogue, July 24, 1987, lots 240–49.
Jade has been carved in China from the Neolithic Period (fifth millennium to eighteenth century B.C.), and the Chinese have traditionally treasured jade even more than Westerners have valued gold. The carving of jade is a slow and difficult process requiring even harder abrasives, such as quartz sand or crushed garnet. Originally reserved for ritual objects, jade came to be used for decorative items, especially those that adorned a scholar's desk, such as this green jade lion paperweight.

In Chinese depictions of lions, the male usually plays with a ball and the female fondles a lion cub. This paperweight is unusual in that the lion combines both male and female characteristics; the semirecumbent lion has a ball with tassels in its mouth and plays with four cubs, which climb over it.

Lions are not native to China but came from India as part of the iconographic vocabulary introduced with Buddhism in the third century A.D. Early Chinese representations depict lions realistically as terrifying beasts. From the fifth century A.D. onward, fearsome guardian lions are found flanking the Buddha in carvings in cave temple complexes, such as Yungang in northern China.

In the Ming and Qing Dynasties (1368–1911), Buddhist lions had assumed a domesticated form, the so-called dogs of fo (fo = Buddhism). They are presented as frolicsome creatures wearing collars and bells, more pets than guardians, which may be why these lions came to be referred to as dogs; indeed, the Chinese especially bred the Pekingese dog to resemble these dogs of fo. Throughout the Ming and Qing Dynasties, large carved stone statues of these playful lions appeared in pairs outside houses, temples, and even outside the Forbidden City, the walled area in central Beijing containing the imperial palaces of the Chinese empire.

—JP
Japanese men in the Edo period wore a loose-fitting garment tied with a sash at the waist, and carried a variety of items hanging from the sash by a cord—tobacco pouches, pipes in cases, inro (seal cases), yatake (a writing brush and inkwell combination). The toggle at the end of the cord, which kept it from slipping, was called a netsuke. At first these toggles were probably simple objects such as a piece of wood (netsuke means root-fix), but gradually complicated carvings in ivory, wood, and lacquer were made.

This netsuke is in the shape of a shishi, the Japanese version of a Buddhist lion-dog and a favorite subject because of its association with the Chinese scholar. In this ivory shishi, the details of a raised bushy tail and a long curly mane down its back are brought out by staining. The ball in the shishi's mouth indicates that this is a male lion-dog and is a sign of the Edo craftsman's virtuosity; this loose piece of ivory was carved within the completed netsuke.

—JP

Plan of Troy, from Heinrich Schliemann's 1881 account of the discovery of Troy, *Ilios, Stadt und Land der Trojaner.*
A MIGHTY METAPHOR: THE ANALOGY OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Donald Kuspit

The archaeological metaphor, as it has been called, is pervasive in Freud's vision of psychoanalysis. The metaphor makes a prominent appearance in two major essays, the "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" (1905 [1901]), otherwise known as the Dora case, and "Constructions in Analysis" (1937), an important statement of psychoanalytic method. It thus effectively informs, and perhaps dominates, Freud's sense of psychoanalysis from the earliest days of its development to the end of his life. To understand the archaeological metaphor is to understand the thrust, if not the detail, of psychoanalytic thinking, its general orientation, if not its particular procedures and concepts. It is not simply a dramatic device to enliven and adorn the discourse of psychoanalysis—a way of disseminating and even popularizing its approach to the psyche—but the major instrument of its self-understanding.

In fact, the archaeological metaphor sustains its momentum in Freud's thought because of its contradictory connotations. Freud seems to have seriously thought of psychoanalysis as a kind of archaeology, in goal as well as method, although, as Philip Rieff has pointed out, their goals only partly coincide and in fact differ in a crucial way. At the least, Freud used archaeological language to structure his conception of the psyche, especially in the case of the topographical model. At the same time, his allusion to archaeology was probably a way of broadening the appeal of psychoanalysis, making it accessible to the nonmedical, if educated, public. The analogy of psychoanalysis to archaeology can even be understood as a theatrical pitch to the public at large—the unintellectual crowd. The analogy associated an unpopular, suspect enterprise with a popular, respectable one, for Heinrich Schliemann's discovery of Troy—his demonstration of the reality of its heroes, the facts that informed the legend—gave archaeology a special celebrity, an honored social place: it was an adventure that produced concrete results, a means of showing the truthfulness of literary fantasy. As Peter Gay has said, Freud "probably envied [Schliemann] more than any other" man, not only, I suspect, "because in discovering 'Priam's treasure' he had found true happiness" but because of Schliemann's social success. "There is happiness" not "only as fulfillment of a child's wish" but of an adult's ambition.

Freud's appeal to archaeology can be regarded as an effort to ingratiate psychoanalysis with society—to win its approval and trust, to gain an influential place in
it—and even to have some of the heroic quality associated with archaeology rub off on psychoanalysis. In Freud’s eyes, psychoanalysis, like archaeology, was a heroic investigation of legendary reality. Both uncover lost reality, ancient worlds that have become legendary with time. There were Atlantises sunken in the psyche as well as in the ocean. Freud directly compared the discoveries of psychoanalysis with those of archaeology: the primitive aspects of the psyche, at least in their gross features, resembled primitive worlds, and vice versa. Their dialectical reciprocity was greater than expected: just as archaeology reminded us of the continuing influence in our civilization of past modes of social organization and outlook (most noteworthy for Freud in religion), so psychoanalysis reminds us of the continuing influence on our intimate lives of primitive psychic forms of experience and points of view. Both deal with the unexpected presence and power of the past. Both are means of remembering it. Both tend to absolve the archaic. For Freud, archaeology and psychoanalysis announce the same fundamental paradox: each is a way of engaging and articulating what remains alive—in effect immortal—and continues to determine our humanness, yet seems dead and buried and lost forever, permanently forgotten. The past even seems forgettable, because antiquated or obsolete, maladaptive in the real world of the present, and thus trivial.

Freud probably shared Europe’s imperialist belief in its civilization’s relative superiority. In a sense, archaeology served this belief by presenting examples of “inferior” earlier civilizations. Of course, the content of this superiority and inferiority were not crystal clear; but what did seem unquestionable to Freud was that “inferiority” was attached to the infantile, while “superiority” meant being adult. Primitive, earlier civilizations were more childlike than adult, and as such only nominally describable as civilized.¹ For Freud, the ultimate sense of adulthood was conveyed by science, ⁴ which meant having the ego strength to sustain the reality principle: to not flinch in the face of reality, and to observe and analyze it rigorously, working at it conscientiously rather than fantasizing about—spontaneously overestimating—it, which is a way of loving it blindly. Freud, of course, came to doubt the “civilized” character of Europe, as well as the stability of adulthood, ⁵ but he apparently never gave up the notion of the childlikeness of early civilizations.

His thinking on this was essentially Comtean. Much as there was a cognitive development from religion through metaphysics to positivistic science, so there was a cumulative psychosocial development from the prehistoric through the ancient (partially historical) to the modern world. Just as in the one there was a clarification of the principles of thinking, so in the other there was an expansion of consciousness (and finally a growth of self-consciousness), inseparable from the willingness—which increased the ability—to remember. The progressive development of civilization also involves what in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud called, in discussing “the changed treatment of the same [Oedipus] material” in Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, “the secular advance of repression in the emotional life of mankind” (SE, 4, p. 164).
Part of childlikeness is the reluctance to face reality directly, an inability to sustain orientation to reality, to develop a scientific approach to it. The more ancient the civilization, the more it was inclined to mask and embroider facts with collective fantasy—to mythologize them. Sophocles did not (and probably could not) tell the story of a child's tangled relationship with its mother and father straightforwardly (it is unlikely that he even thought of studying the relationship in careful detail), but had to symbolize and bury it in a dramatic fable, giving its rough edges and obscure aspects narrative smoothness and clarity. He gave a generalization about life artistic substance rather than breaking it down to emotional and behavioral particulars.

Insofar as it is a social strategy, Freud's appeal to archaeology is no doubt a logical fallacy on the order of the appeal to authority, an attempt to prejudice people in psychoanalysis's favor by associating it with the special authority and appeal of archaeology, which seemed capable of extraordinary revelation. But the appeal to archaeological authority also suggestively communicates authoritative core distinctions in psychoanalysis: that between surface and depth, manifest and latent, adult and infantile, civilized and uncivilized, historic and prehistoric (or rather, the historic obscured by the partial amnesia of the legendary, the half-forgetfulness of the mythopoetic), fact and fantasy. These distinctions seem at once vertically (hierarchically) and horizontally structured. One term subordinates the other, but they are inextricably in conflict. Perhaps they are comparable to Hegel's master and slave. The one is superior to the other, yet neither exists without the other, but they achieve mutuality through essential conflict. Transcendence of conflict changes both, but Freud studies such positive transcendence—in contrast to the "negative transcendence" of repression—less than Hegel does. Thus, the terms of Freud's distinctions are value-tinged as well as descriptive. Freud studies the terms in their psychological necessity, but he sometimes seems to approve of what the higher one signifies, although he never forgets the ironical character of the relationship between "higher" and "lower." Freud explicated some distinctions more than others and sometimes seems to subsume all in one—the manifest/latent distinction is primary, and informs the sense of dream analysis as an archaeological enterprise—but he uses all of them to structure his discourse. Much of it is casually encoded in archaeological language.

In any case, the archaeological metaphor is as demystifying as it is mystifying: as much a way of suggesting psychoanalysis's power to reveal the plain truth hidden in the mysterious fiction as to idealize the facts so that they seem fabulous. For Freud, archaeology was as much a mode of enchantment, a romanticizing of inquiry and understanding, as a symbol of the patient, steady analytic work of uncovering and reconstructing the unremembered past. Archaeology was at once the model for early psychoanalysis and a way of mythologizing its import, not unrelated to Plato's use, in the last book of the Republic, of the myth of the underworld to communicate in a narrative, intuitive way a treacherous psychology that is otherwise difficult to comprehend and accept. One might better speak of the archaeological myth than of metaphor to convey both the comprehensiveness
of the archaeological idea in Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking and its various roles as intellectual buttress, protective fortification, and cosmetic camouflage for psychoanalytic theory. 8 Freud was taken with archaeology not only because of the unusual findings it promised, which psychoanalysis also promised, but because the psyche itself seemed archaeological in character, that is, a realm of relics and ruins.

As I have suggested, Freud never eliminated the archaeological metaphor. While it has been said that he never completely gave up any idea he had once accepted, but continued to use it suggestively as the occasion warranted, his attachment to the archaeological metaphor was especially intense, for it embodied the working assumptions of psychoanalysis, or more precisely, its basic attitude to the lifeworld: its scepticism. This becomes clear when we compare the early allusion to archaeology in the Dora case history, where Freud uncritically compares himself to an archaeologist—not simply correlating psychoanalysis and archaeology, but in effect declaring psychoanalysis to be a kind of archaeology—with the later allusion in “Constructions in Analysis” (SE, 23), where he sharply differentiates the two. Even as he worked his way through the analogy, freeing psychoanalysis from its dependence on archaeology, he continued to use it to propel himself into psychoanalytic conceptual space, and in a sense as the vindication of psychoanalysis.

Freud’s fixation on the archaeological metaphor and its practical persistence as a springboard, however much it came to be theoretically questionable, was not simply a bad conceptual habit of thinking, or worse yet, a linguistic tic or anatistic image, a sort of involuntary regression inhibiting the progressive clarification of psychoanalytic concepts, detrimental to the health of psychoanalysis, the way Freud’s habit of smoking cigars was detrimental to his health. The archaeological metaphor was not Freud’s fantasy formulation of psychoanalysis, his hallucination of the field, the crutch of its youthful self-consciousness, but was in fact emblematic of the psychoanalytic approach as such, indeed, an assertion of what seems most critical in it. For Freud, the archaeological orientation of psychoanalysis was inseparable from its deflationary power: its role as “a disturber of man’s narcissism,” 9 of his “naive self-love” and “megalomania” (SE, 16, pp. 284–85). Archaeology symbolizes psychoanalysis at its most debunking and revolutionary. For psychoanalysis, the life given in the clinical situation is not to be taken at face value but as a site of past life to be dug up in order to discover its true constitution. Psychoanalysis’s consistent refusal to accept the present as given leads straight to its sense of archaeological purpose. Moreover, the process of psycho-archaeological investigation is the beginning of the process of psychic change. For archaeological probing is in effect a preliminary act of intervention, affording preliminary insight. It is a kind of partial interpretation, or pre-interpretation, or propaedeutic broadly hinting at the need for change. It is the uncomfortable awakening necessary for sharp-eyed full consciousness. The act of uncovering the past necessarily brings the psychic present into question, promising transformation.
If nothing else, the archaeological metaphor signals psychoanalysis’s ironical attitude to everyday appearances. Psychoanalysis is a mode of doubt to the extent that it refuses to accept the face—the self-estimate—that people put on themselves. In refusing to let the world save face, as it were, psychoanalysis in effect undermines acceptance of the conventional surface of society or at least encourages reservations about everyday appearance. The shift from the naïve to the psychoanalytic attitude—from nonarchaeological (surface) awareness to archaeological (depth) awareness—it proposes is not unlike Husserl’s shift from the “natural” to the phenomenological attitude. The psychoanalytic and phenomenological attitudes are different versions of the same critical consciousness. Both are deliberate and fundamental changes of orientation—revolutionary reorientations—opening up the possibility of an unconventional, alternate vision of the lifeworld. Both position one to find new meanings in the lifeworld, to discover the unexpected ways one has invested meaning in it. Indeed, they teach one to expect it to have unexpected meaning, “opening one’s eyes” to the novelty of its reality.

In general, psychoanalysis’s postulation of archaeologically indirect meanings and its tendency to take everyday life as a psycho-archaeological text—its use of both “metaphor hermeneutics” and “text-world hermeneutics,” as Don Ihde calls them—makes it threatening and unsettling. Psychoanalysis is inseparable from the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” which is an archaeological hermeneutics, for it denies the seemingly self-evident and insists upon alternative meanings fraught with uncanny necessity. Archaeology is the perfect symbol of disruptive psychoanalytic suspicion, for all archaeological findings exist in a hermeneutic condition of uncertain meaning—no doubt encouraging speculative attribution of meaning, affording food for imaginative thought—which they never quite escape. The archaeological metaphor conveys psychoanalysis’s uncompromising curiosity and its interpretive propensity, which is why Freud never disclaimed it. It encapsulates the insistent questioning and questing consciousness inseparable from psychoanalytic understanding.

In the “Prefatory Remarks” to the Dora case Freud wrote:

In the face of the incompleteness of my analytic results, I had no choice but to follow the example of those discoverers whose good fortune it is to bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless though mutilated relics of antiquity. I have restored what is missing, taking the best models known to me from other analyses; but, like a conscientious archaeologist, I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic parts end and my constructions begin. (SE, 7, p. 12)

In “Constructions in Analysis,” after noting that “what we are in search of is a picture of the patient’s forgotten years that shall be alike trustworthy and in all essential respects complete” (SE, 23, p. 258), Freud states that this picture is, in effect:

[a product of the analytic] work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction, [which] resembles to a great extent an archaeologist’s
excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice. The two processes are in fact identical, except that the analyst works under better conditions and has more material at his command to assist him, since what he is dealing with is not something destroyed but something that is still alive—and perhaps for another reason as well. But just as the archaeologist builds up the walls of a building from the foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and position of the columns from depressions in the floor, and reconstructs the mural decorations and paintings from the remains found in the debris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his inferences from fragments of memories, from the associations and from the behaviour of the subject of the analysis. Both of them have an undisputed right to reconstruct by means of supplementing and combining the surviving remains. Both of them, moreover, are subject to many of the same difficulties and sources of error. One of the most ticklish problems that confronts the archaeologist is notoriously the determination of the relative age of his finds; and if an object makes its appearance in some particular level, it often remains to be decided whether it belongs to that level or whether it was carried down to that level owing to some subsequent disturbance. It is easy to imagine the corresponding doubts that arise in the case of analytic constructions.

The analyst, as we have said, works under more favourable conditions than the archaeologist since he has at his disposal material which can have no counterpart in excavations, such as the repetitions of reactions dating from infancy and all that is indicated by the transference in connection with these repetitions. But in addition to this, it must be borne in mind that the excavator is dealing with destroyed objects of which large and important portions have quite certainly been lost, by mechanical violence, by fire and by plundering. No amount of effort can result in their discovery and lead to their being united with the surviving remains. The one and only course open is that of reconstruction, which for this reason can often reach only a certain degree of probability. But it is different with the psychological object whose early history the analyst is seeking to recover. Here we are regularly met by a situation which with the archaeological object occurs only in such rare circumstances as those of Pompeii or of the tomb of Tutankhamun. All
of the essentials are preserved; even things that seem completely forgotten are present somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the subject. Indeed, it may, as we know, be doubted whether any psychical structure can really be the victim of total destruction. It depends only upon analytic technique whether we shall succeed in bringing what is concealed completely to light. There are only two other facts that weigh against the extraordinary advantage which is thus enjoyed by the work of analysis: namely, that psychical objects are incomparably more complicated than the excavator’s material ones and that we have insufficient knowledge of what we may expect to find, since their finer structure contains so much that is still mysterious. But our comparison between the two forms of work can go no further than this; for the main difference between them lies in the fact that for the archaeologist the reconstruction is the aim and end of his endeavours while for analysis the construction is only a preliminary labour. (SE, 23, pp. 259–60)

There is a crucial difference between these statements. In the one from the Dora case, the archaeologist and psychoanalyst are matter-of-factly equated. In the one from “Constructions in Analysis,” the psychoanalyst is given an important advantage over the archaeologist: the psychic structures the psychoanalyst uncovers are intact, none the worse for wear, while the physical structures the archaeologist uncovers are usually in irreparably poor condition. They can never be entirely reconstructed, while in a sense the psychoanalyst has nothing to construct or reconstruct: he has only to discover. The archaeologist is in a more impossible, or at least less secure, position than the psychoanalyst, who can, as it were, have the object of his psychological inquiry and analytically eat it too. There is something smugly triumphant in Freud’s assertion of psychoanalysis’s advantage over archaeology, as though at last he had reached a long-sought-for goal—his science finally besting the science with which it was most competitive (at least as much as with medicine). But is it true that psychical structures, while no doubt “incomparably more complicated” than the archaeologist’s material ones, are unequivocally preserved in all their essentials? Can they be separated from their fantasy coating? Are they not in some way as mutilated and eroded—destroyed by, lost to—fantasy as the archaeologist’s material structures are lost to
mechanical violence, fire, and plundering? Is fantasy not a kind of violence done to the psychical structure, a plundering of it? Can psychic fantasy ever really be fully separated from psychic fact?

In any case, for Freud the psychoanalyst's uncertainty comes from the subtlety of the psychic structure itself, while the archaeologist's uncertainty comes from the conditions under which he or she necessarily works. Archaeologists must learn to live with it—learn to live with ignorance, learn like Tantalus to live with the object of their intellectual desire permanently out of reach—but psychoanalysts can sooner or later see their objects whole and clear, and hold them fast. Freud privileges psychoanalysis with true knowledge: this is when it leaves archaeology behind.

Nonetheless, Freud repeatedly locates his psychoanalytic inquiry in an archaeological context: it seems indispensable. It finally seems to come apart, but only after it leads psychoanalysis, in the person of Freud, to self-understanding, self-clarification. Is this overestimating the importance and persuasive power of the archaeological context for Freud? Is it unreasonable to extend the archaeological metaphor to speak of the archaeological context of psychoanalysis? Do I dare dispute Freud's own sense of his use of analogy, as in his assertion that "analogies...are only intended to assist us in our attempt to make the complications of mental functioning intelligible by dissecting the function and assigning its different constituents to different component parts of the apparatus" (SE, 5, p. 536)? Is it the case that Freud prosaically realized, through clinical labor, that no psychical structure could be completely destroyed; that it survived intact through historical time, and then poetically stated this fact through the archaeological metaphor in order to persuade us of it? If it were only that simple. The question of what can or cannot survive burial, what is or is not recoverable, and in what state it is recovered, cannot be asked without archaeological awareness. It grows out of this awareness spontaneously; it is inseparable from archaeology. Every formulation of early psychoanalysis, whether technical or theoretical, implies archaeological awareness, because psychoanalysis at its inception was more or less an inquiry into memory.

On December 6, 1896, Freud wrote to Fliess:

[I am] working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come into being by a process of stratification: the material present in the form of memory-traces being subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances—to a re-transcription. Thus what is essentially new about my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times over, that it is laid down in various species of indications...I should like to emphasize the fact that the successive registrations represent the psychical achievement of successive epochs of life.11

Commenting on this statement, Ole Andkjaer Olsen and Simo Koppe remark:

Freud thus believed that the psychic apparatus was composed of separate memory systems whose spatial relationship corresponded to their temporal deposits, similar to the way archaeological findings and geological deposits
were older the deeper one dug. Freud did not determine how many systems
existed, but in time only two genuine memory systems remained: the
unconscious and the preconscious. The unconscious was the older of the
two systems.12

The archaeological metaphor is inseparable from Freud's sense of the importance of
memory in psychic disturbances and in the creation of psychic structures in
general. The house of psyche is not simply built on a foundation of memories, but
it is a mansion composed of many rooms of memory, each built at a different time
and often on the ruins of other memory-rooms, exactly the way Rome has been
built and rebuilt many times, with some of the past visibly surviving in the present
but most of it lost, as Freud tells us in another (and lovingly, almost extravagantly,
extended) archaeological metaphor in Civilization and Its Discontents (SE, 21, pp.
69–70). As Freud and Breuer emphasized in a famous statement in the Studies on
Hysteria: "Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences" (SE, 2, p. 7).

The archaeological metaphor, then, is inseparable from Freud's idea of the
stratified character of psychic structure, especially if far from exclusively evident
in The Interpretation of Dreams. Not only memories but the meanings of dreams
are stratified:

Dreams frequently seem to have more than one meaning. Not only, as our
examples have shown, may they include several wish-fulfillments one
alongside the other; but a succession of meanings or wish-fulfillments may
be superimposed on one another, the bottom one being the fulfillment of a
wish dating from earliest childhood. (SE, 4, p. 219)

In a footnote added in 1914, Freud not only notes "the fact that the meanings of
dreams are arranged in superimposed layers" but calls attention to Otto Rank's
study of "the fairly regular stratification of symbols in dreams provoked by pres-
sure of the bladder" (SE, 4, p. 219). Superimposition or stratification of dream
meanings and dream symbols follows the model of the process of stratification of
memories. Indeed, for Freud every dream meaning and dream symbol has a mem-
ory-trace at its core. Freud's conception of a process of stratification is basic to his
conception of development as well as the dream, which is archaeological in
import: "Every dream was linked in its manifest content with recent experiences
and in its latent content with the most ancient experiences" (SE, 4, p. 218).

Freud uses the terms "ancient" and "prehistoric" more or less interchangeably,
as in his allusion to his "prehistoric old nurse" reincarnated as a maid-servant in
one of his dreams (SE, 4, p. 248). Commenting on Gottfried Keller's use, in Der
Grüne Heinrich, of the Nausicaa story from Homer's Odyssey, Freud writes:

The deepest and eternal nature of man, upon whose evocation in his
hearers the poet is accustomed to rely, lies in those impulses of the mind
which have their roots in a childhood that has since become prehistoric.
Suppressed and forbidden wishes from childhood break through in the
dream. (SE, 4, p. 247)

Thus, psycho-archaeological excavation uncovers the ancient or prehistoric
memories of childhood, memories constituted by wishes—wishes in disguise. At its most fundamental, the psyche is constituted by ancient wishes: its foundation is a compacted structure of stratified wishes. Indeed, one can say that the columns of consciousness in the psyche stand in the foundational depressions made by the memory-traces of wishes. For Freud, the dream is an obvious archaeological site, a natural place to begin digging for wishes and the memory of wishes. It is a kind of tumulus—tumor?—of consciousness, a strange bulge announcing something hidden, buried within it. Dream analysis involves digging for and dissecting its tissue of memory-traces. For Freud, the dream was especially ripe for excavation—a site of consciousness begging for excavation—but as we know he regarded other, if less obvious, phenomena, such as parapraxes, as psycho-archaeological sites.

At one point Freud, describing the relationship of the component “agencies” or “systems” of “the mental apparatus” to one another, writes:

These systems may perhaps stand in a regular spatial relation to one another, in the same way in which the various systems of lenses in a telescope are arranged behind one another. Strictly speaking, there is no need for the hypothesis that the psychical systems are actually arranged in a spatial order. It would be sufficient if a fixed order were established by the fact that in a given psychical process the excitation passes through the system in a particular temporal sequence. (SE, 5, p. 537)

The archaeological metaphor, embodiment of the process of stratification, articulates spatial and temporal stratification simultaneously. It permits Freud to talk of the psyche in spatial and temporal terms, that is, as a structure and a process at once. Archaeologically speaking, they are in principle one and the same.

Apart from the primary usage of the archaeological metaphor to signal what is most fundamental in psychoanalytic thinking, from its developmental conception of the psyche to its understanding of dreams, Freud makes numerous references to archaeological matters. Perhaps the most important one is his mention of Johann Winckelmann, the founder of classical archaeology (SE, 5, p. 196). Winckelmann’s decision to visit Rome changed his life; Freud alludes to him in the course of his analysis of a number of dreams expressing his own wish to visit Rome. Rome, of course, is a living archaeological site, a space of major stratification in which many ancient memories are materially preserved in fragments. Freud’s comparison of the psyche to Rome in Civilization and Its Discontents, illustrative of the “general problem of preservation in the mind,” has already been noted. Gay links the analogy to Freud’s obsessive collecting of antiquities, part of his general “addictive partiality for the prehistoric... second in intensity only to his nicotine addiction.” For Freud they literally were preserved pieces of the mind, petrified parts of the psyche. Surrounding himself with them, he symbolically immersed himself in the psyche.

In describing a dream of his mother being carried, as though dead, by “people with birds’ beaks,” Freud remarks, “The strangely draped and unnaturally tall figures with birds’ beaks were derived from the illustrations to Phillipson’s Bible. I fancy that they must have been gods with falcons’ heads from an ancient Egyp
tian funerary relief” (SE, 5, p. 583). The birds' beaks, of course, remind us of the dream which Freud made so much of in his study of Leonardo da Vinci. Another archaeological occurrence in a dream, the appearance of “an Etruscan cinerary urn,” out of which his wife was giving him a drink of water (SE, 4, p. 124), also suggests the evocative power of the archaeological metaphor, especially its implication of death, more precisely, its connection with the dead, or rather, the ghosts of unconscious wishes. Archaeology is, after all, a search for the remains of the dead and a demonstration of how uncannily alive they still are. Indeed, death is the primary meaning associated with archaeology, as the Italian Futurist painter Umberto Boccioni indicates when, in desperate pursuit of new stylistic life—a new future for art—he shouts, in contempt of traditional artists obsessed with old narratives and old modes of representation, “Out with you, archaeologists infected with chronic necrophilia!” Was Freud a chronic necrophiliac? Certainly the psyche is, retentive as it is of dead but emotionally immortal objects. It sometimes seems like nothing but a cemetery in which it is not clear how many bodies are buried, nor how many of them have been truly laid to rest.

Archaeological associations and associations to antiquity, which are inseparable for Freud, are generally connected with parental figures—imagos—by him. In explaining his funerary dream, Freud remarks that “the introduction of the cinerary urn was probably yet another wish-fulfillment. I was sorry that the vase was no longer in my possession.” (He had given it away.) In fact, the telling detail is that the water “tasted so salty (evidently because of the ashes in the urn).” Did the dream recall a childhood memory of his mother giving him a drink of water when he awoke in the middle of the night? Did the salt water represent the tears he shed at not being able to sleep with her? Did he wish her dead to distance himself from her—to deny the wish to sleep with her? Were these the tears of his unhappiness? Or was it water of life made undrinkable by the presence of death in it? Did the simple salt water encapsulate the struggle between the life and death forces? No doubt this is all too speculative, but so is a dream. Even the most innocuous-looking dream has uncanny permutations. As Freud himself noted, its implications spread endlessly; it leads us down unexpected paths, paths we didn’t
even know existed in the psyche. We hold to the thread of psycho-archaeology to find our way through this labyrinth of meaning.

Perhaps the most telling of Freud's archaeological associations are those which directly evoke classical antiquity in support of his ideas. Indeed, analogy for him is a security prop, and the association of psychoanalysis with classical antiquity was an especially secure staff for it to lean on. Sometimes one thinks of Freud, for all his fluency, as a stuttering Moses—his style in fact has the quirkiness of parole rather than the solemnity of langue—who had to rely on classical antiquity as an Aaron who would give him a silvery tongue, who would honeycoat his aggressive scientific intentions. Thus, he compares indestructible unconscious wishes to "the ghosts in the underworld of the Odyssey—ghosts which awoke to new life as soon as they tasted blood" (SE, 5, p. 553). They form the "store of infantile memories" that are "a sine qua non of repression" (SE, 5, p. 604). The famous line (SE, 5, p. 608) from Virgil's Aeneid (VII.312)—"Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo" (If I cannot bend the Higher Powers, I will move the Infernal Regions)—wittily summarizes the archaeological intentionality of Freud's psychoanalysis. Just as Freud's eldest son, when he was eight years old, was excited by "the legends of Greece" (SE, 4, p. 129), so Freud was excited by them, throughout his whole life.

Jung testified to the importance of the archaeological metaphor in Freud's thinking when he appropriated it to begin his own Psychology of the Unconscious. There he compares the universal "Incest Fantasy... the essential root of that powerful ancient dramatic material, the Oedipus legend," which "Freud calls to mind" as the basis of "individual psychologic conflict," with

the impression made by... that wholly peculiar feeling which arises in us if, for example, in the noise and tumult of a modern street we should come across an ancient relic—the Corinthian capital of a walled-in column, or a fragment of inscription. Just a moment ago we were given over to the noisy ephemeral life of the present, when something very far away and strange appears to us, which turns our attention to things of another order; a glimpse away from the incoherent multiplicity of the present to a higher coherence in history. 15

The archaeological metaphor also has great explanatory power for Jung. It points the way to an understanding of the psyche. He yearns for it to be true:

It would be significant enough if only the far-reaching analogy between the psychologic structure of the historical relics and the structure of the recent individual psychologic products alone were demonstrated. (p. 6)

As with Freud, for Jung psychoanalysis involves a necessary excavation of the archaic strata of the psyche, which are as much collective as individual for him, as they ultimately are for Freud. Archaeology signifies the convergence of collective and individual psychology, and of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic in the psyche:
Through buried strata of the individual soul we come indirectly into possession of the living mind of the ancient culture, and, just precisely through that, do we win that stable point of view outside our own culture, from which, for the first time, an objective understanding of their mechanisms would be possible. (p. 5)

For Jung analogy is an intimation, even anticipation, of a truth. Analogical thinking is a kind of “dream or phantasy thinking” (p. 22), which he believes, in agreement with Freud, is pervasive among “ancient people” (p. 25). It is at the root of myth formation, which sharply differentiates it from “directed thinking” (p. 30)—scientific thinking. There is little to separate Jung and Freud, at least at this stage in their thinking (1914), in their attitude to archaeology and antiquity. While Jung tends to reify the archaic as primary meaning, Freud tends to qualify it as primary wish. Neither denies that it is primary memory. Neither denies its universality and primordiality, nor their fascination with it and the antiquity that represents it.

It is in the name of genuine scientific thinking that Donald P. Spence attacks the archaeological metaphor. It derives, he claims, from Freud’s sense of “the ambiguity of everyday life, the fact that things are almost never what they seem, that surface is always deceptive, and that true understanding must always go beneath the surface.” That is, the archaeological metaphor is a sign of the hermeneutics of suspicion. Spence says:

We may be overly impressed by the metaphor of going below the surface. To the extent that the unconscious is “deeper” and to the extent that a dynamic explanation invokes “depth” psychology, we may fool ourselves into thinking that we have made contact with more fundamental issues and have come closer to the “true” explanation. (p. 31)

In other words, the archaeological metaphor leads down a primrose path of false explanation (and expectation) to a dead end. For Spence the archaeological metaphor is inseparable from the notion of depth; to eliminate one is to undermine the other. Like other postmodernist psychoanalytic thinkers eager to make psychoanalysis operational in linguistic terms, Spence vigorously applies Occam’s razor to Freud’s preconception of depth. Spence’s basic point seems to be that an analogy is not an explanation, and that depth is a hypothesis not justified by surface appearances. The archaeological metaphor is likely to be self-deceptive: it creates the illusion that one can understand visible, concrete phenomena by regarding them as indicators of an abstract, invisible—numinous—depth, where the truth really exists. The archaeological metaphor is more speculative than analytic in import.

Noting “the enormous appeal of the archaeological metaphor in all branches of psychoanalytic work” (p. 76), Spence accepts the view of it as “one of Freud’s master plots” (Brooks), “one of [Freud’s] more convincing story lines” (Schafer) (p. 78). He categorically states “that there are no clinical specimens which convincingly support the archaeological metaphor” (pp. 78–79):
Clinical vignettes which seem to support the archaeological metaphor... are not true data for at least two reasons: With only a few exceptions—and the exceptions are usually the more trivial observations—the so-called data are significantly incomplete—anecdotal rather than archival; even if reasonably complete, they tend to be either theory-laden or context-laden. What is more, we have no grammar of early development, no clearly defined system by which early experience is transformed into later behavior.

Finally, Spence remarks:

The belief in an archaeology of the mind or of the session carries with it the idea that the pieces of the past remain intact and can be recovered unchanged. [As Freud asserted in the citation from “Constructions in Analysis”—D.K.] The metaphor encourages us to look for tracings of the past, variously disguised but somehow recoverable, which could be used to validate the theory—both within the patient and within the session. But such a belief entails a kind of positivism which simply does not apply to the clinical material. The search for historical truth fails once we realize that the observer is always part of what is observed. The search for data within the session to confirm this or that interpretation also rests on the assumptions that the clinical material exists independently of the observer, and that what was compelling or transparent for him will necessarily be the same for an outside judge. (pp. 111–12)

In fact, it is not archaeology but Freudian psychoanalysis that claims to be able to recover historical truth, as Freud himself acknowledged. Archaeology is much more tentative; also, it is much more hermeneutically sophisticated: it recognizes that without their meaning, the historical objects it recovers are incomplete. The objects exist relative to their meanings, not in themselves—not in their simple materiality. To put it another way, the historical truth is not simply a matter of memories, but the meanings these memories have for those who have them, and the meaning the remembered experiences had when they occurred.

Moreover, archaeology recognizes that the recovery of meaning is fraught with problems: it is possible to know the letter of the meaning, but not its spirit; the recovered meanings are rarely straightforward, especially the socially more complex ones; and we can never know what it was like to live these meanings, for they are no longer ours. Freud refuses the partial ignorance and epistemological problems that archaeology accepts as its lot. In his enthusiasm and self-belief, his trust in his own powers of mastery, he sees inarticulateness, uncertainty, and unconsciousness at the beginning of the psychoanalytic process, and articulateness, certainty, and consciousness at its end. For him archaeology signals not only the will to make what is unconscious conscious, and thus bring it under control, but the success of the effort, whatever its difficulty. For him, the psycho-archaeologically discovered truth frees one of superstition about the unconscious past. A believer in enlightenment, Freud never quite realized its equivocal character. Like a good Cartesian, he thinks he can be uncompromisingly clear and distinct. Finally, in Spence’s words, he believes he can be a detached “outside judge” and
participant-observer at once, disentangling the roles of theorist and technician. From Spence's point of view, this is no doubt exceptional grandiosity.

What Spence finally seems to want to do is to collapse the surface/depth, present/past, manifest/latent distinctions implicit in the archaeological metaphor. They predetermine the reading of the psychological data, in effect absolutizing one reading. This reflexes and dogmatizes psychoanalysis. Spence wants to recreate it as an open discourse rather than as a statement of absolute phenomena. He also wants it to be much more than a reconstruction and reliving of the past:

In arguing for an accumulation of commentaries rather than the excavation of a session (or a person's mind), we are saying goodbye to the archaeological metaphor and substituting something much closer to an open conversation. We are suggesting that wisdom does not emerge by searching for historical truth, continually frustrated... by a lack of clear specimens and context-free data; rather, wisdom emerges from the gradual accumulation of differing readings of the same situation and the accumulating overlay of new contexts. Notice how the metaphor has changed. No meaning attaches to any one piece which is buried in the past, in the unconscious, or in the clinician's incomplete records; no excavation is necessary. Instead, the meanings are constantly in flux, seen each time against a different context which provides a change of emphasis; figure and ground are constantly in motion. (p. 180)

What Spence should say is that the meanings are constantly in flux because they exist in the present, and imply a future, whatever their relation to the past. In any case, Spence's "new brand of tough-minded hermeneutics," which "assumes that not everything has a pattern, or more specifically, it assumes that no pattern exists until it is discovered," a "null position" which he equates with the "null hypothesis in statistics" (pp. 210-11), is commensurate with archaeological thinking, which, as I have suggested, accepts tentativeness and readiness to recontextualize—reconceive—its data. Spence, I believe, is attacking archaeologist, which knows in advance the patterns it will find, or at least is on the lookout for certain patterns, which it tends to find everywhere and overgeneralize.

Should we, then, with Spence, say goodbye to the archaeological metaphor? Certainly he convinces us that we must say goodbye to the archaeologicist metaphor. But the archaeological metaphor can continue to have value, provided it is reconceived. I began to do so when I compared the psychoanalytic attitude with the phenomenological attitude, arguing that the archaeological attitude had the same critical import as they did. If the psychoanalytic attitude is an époche reduction—positioning us to conceive phenomena as intelligible and meaningful in psychological terms, then the archaeological attitude is a reduction within the psychoanalytic reduction: an époche positioning us to conceive psychological data as intelligible and meaningful specifically in terms of the past. (To convert phenomena to data means to qualify them in terms of some cognitive task.) That is, the archaeological reduction posits that the data reference the past; more specifically, it interprets or makes the data intelligible as signifiers of past meanings
(not literal past experiences). To put this another way, where the psychoanalytic attitude reduces phenomena to psychological intelligibility and meaningfulness, the archaeological attitude reduces the psychoanalytically available data to mnemonic intelligibility and meaningfulness. That the archaeologized data will eventually be discovered to constitute a circular system of signifiers called "the past" is secondary to the archaeological reduction itself, which can be conceived as a necessary epistemological fiction.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus archaeology is not simply a means to end amnesia, but an assertion that there is none: the past lives all around us, it is sedimented in the present, we are surrounded by it, but in the symbolic form of memory; more precisely, we unwittingly live memories. The larger point of the archaeological attitude is that we must decode the present to reveal it as the memorable, lived past. The past exists in suspended form in the present; archaeology precipitates it out of the solution of presentness and shows why certain things are experienced as having more presence than others. Archaeology suggests that the present is precious, tilting us toward the past from which it emerges.

Within the archaeological attitude, progressive and regressive tendencies must be sharply differentiated. In a sense, Spence does this for us when he distinguishes between psychoanalysis as a "hermeneutic adventure" and as "a staid, pseudoscientific account" (p. 151). He advocates the former and opposes the latter. The adventure, with its implication that "the context of discovery will very likely have the appearance of a disconnected series of insights, strung together by time" (p. 153), is progressive in import. The account, with its preconception of the psychoanalytic goal to be reached—the discovery of "the hidden message," as Spence says—and the method of reaching it—recovery of the historical past (usually conceived in an all too unsubtle, one-dimensional way)—is regressive. For Spence, the crucial difference between the adventure and the account is that the latter does not take into consideration the psychoanalyst's self-awareness. Spence means something more than awareness of countertransference. He quotes with approval Gray's idea "that perhaps the most important element in the study of technique lies in identifying, in more than usual detail, the manner or choice of the analyst's forms of attention during the course of the analysis" (the first italics are Spence's; p. 151) and Gray's call for knowledge "of those functions of the ego that potentially enable it to observe itself" (p. 152).

The progressive psychoanalyst would be the self-observant one, aware of his or her archaeological attitude and its effect on interpretation—the character of the insight offered. The regressive psychoanalyst is not aware of his or her archaeological attitude, or rather, takes it for granted as the natural psychoanalytic attitude, not realizing that it is simply one form of psychoanalytic attention. To be aware of one's form of attention is to be potentially able to change it, as the need arises. There is no reason why psychoanalysis should not be an archaeology of the present and the future, able to move freely between past, present, and future as intersecting objects of inquiry, converging in the patient's life. The psychoanalyst should be prepared to archaeologically dig into the patient's life as it is temporally presented and uncover the meanings implicit in the presentation.
(Presentation is always temporally grounded, which is another implication of the archaeological metaphor.) Temporal presentation may be as much in terms of worry about the future as about disturbance by the past (or present). Patients may suffer from anticipations as well as reminiscences. They may experience a loss of possibility as well as be overwhelmed by actuality. Perhaps psychoanalysis’s most important task is to defend against meaninglessness and lack of intelligibility, by discovering the meanings of the patient’s past, present, and future, thus making them intelligible. The archaeological attitude implies the general meaningfulness and intelligibility of temporal events, however uncertain we may be about particular meanings and however equivocal intelligibility always is. What is at stake in the archaeological metaphor is not historical truth, as Spence thinks, and as Freud did, but the intelligibility and meaningfulness of history.

Spence implies that the form of attention, and the psychoanalyst’s attention to his or her forms of attention, seriously condition the field of discovery. The archaeological reduction is a form of attention that gives discovered data the form of the past, that is, conceives it as a disguised or surrogate past. If the psychoanalyst is unaware of operating with an archaeological form of attention, he or she is likely to foreclose on the field of discovery, that is, not find any further implications or meanings in the discovered data. Spence is arguing in effect that there is more than one way of making the field of discovery intelligible. Indeed, I would argue that no way has priority over any other, except in terms of a specific therapeutic task. However, I would also argue that archaeological attention to the past—which, as I have suggested, is not the only form of archaeological attention—is one possible way of making the field of discovery intelligible and the discovered data meaningful. Intelligibility and meaningfulness are achieved by regarding the field of discovery as the scene of memory. One therapeutic task is to remember; perhaps not the first task, as Freud seemed to think, but certainly one possible if not absolutely necessary task, and one rarely carried out completely. Indeed, it is probably impossible to do so.

"To remember," Merleau-Ponty writes, "is not to bring into the focus of consciousness a self-subsistent picture of the past; it is to thrust deeply into the horizon of the past and take apart step by step the interlocking perspectives until the experiences which it epitomizes are as if relived in their temporal setting."¹⁹ Freud certainly seemed to advocate this reliving, but perhaps his error was to think it possible to create a self-subsistent picture of the past. That is, his error was to have a foundationalist sense of the past that was not necessary to his edifying therapeutic—reeducative—purpose.²⁰ However, he is probably correct in thinking that some sense of the past is necessary for any and every therapeutic task to be successful, since such a task invariably implies a reevaluation of the present and the projection of a new future: the existential realization of a new sense of possibility and choice in life.

Indeed, Freud was right in thinking that past meanings—past forms of intelligibility—spontaneously emerge in the course of the psychoanalytic process: recognition of the past is inseparable from it. This is why it can be called a psycho-archaeological process. In a sense, in the very act of showing us that the
past is still alive, archaeology makes clear that it is unmistakably past; pastness is not presentness, and the influence of the past on the future can be restricted. Perhaps the true import of the archaeological metaphor is not the theory of the process of stratification of memories, but Freud’s assertion that when the past is spontaneously relived, the psychoanalyst must grab it fast and discover what kind of life it is. Failure to do so means that the psychoanalyst is not properly reflective, and thus not properly responsible to the patient, who must be made reflective in order to change his or her life. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “Reflection is truly reflection only if it is not carried outside itself, only if it knows itself as reflection-on-an-unreflective-experience, and consequently as a change in the structure of our existence.” 21 The psychoanalyst must participate in the patient’s past with his or her reflections on (interpretations of) it, in order to generate the patient’s reflection. The psychoanalyst must become a truly participant observer; must catalyze the patient’s own psycho-archaeological awareness. If the psychoanalyst does not relive the past with the patient and does not offer reflection on it—reflecting as if inside the patient rather than as an “outside judge,” to recall Spence’s term—“it would be just as though, after summoning up a spirit from the underworld by cunning spells, one were to send him down again without having asked him a single question” (SE, 12, p. 164).

Freud used his antiquities to summon up the spirits of his own underworld and to reflect on them, to question them about himself. They were, in effect, inside him: instruments of self-analysis. They were transference objects, in which he could read his own prehistory. They also reminded him of the inescapability and pull of the collective past, that is, of the fact that we all exist, phenomenologically speaking, in already sedimented life.

NOTES
1. Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 45. Rieff writes: “To have a repressed past is to be sick of it, to be healthy is to live more fully in the present. It is in this sense that analytic effort differs from the labors of the archaeologist, to which it is often compared. The archaeologist is neither for nor against what he digs up, but the analyst is necessarily arrayed against the patient’s past, since he sees it as an incubus on the present.”


3. A good example of this belief is Freud’s assertion, at the beginning of Totem and Taboo: Prehistoric man, in the various stages of his development, is known to us through the inanimate monuments and implements which he has left behind; through the information about his art, his religion and his attitude towards life which has come down to us either directly or by way of tradition handed down in legends, myths and fairy tales, and through the relics of his mode of thought which survive in our own manners and customs. But apart from this, in a certain sense he is still our contemporary. There are men still living who, as we believe, stand very near to primitive man, far nearer than we do, and whom we therefore regard as his direct heirs and representatives. Such is our view of those whom we describe as savages or half-savages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest for us if we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own development. (SE, 13, p. 1)

4. This is, I think, apparent from “The Question of a Weltanschauung,” the final lecture in the New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (SE, 22).

5. “Why War?” (1932) testifies to the one and “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937) testifies to the other. In a sense, the one is about the failure of civilization to lead to self-control, and the other about the failure of psychoanalysis to lead to it. In the former Freud notes that “the attempt to replace actual force by the force of ideas seems at present doomed to failure” (SE, 22, p.
208). In the latter, which also deals with "the instinct of destruction," Freud remarks that "even to exert a psychical influence upon a simple case of masochism is a severe strain on our powers" (SE, 23, p. 243).

6. Sarah Kofman writes in The Childhood of Art, An Interpretation of Freud's Aesthetics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 30: "The grammar and logic of dreams are not those of consciousness, which, as Derrida has shown, are linked to the logos and the phant". The logic of dreams is arch-eo-logic that makes use of primary processes that govern the unconscious system.

7. For a discussion of Plato's use of myth, see Paul Friedländer. Plato (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), chap. 9. Friedländer's remark (p. 210) that "Plato escapes the danger of a metaphysical dogmatism, just as the artistic form of the dialogue avoids the fixity of the written word, and irony the danger of dogmatic seriousness" seems particularly to the point of Freud's avoidance of psychological dogmatism, scriptural fixity (among other things, his use of analogy counteracts it, as does his dialogic tendencies, most in evidence in The Problem of Lay Analysis) and a seriousness which presumes to know all the problems and have all the answers, which some have claimed for him.


15. C. G. Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1944), p. 3. Subsequent references to this work appear in the text.


17. For a discussion of the epoche or phenomenological reduction, see my article "Parmenidean Tendencies in the Epoche," Review of Metaphysics 18 (June 1965), 739–70.

18. For a discussion of necessary fiction, see my article "Fiction and Phenomenology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (Sept. 1968), 16–33.


20. I am using Richard Rorty's distinction between foundational and "edifying" philosophies. The latter involves the "project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking," and may include moral and educative concerns as well as "the hermeneutic activity of making connections ... between our own discipline and another which seems to pursue in commensurable aims"; in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 360. This implies horizontalization, or "that there are no privileged language games, no disciplines, no privileged activities" (Ihde, Consequences, pp. 185–86, as in n. 10).

Sigmund Freud at his desk, etching by Max Pollack, 1914.
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE LEGACIES OF ANTIQUITY

ELLEN HANDLER SPITZ

But what if both of us have strayed on to a wrong path? . . . What if we have shared the fate of so many interpreters who have thought they saw quite clearly things which the artist did not intend either consciously or unconsciously?
—Sigmund Freud, 1914

The scrim through which each era stages and views its past inevitably wear and fade. They must be patched, repainted, and rehung. Taking Freud's collection of antiquities as emblematic of a first staging of what may be viewed as an ongoing drama between the ancient world and psychoanalysis, this interpretive essay has two aims. First it attempts to show that, symbolically, Freud's choice of ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman cultures constituted, for him, a conflicted legacy in which feelings about his Judaic birth and heritage were deeply implicated. Second, it seeks to demonstrate that antiquity, as represented by this group of objects, continues to count as a major and underexplored legacy for contemporary psychoanalysis and the other mental health professions. Recent contributions to classical scholarship have suggested interpretive possibilities that supplement those of Freud and reopen the rich treasure trove of antiquity for fascinating new borrowings by present-day explorers of the psyche.

Unlike symptoms, which, it is hoped, succumb to the power of good interpretation, great myths thrive on rereadings and thereby gain an added significance and longevity. Moreover, to critique old ties or urge the forging of new bonds between psychoanalysis and antiquity is but to follow a deep and turbulent current in Freud's ever-changing thought. To reinterpret the cultures of antiquity and rethink their relevance for modern clinical practice is to support Freud's belief, as attested by his classical collection, that antiquity provides an inexhaustible well of understanding vis-à-vis the human condition.

Freud's cherished antiquities reflect his profound indebtedness to a past that inspired him to make dazzling theoretical and interpretive leaps. Gazing at the assembled objects, we are moved to reflect on the curious fact that this Viennese neurologist, man of medicine and science, so clearly wished to be thus indebted and to elect his antecedents in the realms of mythology, art, and literature. We
may interpret this desired legacy as symbolizing for him perhaps a permanence, an authority, an acceptability, a wreath of ancient glory and legitimization in the face of an initial and ongoing spurning of his intellectual enterprises. Such speculation is irresistible to wanderers in the maze of Freud’s voluminous writings and encircling scholarship. Both his oeuvre and the collection of antiquities betray the tangled skeins of signification and emotion by means of which life and work are, as he himself taught, inextricably knotted.

Each part of this essay takes a specific object in the collection as a starting point. First, with the statue of Amon-Re from Freud’s desktop in mind, I shall address some of the complexities and ambiguities latent in Freud’s desire for an ancient legacy. Second, turning to a small terracotta piece that might easily escape notice, a head of Demeter, I shall argue that certain ancient myths and practices, passed over by Freud, might nevertheless serve as fertile ground for the expansion of metaphor and meaning in present-day analytic work. I shall probe one such myth, illustrated by this piece, in some depth, but clearly the scope of such an endeavor must be partial and fragmentary. Its modest aim is to provide a background for contemplating the collection and an impetus to further study.

Central to the theme of the collection is the powerful awareness forced on its viewers that Freud, ever seeking clues to the riddles of psychic life, chose to peer into the murky reservoirs of ancient mythology and art. In so doing, he marked out a direction and a territory that mental health professionals today, intent on gazing into the sterilized test tubes of the laboratory or examining orderly tabulations of statistical data, have tended increasingly to ignore. To these modern explorers of the mind, preoccupied with information systems, data processing, quantification, and so-called hard facts, Freud’s forays, his retrospection and borrowings from past cultures, may seem merely quaint. Yet, as we gaze at his antique objects and conjure the cluttered study that housed them, we cannot fail to acknowledge the indelible impact upon us of his fascination with all this—at the impact of his deeply mythical cast of mind and his relentless pursuit of fantasy, dream, and desire.

Despite an interest in antiquity that originated in his childhood, Freud began actively collecting antiquities only after his father’s death and during the period of his self-analysis; from that point, however, he continued to do so avidly throughout his lifetime. Intimately present in his visual field on a daily basis and physically proximate, close enough to touch, these objects—statuettes, busts, vases, reliefs, tablets, receptacles—ever growing in number, formed, in the company of books and pictures, a thickly textured stage-set against which his patients’ narratives and his interpretations of them were played out. Seated in his consulting room, listening hour by hour, penning the theories that were to transform our self-understanding, Freud shared physical space and visual field with these carved, limned, and modeled objects; he worked, as it were, under their gaze.

A naive project, therefore, might be to plot manifest relations between them and the Freudian texts—direct references to myths illustrated by specific antiquities. No overall pattern emerges, however, since many pieces cannot be directly
tied to written allusions. Yet, despite a dearth of superficial one-to-one correspondence, it is clear that deep currents bind the artifacts to the written texts. Adapting J. W. N. Sullivan's sensitive account of the genius of Beethoven, we can regard Freud's passion for antiquity as a theme with a life of its own that combined with other elements to form ever more complex synthetic wholes in the unfolding of his life's work. Or, if this seems excessively poetic, we might invoke a highly original insight of Didier Anzieu and apply it to the collection.

In a discussion of Freud's so-called Rome dreams (reported in chapter 5, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE. 4, pp. 193–98),7 Anzieu begins with the supposition that Freud began to collect antiquities the summer before having these particular dreams. He suggests an interpretation of Freud's method of working that, I propose, sheds light on the way he "worked" with his collection, or, more precisely, on the way his collection may have "worked on" him.8

On the basis of the vivid imagery in the Rome dreams, Anzieu speculates that Freud's genius was capable of moving directly from vision to writing. Freud's creativity, he claims, was predicated on a hypercathexis of sight and writing; thus, Freud was able to transcribe directly what he saw or intuitively grasped without the intermediary of the spoken word, "to leap without transition from the body to the code."9 This formulation is highly suggestive as we imagine Freud surrounded by visual art and attempt to grasp its impact on him as he listened and wrote.

We also gain insight into the depth of feeling associated with these objects when we learn that Freud had the habit of occasionally bringing a newly acquired purchase, such as a statuette, to the dinner table and placing it in front of him as he ate, then returning it later to his desk.10 Our intuitive understanding of the phenomenon is further advanced by perceiving links between the antiquities and Freud's ineffable feelings about his Jewishness and his own characterization of them as enigmatic, mysterious, and unanalyzable.11 In tracing the subtle ties here between art and allusion, I have found that the subject of Freud's Jewishness returns: the thickets of reference and association, never simple or straightforward, lead, as he himself has shown, in surprising and unforeseeable directions.12

The bronze figurine of Amon-Re that adorned Freud's desk serves as our point of departure.13 This image ties directly with the first essay of Moses and Monotheism (SE. 23, pp. 1–137), where Amun figures in the opening pages as a displaced god. Here Freud, in his late seventies, argues, in a highly problematical text, that Moses was an Egyptian nobleman who transmitted to the Jewish people a stern monotheism based on the cult of Aten (which Pharaoh Amenhotep IV, Akhenaten, inaugurated, thereby temporarily suppressing the time-honored worship of Amun, god of Thebes), and that the Jews murdered Moses. Standing as a major document in the evidence for Freud's complex relations with Judaism,14 this manuscript caused considerable turmoil both for its author (he spoke of it as tormenting him like an unlaied ghost, SE. 23, p. 103) and for others. It was considerably, even agonizingly, worked over and its publication delayed.15 The antiquities are connected here as well, in that suggestions have been made that, in some richly overdetermined way, Freud's very passion for them can be traced to his ambivalent awareness of an ancestry that originated in the lands of the Orient and the Mediterranean.16
This supposition is bolstered by the fact that Freud’s initial collecting of antiquities immediately postdated the death of his father, Jacob, who, although in practice a liberal and nonobservant Jew, represented for Freud a major link with his Jewishness. We are told that Jacob “was fond of reading the Torah” and that he introduced Freud at age seven to the family’s illustrated Philippsen Bible. A further link in the chain that binds Freud, Egypt, Moses, Jacob, and Judaism is the biblical figure of Joseph, favorite son of Jacob, interpreter of dreams and viceroy in Egypt, with whom Freud identified in complex ways.

The most dramatic (and painful) association of Jacob Freud with Judaism is poignantly conveyed through the impact made on his son by an incident he relates in The Interpretation of Dreams. Freud was told as a child by Jacob that the
latter was insulted and humiliated in the street merely because he was recognized as being a Jew. Freud's youthful reaction on hearing this anecdote was to fantasize a scene from Roman history in which he, in the role of the child Hannibal, swore to avenge his father by marching against Rome (SE, 4, p. 197). This memory arose out of his associations to the fourth Rome dream, which, as noted above, dates from the period just following Jacob's death and the time of Freud's initial forays into collecting (SE, 4, pp. 196–98).22

Thus, Rome, like Egypt the origin of a sizable number of Freud's antiquities, is linked both with his father and with Judaism. In a penetrating analysis of each of the four Rome dreams, Anzieu sorts out the threads in their tangled web of linkages.23 He makes a point that bears directly on Freud's collection, even though he does not say so straight out. Remarking that Rome (i.e., the Greco-Roman heritage) is a culture that Freud chose, as opposed to the Judaic one into which he was born, Anzieu comes just short of interpreting that, in giving the former priority over the latter, Freud was symbolically denying his father and claiming a different origin. He was, as it were, enacting his own version of a "family romance" (SE, 9, p. 237).24

Linked with Egypt and scion of Greece, it is Rome, mingled with the others, that becomes another element in the heritage of Freud's conflicted choice. Bolstering this interpretation, Anzieu draws a parallel between the two heroes Moses and Aeneas, pairing them as conquerors of unknown lands and founders of new laws.25 In seeing them thus, however, we cannot neglect the agonistic underside of the equation: Rome (which Freud longed to visit for years before actually making the trip) figures for him not only as desired goal but as opponent and oppressor. Anzieu, following the content and timing of the dreams, reads Freud's upsurge of ambivalent longings for "Roma" (which, spelled backwards as in the dream mechanism of reversal into its opposite, becomes "Amor")26 as symbolizing in part an infantile yearning for the body27 of the oedipal mother rekindled in
fantasy now by the death of the father. It is apophasis that Freud throughout his lifetime acknowledged and theorized only the positive side of what he saw as the privileged primary relationship between a mother and son. This partial view on his part cannot be independent of the fact that this aspect of his longing for Rome remained unaddressed. The point is underscored by his seeming obliviousness, in quoting Virgil’s lines, “Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movet” (If heaven I cannot bend, then hell I’ll stir),” as his epigraph for The Interpretation of Dreams, that these words are uttered not by the hero Aeneas but rather by the enraged and scheming goddess Juno.28

In emphasizing that Freud elected for himself an intellectual heritage different from that of his ancestors, it seems hardly necessary to point out that Jewish rituals and observance were anathema to him.29 Thus, to return to Amun and the treatise Moses and Monotheism, written in the last years of his life, when travel had become impossible and the collected antiquities were his only tangible link with their sites of origin, we may speculate on a subliminal agenda for the entire project. In redefining Moses as Egyptian (and, implicitly, as not Jewish), was Freud not also unconsciously redefining the relations between himself and the legacy represented by this very collection of antiquities?30 Was he not compelling these objects, as it were, to assume a more intimate relation with him? Was he not, in essence, coercing them into a heritage of birth rather than of mere choice? By acknowledging in the opening sentence of the text of Moses and Monotheism the implicit aggression against his fellow Jews, was he not betraying and masking a deeper and more personal level of aggression?31 If so, his early mention of the de-throning of Amun (and the commanding presence of this statue on his desk) assumes, as I have suggested, a paradigmatic significance.

My point—if Moses could be considered Egyptian, then so, in fantasy, might Freud—is supported by Freud’s lifelong fascination with the figure of Moses.32 In his 1914 essay “The Moses of Michelangelo,” for example, he speaks of the patriarch in this representation as making a profound impression on him. Splitting the identifications, he fantasizes here that he is a member of the mob upon whom Moses gazes and glares (SE, 13, p. 213). But who is this “mob?” Bearing in mind Freud’s association of his father with Judaism and recognizing this fantasied mob to whom Freud feels momentarily attached as none other than the “children of Israel,” we cannot avoid emphasizing what it is they have just done: they have at that very moment been caught in an act of arrant rebellion, a breach of trust, a rejection of God, above all, a reversion to idolatry (SE, 13, p. 213).33 Mapping Freud’s ambivalences onto this image while picturing his growing collection of statues, we can glimpse what is at stake here in the doubling of identifications and the screening function of the “inscrutability” (SE, 13, p. 213) he attributed to the statue.

Relevant here also are the disparaging comments Freud permitted himself about his father in his essay “A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis” (SE, 22, p. 239ff). Here, to explain a sudden dysphoria he suffered on realizing his childhood dream of reaching Athens—another cherished site of antiquity—Freud remarks on his father’s inferior education and lack of interest in the classics; he points out the disparity between his own feelings at this important moment
and those his father might have been expected to have had under similar circumstances. He interprets his own love of antiquity as an advance over his benighted father and attributes the momentary dysphoria to conflicts aroused by the enjoyment of that which his father could not possibly have appreciated. One feels the confluence of shame, guilt, and triumph: the shame of the small son whose inadequate father did not retaliate when insulted and who was likewise too uneducated to admire pagan antiquity; the guilt of the grown son who perceives himself suddenly as having surpassed, triumphed over, that father.

All of this has taken us far from the bronze statuette of Amun. But perhaps this is only an illusion, for, circling round him all the while, we have taken him as a figure for other displaced gods and overthrown idols. Our discussion points to the complexity of Freud's investment in his antiquities and to the multiple agendas met by his collecting as well as by the interpretive choices he made with respect to antiquity in his theoretical usage of it. 34 Bitterly disdainful of Jewish self-hatred in others, his own unresolved conflicts in this area seem to have created something of a scotoma in his self-understanding. 35 To conjure him surrounded in his study by miniature figures of gods and goddesses (Aphrodite, Athena, Dionysos, Artemis, Amun, Hathor, Osiris, and others) is to recall the second commandment of the Torah (Exodus 20), which expressly prohibits sculptured images on account of their association with polytheism and idolatry.

If we invoke the dream mechanism of representation by reversal into its opposite, this image of Freud in his study produces a striking inversion of a well-known midrash or rabbinic commentary. 36 Here, in order to explain why Abraham was chosen to be the father of the Jewish people, the story is told that Abraham, the son of an idol maker named Terah, one day in his father's absence went into the workplace and smashed the idols there. Freud, in the absence of his own father, Jacob, surrounded himself with idols which, assuredly, he did not worship but which afforded him, apparently, an extraordinary and not unambiguous pleasure.

If such issues matter in Freud's passion for antiquity, we may conclude that the myths and artifacts of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome functioned for him not only, as others have intimated, to connect him with a past but also to separate him from a past. If so, his passionate 'addiction' to collecting may also have served unconscious repetitive efforts at mastery and integration as well as the enactment of an ongoing family romance. As with other aspects of his oeuvre when viewed from the perspective of his life, this one may be seen as a heroic attempt to create (and coerce) an elusive harmony between culture, family, and individual.

Beyond the figure of Amun, other pieces in the collection relate more overtly to Freud's psychoanalytic oeuvre. I wish to point out only a few. Two vases depicting Oedipus and the Sphinx as well as additional sphinx images may be taken as symbolizing Freud's fascination with its riddle and his idealized self-image as a solver of riddles.

Moving accounts describe Freud's well-known pallor and agitation on receiving, at age fifty, the famous medallion inscribed with the line from the end of
Sophocles' Oedipus Rex: "Who knew the famous riddle and was a man most mighty." His reaction was caused by the sudden revival of his youthful fantasy that one day his own bust inscribed with these very words would adorn the courtyard of the University of Vienna (an unlikely honor for a Jew, but one that eventually came to him sixteen years after his death). This episode reveals not only the intensity but the longevity of Freud's identification with Oedipus, an identification that substantially preceded his discovery of the Oedipus complex and the creation of psychoanalysis—a point that underscores the circularities inherent in his interpretive strategies vis-à-vis antiquity.\(^{38}\)

On this topic, namely, Freud's deep identification with Oedipus and his use of this particular myth as a cornerstone of theory, it is worthwhile noting points of convergence in the stories of Moses and Oedipus and the fact that the structure of Freud's own family mirrored that of Oedipus.\(^{39}\) In all three cases, there are distancings of the boy child from his father of birth as well as scenes that place questions of origins at the forefront; in the Oedipus myth and in the structure of Freud's own family, an overlapping of generations produced confusions and confusions—riddles—over issues of origin and destiny (a powerful motive for the continuing investment in a family romance).

Both yoked to and disjoined from his personal past, antique references were used by Freud in ways that occasionally verged on the preemptive (as, for example, his passing allusion to the Oresteia as a support for equating intellectuality with father and sensuality with mother; SE, 23, p. 114).\(^{40}\) Rather than confront the ancient world as "other," as an eccentric locus from which to behold contemporary practices, his approach was appropriative and idealizing—an attitude, however, by no means discordant in fin-de-siècle Vienna, where classicism continued to be revered in the midst of a welter of countercultures.\(^{41}\) Freud saw antiquity as embodying universal human themes and as a felicitous anticipation and confirmation of his own theoretical formulations.\(^{42}\) Thus, characterized by processes of circular infusion and reinfusion, his borrowings have occasionally attracted the criticism of contemporary classicists, who express dismay at what they consider his Procrustean tendencies.\(^{43}\)

But like Freud we, too, inhabit an inexorable afterlife of antiquity, particularly with regard to the Greeks, whose myths and metaphors have played a major role in molding our (psychoanalytic) culture. To reinterpret these within the framework of our own time, with its stringencies and ideologies, is inescapably to become prey, with him, in the nets of hermeneutic entanglement.

Shifting scenes now, I should like to turn to a small terracotta head, identified as Demeter,\(^{44}\) and consider an area where Freud's work, especially since his death, has come under some criticism both by scholars and by clinicians, namely, his construction of gender. Despite his bold intellectual iconoclasm, Freud's construction of gender was markedly conservative. Dominated by the symbol of the phallus and the polarity between having and lacking the biological organ for which it stands, his theory offered only this metaphor, present or absent, for sexual difference.\(^{45}\) Female reproductive organs, female development, and feminine psychology were repeatedly interpreted as a variant on, complementary to,
opposite of, or inferior to the male model as norm. It is important to state, however, that Freud was never fully satisfied with his formulations of female sexuality and development and continued to revise them throughout his lifetime. Furthermore, his basic position has been considerably modified in the clinical literature, especially during the last twenty-five years, as it was even during his lifetime. Although the implicit misogyny of the original formulations is traceable directly to antiquity (as Freud knew), the extant corpus of ancient myth, art, and social practice lends itself to supplementary readings that may yet have much to offer modern psychoanalysis in this area of contemporary concern.

Powerful persuasive readings backed by precedent, such as Freud's of Oedipus, tend to preempt the stage and occlude plausible alternatives. However, as Sophocles' drama teaches, interpretation itself can create permanent blind spots. Thus Freud, in colonizing antiquity for his purposes, closed as well as opened the territory. My aim is to suggest perspectives that might supplement his usage and stimulate an expanded dialogue between psychoanalysis and antiquity.

I have chosen this head of Demeter because of the fascinating myth to which it refers. Freud, having read Ovid, clearly knew the story of Demeter and Persephone, at least in this version. Yet, although in all its forms it addresses the theme of mother-daughter relations, which Freud eventually came to recognize as central to female development, he never chose to interrogate this exemplary myth in terms of his own important question: "What does the little girl require of her mother?" (SE, 21, p. 235). His scattered references to it curiously bypass its central motif. He refers to Demeter only with regard to an incident that occurs in
her daughter’s absence (SE, 14, p. 338) and to Persephone as a chthonic figure with no mention of her relationship to her mother (SE, 12, p. 299). These omissions suggest that Freud may have addressed himself with less depth and sensitivity to the range and complexities of feminine psychology than to comparable masculine issues. Taking this small figure of Demeter as a point of departure, I wish to urge her story as a source of rich material for psychoanalysts confronting these issues anew.

Giving priority to the role of the mother, the myth can be summarized as follows: Demeter, goddess of fertility and the harvest, has a beautiful daughter Persephone (Kore) who, while gathering flowers with other young girls one day in an idyllic setting, plucks a fateful narcissus. This flower was placed before her as a lure by her father, Zeus, on behalf of his brother Hades, god of the underworld, who had seen the girl and developed a passion for her. As Persephone plucks the flower, a rift opens in the earth, and Hades suddenly appears in a horse-drawn chariot; he surprises, terrifies, and abducts her. Zeus, meanwhile, remains throughout the myth a distant, shadowy figure who, by staging his daughter’s violation, enacts by proxy his incestuous wishes toward her. He is never portrayed as having any direct contact with her, and her entire filiation is bound up with her mother.

Demeter’s response to the loss of Persephone is, by turns, sorrowful, depressed, and then bitterly indifferent. Wandering the earth in an effort to discover what has become of her beloved child and to regain her, she enact a sequence that seems uncannily to prefigure the stages of melancholia as outlined by Freud in 1917 (SE, 14). Turning aggression inward against herself, she tears the covering on her hair, refuses food and drink, ceses to bathe. Upon learning that Zeus abetted the rape, her grief reaches fever pitch. Cutting herself off from all company of the gods, disfiguring herself, she assumes the appearance of an aged woman whose childbearing years are over.

Shortly after this, in the course of her subsequent wanderings, Demeter “adopts,” as it were, another woman’s child; she “becomes” a mother again as a means of undoing her loss and of symbolically recovering Persephone. Yet the child, in this case, is a boy, and the incident has disturbing overtones: Demeter seeks, by breathing on him, clasping him to her bosom, and placing him each night in a fire in order to turn him into a god, to utterly possess him — thus separating him irrevocably from his own mother. In this way, under the guise of beneficence, she turns passive into active; she relieves her trauma by inflicting it on another through identification with the aggressor. By displacement, this incident reveals multiple levels of Demeter’s unacknowledged ambivalence toward Persephone — jealousy toward her as the (incestuously) preferred object of the father and envy for her burgeoning fertility, symbolically represented by the boy child taken in fantasy as Persephone’s future child, a child who also represents the dangerous and unfaithful male world which has betrayed her.

The intensity of Demeter’s mingled sexuality and aggression toward this “new child” is spied out by the boy’s real mother, and a confrontation between the two women ensues. At this point in the myth Demeter reveals herself in all her glory as a mighty goddess and, rejecting the substitute child, throws off her melancholy
disguise. Vehemently now, she turns her aggression outward. Withholding her own fertility, she punishes Zeus, and by causing a cruel famine to spread across the land, she coerces him into returning Persephone to her. Persephone, in the underworld, pining for her mother, is elated when Hermes, at the bidding of Zeus, comes to rescue her. Hades, however, slips a pomegranate seed into her mouth (symbolic of heterosexual union with its many seeds and blood-red juice); thus, secretly, he binds her to him and secures her return.

This myth ends with a compromise solution that leaves the modern mind perhaps slightly less easy than the ancient. Persephone is partially restored to Demeter. By tasting the pomegranate in the underworld, however, she is bound forever to her husband, with whom her mother can, henceforth, only share her. According to different versions of the myth, she spends one-third or one-half of the year with him and the other half or two-thirds with Demeter. When mother and daughter are united, they are portrayed as radiantly happy, and the earth is fertile; when Persephone returns to Hades, however, she is melancholy and depressed. Interestingly, in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, the final reconciliation between daughter, mother, and Olympian Zeus comes about through the agency of Rhea, a goddess who represents the fertility of the previous generation, she being the grandmother of Persephone and mother of Demeter.54

As with all great myths, alternate versions present fascinating details that call for lengthy treatment, and psychologically valid readings may logically contradict one another. What follows is a modest opening of the question: how might this material illuminate Freud's own query as to what a little girl requires of her mother (and vice versa)? Does the myth represent normal or disturbed relations between a mother and daughter, or some layering and combination of these? In celebrating the enduring power of the mother-daughter bond at the expense of joyful heterosexuality, does the myth endorse its own solution or express wishes and fears—fears of wishes and denial of fears? And precisely what wishes and fears are at stake here? What developmental levels of fantasy are addressed—the infantile, the adult, or some combination? Does the myth correspond to male or female fantasies, or to both? (The aggressive bridegroom, for example, appears clinically in adult fantasies of both genders.55) Superficially dyadic in form, the myth marginalizes its male characters, but in my telling here, I have tried to reintroduce triadic determinants into the narrative. Its cyclical content and solution brilliantly evoke the female reproductive system as well as the seasons of the year and convey that, because a girl shares her mother's biology, their object relations are deeply structured by this sameness. And the questions posed by the myth may likewise seem to flow in circles.

Dramatizing in its initial episode an abrupt and bewildering moment of schism that occurs in mother-daughter relations shortly after puberty, the myth returns us to a time when, in ancient Greece, girls who still played with dolls and toys were abruptly taken from their childhood homes and married to men considerably older than themselves.56 Under altered social conditions today, puberty and marriage are separated by a decade or two, and menarche often triggers not only a resurgence of early ambivalence in the mother-daughter dyad but a special renewal of closeness. However, when separation does become a dominant theme,
mutual adoration can turn overnight into antagonism, caring be suddenly construed as criticism, and closeness widen out into a chasm.\textsuperscript{57}

The Demeter-Persephone myth portrays such rupture in dyadic terms as a warding-off of anticipated loss by its precipitation, a turning (on both sides) of passive into active. Thus, distance (psychological/spatial) functions to defend the mother-daughter pair against their unspoken knowledge that the daughter's flowering beauty, her newly acquired reproductive capacity, can result in a heterosexual relationship that threatens to disrupt and supersede the ties that bind them to one another. On this reading, the myth enacts both a fantasy (of violent male intrusion) that precipitates unbearable emotional distance (in the female dyad) and a fantasied rapprochement between the members of this dyad (exclusive of the male). What the myth strikingly avoids, in so doing, is any direct representation of aggression between mother and daughter. This primary dyad remains intact throughout, and aggression is projected outward on to the male(s).\textsuperscript{58}

Dreading her loss (of self? of object?), a mother goes in search of a daughter she needs to keep. What does it mean for Demeter to regain Persephone, to "save" her? At what price is Persephone rescued from Hades and returned to earth? One possible reading casts Demeter as the omnipotent pre-oedipal mother, more powerful than all males. A related interpretation casts her as the narcissistic mother who, under the pretext of salvation, sacrifices her child in order to preserve herself—Persephone representing to her an indispensable element of her own body, self, fertility.\textsuperscript{59} Thus, Persephone, reverting to her mother to gratify the latter's need, is forever barred from achieving loving heterosexual relations. In this reading, Demeter only superficially rescues a cherished and victimized child; on the contrary, she herself plays the role of victimizer, using her daughter for her own ends.\textsuperscript{60} To say this, however, is to interpret against the grain both of the manifest content and of the overall tone of the myth. Not only does it bracket the fact that Persephone's initiation into heterosexuality comes via weakly disguised incest and rape, but it denies the mood and language of the myth, which clearly exalts and idealizes the mother-daughter dyad—its symmetry, mutuality, and tenderness. Yet this very idealization could be interpreted as a defense against underlying and disavowed pathology: the unconflicted love serving as a rationalization for a tragic inability of both mother and daughter to separate.

Taking another tack, that of historicizing the myth, classicist Marilyn Arthur has suggested that under extreme forms of patriarchy women need ongoing contact with one another in order to achieve and sustain self-definition—hence, the desperation of Demeter's search and the idealization (at the beginning and end of the myth) of the mother-daughter pair and of exclusively female bonding.\textsuperscript{61} However, even under present social conditions of increased political and economic freedom and articulate presence for (some) women, deeply felt needs for maintaining the ties rendered in this myth have not been significantly mitigated. Clinical evidence reveals that despite external changes, women require not only stable maternal introjects but ongoing contact with one another and with primary maternal objects,\textsuperscript{62} especially at moments associated with fertility—menarche, marriage, pregnancy, birth, and the nurturance of children. The myth, which tells its story (manifestly) from the mother’s side, stresses Demeter's desire
to be available as an ongoing presence in Persephone’s life, to play an active role and foster identifications between her daughter and herself. Women who lose mothers before childbirth mourn them at this time, and both mothers and daughters who reestablish relations after the painful disharmonies of adolescence derive mutual benefits from their reunion and discover more fully their own unique capacities for nurturance, a point underscored in the myth by the presence, in the end, of the figure of the grandmother.

While associating youthful innocence in an enclosed female space with playfulness and freedom from care, the myth, by contrast, equates marriage, in the form of Hades, with brutality and death. For Persephone, the joys of marriage and heterosexual love are absent. In spite of being restored to her mother (or perhaps because of it), her sacrifice continues. She neither establishes a satisfying marriage nor is it clear that she ever becomes a mother herself.

This dark parallelism (nuptials and death) evokes the recent work of classicist Nicole Loraux on congruities between marriage, death, and virgin sacrifice in Greek tragedy. Antigone, led to her death, is expected to “marry somebody in Hades,” and Euripides’ Agamemnon, referring to his doomed daughter Iphigenia, laments that Hades will marry her before long. The status of virgin, however protected and pleasurable to a young girl while it lasted, was untenable after childhood in Greek culture. In one way or another, it, and she, had to be sacrificed. Clearly, shards of such notions of necessary sacrifice persist in fantasies that continue to deform the feminine psyche. Fed by pervasive visual and literary tropes, they need to be more widely addressed by contemporary clinical writings on female (genital) anxieties and conflicts.

Reading Loraux against the background of Arthur, we see Demeter’s loss of Persephone replayed in Hecuba’s tragic loss of Polyxena, and in Clytemnestra’s loss of Iphigenia. The latter case is of interest because it marks a contrast between Clytemnestra’s two daughters. One, Iphigenia, is, like Persephone, taken away by males to be sacrificed; an act that precipitates maternal melancholy, rage, revenge (and, finally, in the case of Demeter, reparation). The other, Electra, is (in Aeschylus’ version) not separated from the mother, and thus a different tragic outcome is plotted for her: she grows resentful, hostile, and precipitates an act of violence against her mother (inciting her brother Orestes to murder).

In the first case, male aggression from without splits the female dyad with the ultimate result of reuniting it, at least in fantasy; in the second case, however, the female dyad, not disrupted by a male from without, imports male aggression and uses it to rend the relationship asunder. Both are tragic paths. With Clytemnestra and Electra, we have no initial image of closeness, as is intimated in the Demeter-Persephone myth. Thus, Electra’s rage, like Orestes’, can be interpreted in part as a response to maternal deprivation, as dyadic envy as well as triadic jealousy.

Freud evinced scant interest in these complexities. Despite the multifaceted nature of his collection of antiquities, his theoretical attention remained riveted on the towering figure of Oedipus, whose tale, he seemed to believe, could stand alone as a paradigm to which all others, even when the protagonists were female, could be referred, if not reduced.
In tracing the specific regions of a woman’s body that figure in her sacrifice in Greek tragedy, Loraux focuses on the throat, the scene also of major symptoms both in Freud’s “Studies on Hysteria” (SE, 2) and in the Dora case (SE, 7). This detail raises the question as to whether antiquity actually offers metaphors for the female body other than its lacking or “being” a phallus. The image of Demeter, mythical mother, symbol of harvest, wandering the earth in search of her daughter, suggests a possible answer.

Metaphors of the female body in ancient Greek culture have recently been traced by classicist Page duBois, who proposes allegories of representation that may supplement constructions of gender based entirely on models of deficiency. A full, closed surface, the fertile earth gives rise spontaneously to plants, fruits, and wildflowers. This first metaphor, cited by duBois, is derived from Hesiod, where Gaia, Earth, gives birth parthenogenetically to Uranus, her husband. Earth, analogous with the female body, is thus experienced in the dawn of Greek culture as an unowned meadow, spontaneously generative.

Later, this fertility, appropriated for agriculture, becomes linked in myth and metaphor with sexual reproduction. As man ploughs the earth and sows seeds in the furrows he has made, the female body comes to be compared also with empty ovens that can cook up babies when filled with grain, with earthware vessels into which wine and grain can be poured, and with stone tablets upon which man can write with his stylus/phallus. In duBois’s construction of this trajectory, the male is seen as colonizing the female body and as gradually appropriating her generative powers while, incrementally, nature is transformed into an ever more complex culture. Rather than woman as parthenogenic source of life (as in Hesiod), woman becomes the nurse, the nurturer of male seed (as in Aeschylus’ Eumenides). Yet, fundamentally for the Greeks, earth is mother, Demeter is female, and, even unploughed, uncultivated, she produces food. The plough increases but does not cause her fertility. Utterly dependent on the earth for their sustenance, the ancients must have experienced an overwhelming ambivalence toward her, an ambivalence extended as well to the human mother who has, like the earth, the capacity to withhold nourishment from children, and, in addition, the power to withhold children from men (as, for example, in Euripides’ Medea).

Pondering the myth of Demeter-Persephone against this background is to grasp its significance, longevity, and power, qualities attested to, among others, by classicist Walter Burkert, who refers to it as the “crystallization of Greek mythology.” In bypassing it, Freud lost an opportunity, perhaps, for theoretical elaboration of feminine psychology. Here, for example, we see how a mother may try in desperation to keep a daughter from a father by threatening him (not the daughter) and by withholding her own fertility—a pattern not equivalent to (threatened) castration of the boy child by the father as a means of preventing access to the mother. Yet much remains uncanny and elusive. When Burkert speaks of the myth as encompassing a circularity, a self-containedness that excludes man, he means mankind as opposed to the gods—but the meaning of gender works as well. Being doubles, mother and maiden, Demeter and Persephone each contains the other within herself. Descending and retreating, the
tale moves within a closed system, like the generative earth, with man ploughing and playing in it a crucial but marginal role. Neglected by Freud, it stands enigmatically as a testament to the rich legacy of antiquity that remains to be explored by contemporary psychoanalysis.

NOTES
I would like to express my appreciation to the many colleagues and friends who generously gave time to discuss aspects of this interdisciplinary essay with me, shared their specialized knowledge, and led me to sources I might otherwise have missed; I wish also to apologize to colleagues whose relevant works and ideas could not be mentioned in this brief essay. I owe special thanks to Cantor Edward Graham, Rabbi H. Leon B. Poller; Rabbi Jeffrey Sircman; Prof. Marilyn Arthur, Wesleyan University; Prof. Milad Dossouyi, Johns Hopkins University; Prof. Yael S. Feldman, New York University; Muriel Gold Morris, M.D.; Ruth F. Lax, Ph.D.; Helen Abramowicz, M.D.; Joanna B. Strauss, M.S.W; Harlan Spitz, M.D.; Nathaniel Geoffrey Lew, and, above all, my co-participants in this project, Prof. Donald Kuspit, Prof. Peter Gay, Dr. Martin Bergmann, and, especially, Lynn Gamwell—whose spark and indomitable spirit illuminated these efforts from start to finish. I am grateful also to the Fund for Psychoanalytic Research of the American Psychoanalytic Association, which supported research that found its way into these pages. My greatest debt, of course, is to the monumental legacy of Sigmund Freud, who bequeathed to us all the powerful lenses through which we are now both privileged and compelled to see. —E.H.S.

2. Among the many remarks one could cite here, see Freud's autobiographical study of 1925: "When, in 1873, I first joined the University, I experienced some appreciable disappointments. Above all, I found that I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew" (SE, 20, p. 9).
4. See Lynn Gamwell, above, pp. 27–28, for a description of the way in which Freud actually placed the objects to face him while he worked.
7. Freud describes a series of dreams based, as he says, on a longstanding yearning to visit Rome. In the first of these, he dreams he is on a train and sees the Tiber and the Ponte Sant' Angelo through the window. In the second, he is led to a hilltop and see Rome shrouded in a mist. In the third, he finally arrives in Rome but finds the scenery disappointing, a pastiche of associations that he traces in some detail. In the fourth, he is in Rome but, oddly, sees a profusion of German posters tacked up on a street corner; in part, he interprets this as expressing his wish to meet his colleague Fliss in Rome rather than Paris which, as he had written the day before, he thought might not be an agreeable place for Germans to walk about (see also SE, 4, pp. 323–24). Didier Anzieu, in his fascinating Freud's Self-Analysis, comments at length on these dreams (pp. 182–212).
12. For a study of Freud's unacknowledged indebtedness, for example, to the interpretative traditions of rabbinical Judaism, see Susan A. Handelman, The Slayers of Moses (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982).
13. See Joan Raphael-Leff, “If Freud Was an Egyptian: Freud and Egyptology,” forthcoming, Proceedings of the International Conference on Psychiatry, held in Cairo, Egypt, March, 1988, for an analysis of Freud's interest in Egyptology. Raphael-Leff argues that despite the many references to Egypt in his texts and the numerous Egyptian artifacts in his collection, only the Greek-Roman material was developed theoretically by Freud because it served a defensive function for him vis-à-vis unanalyzed pre-ocipital material that the Egyptian imagery and mythology convey—imagery represented in his collection principally by the statue of Isis and Horus.


17. See Gamwell, above, pp. 3ff.

18. It is poignant to note that in the year before his death, painfully ill, hounded out of Vienna by the Nazis, and awaiting a permit to leave for England, Freud spoke of himself as an “old Jacob” about to be taken by his children to Egypt (letter to Erne Freud, May 12, 1938).


22. See also Anzieu, Freud’s Self-Analysis, p. 183 (as in n. 6).

23. Ibid., pp. 182–212.

24. Thus there is, among the latent meanings of the collection, that of patriarchy, a theme notably absent from Judaism; see Yael S. Feldman, “Recurrence and Sublimation: Toward a Psychoanalytic Approach to Biblical Narrative,” in Barry N. Sohlen and Yael S. Feldman, eds., Approaches to Teaching the Hebrew Bible as Literature (New York: MLA Publications, 1989), pp. 78–82.

25. See Anzieu, Freud’s Self-Analysis, pp. 177, 457.

26. Ibid., p. 194.

27. Ibid., pp. 182–212 passim.

28. This epigraph, “If I cannot bend the higher powers, I will move the infernal regions,” is appropriate for a text that explores the ways in which what cannot be openly enacted in waking life is played out in the nocturnal and instinctual realm of dreams. For an excellent commentary, in addition to Anzieu, Freud’s Self-Analysis, pp. 176–78 (as in n. 6), see Jean Starobinski, “Acherontia Movenbo,” Critical Inquiry 13:2 (1987), 394–407. Juno is, obviously, not the mother of Aeneas; yet, in her relentless prosecution of him, she figures as a split-off bad mother (a maternal imago insufficiently recognized by Freud, because to have done so would have been to enclose her with intolerable powers); she is a foil for the beautiful and adoring Venus, Aeneas’ actual mother in Vergil’s text.

29. “The effort to provide Freud with a Jewish intellectual ancestry is no more productive than the search for his Jewishness in his patients or his jokes” (Gay, A Godless Jew, p. 129; as in n. 11). In the same text, Gay makes the point that Freud prohibited his wife, Martha, from lighting Shabbat candles (for which behavior she called him ‘Unmensch,’ monster). In Gay’s view, Martha Freud “retained a trace of indignation, perhaps of sadness, in the presence of the impious atheist who had ... swept her away from her family and, more painfully, from her faithfully practiced religious observances” (p. 153).

30. Ibid., p. 150.

31. Ibid., p. 152. For a penetrating analysis of relationships between Freud and Moses, psychoanalysis and rabbinical models of interpretation, see Handelman, The Sages of Moses, especially chap. 5, pp. 132–37 (as in n. 12), where the analysis overlaps aspects of mine.

32. See Gay, A Godless Jew, p. 150 (as in n. 11). See also Harold P. Blum, “Freud and the Figure of Moses,” The Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, forthcoming.


34. See, for example, Feldman, “Recurrence and Sublimation” (as in n. 24), for a discussion related to Freud’s theorizing on the basis of Greek rather than Judica themes (cf. Oedipus versus Isaac).
35. See Gay, Freud: A Life, p. 605 (as in n. 11).


38. This important point is made and emphasized by Rudnytsky, Freud and Oedipus, p. 5.

39. See Marthe Robert, From Oedipus to Moses: Freud's Jewish Identity, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday, 1976); see also, among the many sources elaborating on this point, the family tree depicted in Anzieu, Freud's Self-Analysis, p. 248 (as in n. 6).


42. For an interesting and speculative analysis of the possible defensive nature of this posture, see Raphael-Loff, "If Freud Was an Egyptian" (as in n. 13).


44. Collection Inventory, Freud Museum.


47. See Spitt, "The Inescapability of Tragedy" (as in n. 11).

48. This retelling is both an abridgment and an amalgam; see Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homeric, trans. H. G. Evelyn-White (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924), and The Metamorphoses of Ovid, trans. Mary M. Innes (Hammondsworth, Middlesex, 1955). See also an interesting retelling in Robert May, Sex and Fantasy. Patterns of Male and Female Development (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 7–13; and a fine psychoanalytically informed critical article by Marilyn Arthur, "Politics and Pomegranates: An Interpretation of the Homeric Hymns to

49. The narcissus may be seen as emblematic of the girl’s youthful self-involvement and delight in her own loveliness as well, perhaps, as her desire to add something to it. It is also of interest to compare the myths of Persephone and the youthful Narcissus.

50. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, trans. James Harle Bell, Richard von Sturmer, and Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), on kinship and women as a medium of exchange between men. It has been much remarked that Freud failed to perceive this dimension of the Dora case (SE, 7), and that in failing to recognize it, he collided with it and became, as it were, one of the men among whom Dora was being passed.

Apropos the Demeter-Persephone myth, it is crucial for a psychological understanding that takes into account not just the dyadic but the implicit triadic nature of all mother-daughter relations (a perspective downplayed in the mythic narrative) that Persephone’s initiation into heterosexual relations comes by means of trickery, surprise, physical violence, and betrayal by her father. This act is seen as betrayal, moreover, only from the women’s point of view; in Ovid, the father protests Demeter’s complaints of piracy and claims that, on the contrary, his brother’s act of abduction should be seen as an act of love, and that the lord of the underworld is a fitting husband for their daughter (see Ovid, Metamorphoses, V, 522–30). Thus the father both rationalizes and reveals the incestuous pleasure he takes in colluding with the abduction, and we are reminded once again of Dora.

51. See Marilyn Arthur’s sensitive analysis in “Politics and Pomegranates,” pp. 15–17 (as in n. 48).

52. See Arthur’s comments, ibid., pp. 22–26; see also the discussion in Robert Mass, Sex and Fantasy, pp. 11–13 (as in n. 48). See also, Nancy Felson-Rubin and Harriet M. Deal, “Some Functions of the Demophon Episode in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter,” Quaderni Urbaniani di Cultura Classica, n.s. 5 (1980), 7–21, for a structuralist approach.


55. Muriel G. Morris, M.D., personal communication.

56. See Xenophon, Oeconomicus, III, 12–13 and VII, 5–6 (Loeb Classical Library). It is interesting to note here that the narcissus flower which attracts Persephone in the myth is described as a toy; see Hymn to Demeter in Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, p. 289 (as in n. 48).

57. For a catastrophic portrayal of this rift in contemporary American letters, from the daughter’s viewpoint, see Jamaica Kincaid, Annie John (New York: New American Library, 1983).

58. It is fascinating, however, that the one moment of conflict between two women (Demeter and Metaneira, mother of the boy Demophon) that is portrayed in the myth proves catalytic to Demeter and empowers her to act on what she perceives as her own and her daughter’s behalf.


60. See John F. Makoski, “Persephone, Psyche, and the Mother-Maiden,” The Classical Outlook (March/April 1985), 73–78, for several interesting readings of the myth.


62. Muriel Gold Morris, M.D., personal communication. Clinicians, for example, who treat adult women patients remark on the frequency in their discourse of references to mother (personal communication, Ruth E. Lax, Ph.D.).

This is a point Freud missed in his analysis of Dora; see Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (SE, 7). There is voluminous literature on this case; many commentators, however, have noted that Freud’s implicit devaluation of the mother, and his failure to recognize the impact on Dora of her father’s rejection of the mother, indicate an underestimation on his part of the importance of the young girl’s need to identify with the parent of her own sex and her special vulnerability to the quality of the parental relationship.

63. This is true in the central narrative of Persephone and Demeter but not in the inserted incident, a point stressed by Arthur and central to her understanding of the psychological meaning of the myth as a whole (see “Politics and Pomegranates”; as in n. 48).

64. See Nicole Loraux, Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).


67. See Bernstein, "Female Genital Anxieties" (as in n. 46).


69. This is.exquisitely dramatized by a duet in the prologue of Martha Graham’s ballet “Clytemnestra” (1958), where the mother fantasizes that her dying daughter is reaching out to her from across the stage.

70. Freud states: “I should like to insist that ... the beginnings of religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex. This is in complete agreement with the psychoanalytic finding that the same complex constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses, so far as our present knowledge goes. It seems to me a most surprising discovery that the problems of social psychology, too, should prove soluble on the basis of one single concrete point—man’s relation to his father” (*Totem and Taboo*, SE. 13, pp. 156-57).

71. For a comprehensive, scholarly overview of Greek attitudes toward the male and the female body, see Marilyn Arthur, “Sexuality and the Body in Ancient Greece,” in *Trends in History*, forthcoming.

72. See duBois, *Sowing the Body* (as in n. 43).


74. See duBois, *Sowing the Body*, p. 28ff.

75. Just to indicate the incredible persistence through the centuries of this particular imagery, one might recall the lines of a song entitled “Sixteen Going on Seventeen,” by Rodgers and Hammerstein from *The Sound of Music* (1959): “Your life, little girl, is an empty page, that men will want to write on.”

76. The woman’s body as nature is a trope discussed by Linda Nochlin with respect to the paintings of Courbet; see Faunce and Nochlin, eds., *Courbet Reconsidered*, 1988 (as in n. 66).

77. See Aeschylus, *The Eumenides*, in *Aeschylus I: Oresteia*, Lattimore, p. 158 (as in n. 68).

78. See duBois, *Sowing the Body*, p. 92.

The Freud family Bible, bearing Jacob Freud’s Hebrew inscriptions dedicating the volume to Sigmund (left) and recording the date of his birth (right).
Freud taught us that every love is complex and multidetermined. His love for the classical past and archaeology is no exception. The aim of this essay is to illuminate the nature of this love and its relationship to Freud's lifework: psychoanalysis.

On Freud's thirty-fifth birthday, his father returned to him a German illustrated Bible, known as the Philipson Bible. Jacob Freud had added a Hebrew dedication (incidentally, a dedication that his son could not have deciphered). The handwriting and the style are those of a man well versed in the Hebrew language, but not of a religious Jew. The language of this dedication marks Jacob Freud as a member of the Hebrew movement of enlightenment, a movement that sought to infuse secular knowledge into the Jewish ghettos of eastern Europe. We know from Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* that this Bible played a role in a number of his dreams (SE, 5, p. 583). From this dedication we learn that, unlike many Jews of his generation, Sigmund Freud did not have to wage war against the tyranny of Jewish orthodoxy.

The Philipson Bible, at first glance, seems to follow the pattern of many Jewish Bibles that contain Hebrew text, translation, and commentary. However, instead of the traditional commentary compiled by Jewish sages, Philipson gives a lesson in comparative mythology. The verses of Deuteronomy 4:19 read:

> And lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun, and the moon, and the stars, even all the host of heaven, shouldest be driven to worship them, and serve them, which the Lord thy God hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven. (p. 870)

This verse gives Philipson the opportunity to launch an illustrated lecture combining astronomy with Egyptian and Greek mythologies. The influence of Max Müller's comparative mythology is evident.

We also know that as a young man Freud was ambivalent about his Jewish heritage, and only relatively late in life did he find in Moses an object of identification (SE, 13; see also SE, 23). In 1867, when Freud was eleven years old, the Jews of Austria received full civil rights, and for a time hopes ran high that this nation's century-old anti-Semitism finally belonged to the past. Indeed, Freud thought of launching a political career. However, the rise of a new racial anti-
Semitism soon curtailed his hopes. Twice in his life Freud felt German patriotic emotions: once in 1870 when Bismarck unified Germany, and again during World War I when he was for a time swept up in the patriotic tide, as his correspondence with Karl Abraham indicates. Apart from these short lapses, Freud was a humanist and a citizen of the world. Freud knew Victor Adler well, the future leader of Austrian social democracy. However, socialism, which at that time appeared as a solution to the diseases of nationalism and anti-Semitism, never held an appeal for him.

In a letter written in July 1882 to his then-fiancée and future wife Martha Bernays, he said, “As for us, this is what I believe: even if the form wherein the old Jews were happy no longer offers us any shelter, something of the core, of the essence of this meaningful and life-affirming Judaism, will not be absent from our home.” A powerful feeling of belonging to the Jewish group never left Freud, but it was a sense of belonging empty of cultural content. Alienated from the Jewish past, constantly made aware of discrimination, Freud found refuge and a safe harbor in the classical past. The great men he admired, Goethe, Schiller, and Heine, were also smitten by the same love for Greece.

In a sensitive book entitled The Tyranny of Greece over Germany, E. M. Butler showed how Johann Winckelmann’s (1717–68) discovery, or perhaps one should say creation, of a Greece consisting of “noble simplicity and serene greatness” was an essential ingredient in the development of German poetry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From Goethe to Hölderlin, Heine, and Nietzsche, these Germans looked to Greece for spiritual renewal. In Butler’s view, it was Heine, the German-Jewish poet (1797–1856), who delivered the coup de grâce to the idealized image of Greece.

Butler did not include Freud among those smitten by the Greek ideal, but Freud’s relationship to the classical past deserves examination. Freud loved Italy but developed a prohibition against visiting Rome (SE, 4, pp. 193–98). Incidentally, he overcame this inhibition through his own self-analysis and mastered it in 1901. After this mastery, Freud commented, “It only needs a little courage to fulfill wishes which till then have been regarded as unattainable” (SE, 4, p. 194n). In one of his dreams he transferred the Slaughter of the Innocents from Bethlehem to Rome. Rome had become to Freud the Promised Land which, like Moses, he felt he would never be permitted to enter. In 1901, Freud had come within fifty miles of Rome and was planning to bypass it again on a trip to Naples. Struggling with what he came to call his Rome inhibition, Freud was engaged in analyzing a dream when the following sentence came unbidden to his mind: “Which of the two, it may be debated, walked up and down his study with the greater impatience after he had formed his plan of going to Rome—Winckelmann, the Vice Principal, or Hannibal, the Commander-in-Chief?” (SE, 4, p. 196). To understand this enigmatic statement, we have to keep in mind that Hannibal, the Semitic general of Carthage who nearly conquered Rome, was one of Freud’s childhood heroes. We might call Hannibal an emergency hero, called up to bolster Freud’s sense of Jewish pride. Winckelmann, a convert to Catholicism, was in this case equated with Rome. The unbidden sentence can
therefore be translated: “Should I actively conquer Rome, that is, my Rome inhibition, or should I bow to it?”

In 1907 Freud was asked by a publisher to name ten good books. Among others, he named Gomperz's Greek Thinkers, which became a sourcebook for many of Freud's ideas. There he became acquainted with Empedocles, the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher whose writings foreshadowed Freud's dual instinct theory. Freud also was deeply influenced by Plato. By all accounts, the most productive encounter between Freud and the Greek past took place when he read Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. Not many encounters in the realm of ideas have been so fruitful; this one made possible Freud's discovery of the Oedipus complex.

By a fortunate coincidence, we know that Freud read Oedipus Rex when he was seventeen years old and shortly after he first fell in love with Gisela Fluss, the subject of Freud's Screen Memories, published in 1899. One cannot claim that it was a propitious time for Freud, the young lover, to read this tragedy, but it left a profound impression on him. Freud discovered the Oedipus complex when, "a dim presentiment following," he exchanged hypnosis for free association. His theory was the product of his self-analysis and is dramatically told in his correspondence with Fluss. To Sophocles, the fate of Oedipus was the fate of one man. To Freud, it became the fate of Everyman.

In place of the prophecy of the oracle, Freud put the unconscious wish. Before an oracle all are helpless, but before the unconscious we need not be helpless if we are willing to undertake psychoanalysis and make these unconscious wishes conscious. In many ways Freud misread Oedipus Rex, and a very productive misreading it turned out to be. Freud ignored the fact that Oedipus was mutilated and exposed to death by his father; therefore, Freud's Oedipus complex never had a chance to develop out of the inner psychological needs of an Oedipus. Even more telling, when Freud introduced the argument that Oedipus accepted the punishment even though his crime was committed unintentionally, Freud did so because he felt guilty over his oedipal wishes. Freud introduced the biblical concept of guilt into the Greek matrix. To the Greeks, Oedipus had polluted Thebes, and pollution was punishable whether it was committed knowingly or not. The discovery of the Oedipus complex Freud owed to the classical past, but the interpretation of guilt he gave it he had inherited from his Jewish past.

The same problem that created the Rome inhibition reappeared, although in a different form, when Freud visited the Acropolis in Athens in 1904, accompanied by his brother. It is difficult for modern travelers who have been to Greece a number of times to appreciate that this journey in Freud's time was still far from usual. Freud reported on it in an open letter that he published in honor of the French novelist Romain Rolland in 1936 (SE, 22). In that letter he stated that the experience surpassed anything he had ever seen or could have imagined. Nevertheless, he remembered how reluctant he was to go to Athens, and how he had to be persuaded to go there rather than to nearby Corfu. While on the Acropolis, Freud had an experience of derealization; he had to ask his brother if it were true that they were really there. In the essay written thirty-two years later Freud reported: "In my unconscious I had not believed in [the Acropolis], and... I was
only now acquiring a conviction that ‘reached down to the unconscious’” (SE, 22, p. 241). Further analysis showed that Freud had really doubted he would ever be so fortunate as to see the Acropolis. Going a step deeper in his self-analysis, Freud found that Athens could not have meant much to his father, for whom the Greek past was a closed book. To be on the Acropolis meant, to him, to have surpassed the father. This “oedipal victory” was denied in the derealization.

While Freud confessed a great deal in the letter to Rolland—perhaps more than other men would do—he did not tell everything. He did not explain why an event that took place in 1904 was still so alive that it required self-analysis in 1936. I offer an interpretation that Freud did not make: the visits to Rome and Athens, which would not have meant much to his father, were also symbols of disloyalty to his Jewish past, since both Greece and Rome were enemies of Israel at a certain period in history.

In 1907 Freud published an analysis of the novella Gradiva by Wilhelm Jensen. Today this work of Freud (SE, 9) is seldom read and no longer quoted in the psychoanalytic literature. But there was a time when it ranked high in the estimation of psychoanalysts; it became customary to adorn the consultation room with a copy of the Vatican relief on which the story of Gradiva had been woven. The novella deals with the life of a young archaeologist who lost all his sexual wishes and concentrated entirely on his work. It so happened that he fell in love with a relief in the Vatican museum which showed a woman with her gown slightly raised and her ankle exposed. The archaeologist spins a whole fantasy around this woman and believes that she perished in Pompeii in the eruption of Vesuvius.
Drawn to Pompeii and there imagining that he meets Gradiva, he encounters a childhood sweetheart whose gait reminds him of the gait of the Roman woman. He gradually recovers from the delusion through the skillful therapy of his childhood beloved.

One can imagine how this novella appeared to Freud, for in it his theories were described. It also included dreams that Freud deciphered with a great deal of skill. In retrospect, however, this analysis represents a unique event in which Freud himself succumbed to the charm of the artist. He forgot that the childhood sweetheart was only a substitute for the mother with whom the adult cannot fall in love without evoking the dread of incest. The substitution of the childhood sweetheart enabled the artist to give his reader the fulfillment of a wishful fantasy without evoking the dread of an incestuous relationship. In addition, Freud thought that his archaeologist was cured, when in fact he only exchanged his previously repressed sexuality for a fetishistic fixation on the ankle.

Freud used the archaeological metaphor to illustrate the unconscious frequently and powerfully. He emphasized their similarities as well as their differences. In archaeology and in psychoanalysis, burial acts as preservation, but in archaeology every new layer is built on ruins. In the unconscious, it is as if all the many layers of Rome could coexist intact and simultaneously in the same space (SE, 21, p. 70). The central technical term that Freud introduced into psychoanalysis from archaeology was the concept of reconstruction (SE, 23, p. 259). For him, although not necessarily for all psychoanalysts, it was a central concept. It is related to the question whether psychoanalysis is primarily a science or an art.

I will now venture to state my interpretation of Freud’s love for archaeology. Freud’s derealization on the Acropolis was an attempt to deny that he was really in Athens, and on a deeper level that he was the oedipal victor over his father. He could easily analyze the same conflict in 1936 because by that time he was already old, unable to travel, and no longer compelled to experience himself as the oedipal victor. If we add the Athens experience to the equation archaeology = unconscious and assume that Freud, like every analysand at times under the pressure of resistances, lost his belief in the reality of the unconscious and in his own discovery of the Oedipus complex, his collection of archaeological statues would have a special value: their presence in his consulting room rectified that the buried unconscious can indeed be resurrected and brought back to life. In the uncharted voyage into the unconscious, archaeology acted as a reassurance that he was not alone and was on the right path.

What was the impact of Freud’s archaeological collection on his analysands? The Wolf Man described the effect on him:

Here were all kinds of statuettes and other unusual objects, which even the layman recognized as archaeological finds from ancient Egypt. Here and there on the walls were stone plaques representing various scenes of long-vanished epochs. A few pot plants added life to the rooms, and the warm carpet and curtains gave them a homelike note. Everything here contributed to one’s feeling of leaving the haste of modern life behind, of being
sheltered from one's daily cares. Freud himself explained his love for archeology in that the psychoanalyst, like the archaeologist in his excavations, must uncover layer after layer of the patient's psyche, before coming to the deepest, most valuable treasures.  

The poet H.D. (Hilda Doolittle) left us a less stereotyped account. Between 1933 and 1934, at age forty-seven, she was a patient of Freud, then seventy-seven years old. Clinically she suffered from a disturbance more severe than neurosis. In such cases, psychoanalysts often employed methods different from the standard psychoanalytic procedure. Her case may not be typical of Freud's analytic work, but it is certainly interesting. Whatever the reason, Freud took H.D. to his private working room:

I did not always know if the Professor's excursions with me into the other room were by way of distraction, actual social occasions, or part of his plan. Did he want to find out how I would react to certain ideas embodied in these little statues, or how deeply I felt the dynamic idea still implicit in spite of the fact that ages or aeons of time had flown over many of them? Or did he mean simply to imply that he wanted to share his treasures with me, those tangible shapes before us that yet suggested the intangible and vastly more fascinating treasures of his own mind? Whatever his idea, I wanted then, as at other times, to meet him half-way; I wanted to return, in as unobtrusive a way as possible, the courtesy that was so subtly offered me. If it was a game, a sort of roundabout way of finding out something that perhaps my unconscious guard or censor was anxious to keep from him, well, I will do my best to play this game, this guessing game—or whatever it was.

H.D. reacted as many analysands would in her place—as if she had been given a psychoanalytic examination, a kind of Rorschach test. Freud speaks:

"This is my favorite," he said. He held the object toward me. I took it in my hand. It was a little bronze statue, helmeted, clothed to the foot in carved robe with the upper incised chiton or peplo. One hand was extended as if holding a staff or rod. "She is perfect," he said, "only she has lost her spear." I did not say anything. He knew I loved Greece. 14

"She is perfect only she has lost her spear." Pallas Athena is a goddess who owes nothing to her mother; she sprang full-grown from her father's head. She therefore symbolizes a woman who denies her femininity. She also lends herself to the fantasy that H.D. herself is reborn out of Freud's head. What Freud was doing was called by Ekestein "interpreting within the metaphor." 15 In a symbolic language, a language that his patients may be able to accept, Freud is telling her that in his eyes she is perfect, even though she does not have a phallus. Stated in this way, the interpretation is left up to the patient to accept or reject. It avoids a confrontation that could bring about a transference crisis and might be a source of danger to the patient. It is, however, less effective than the straight interpretation, namely, that H.D. had never overcome the fact that she did not have a penis. Indeed, in a state of positive transference, not free from masochism however,
H. D. identifies herself with Alcestis (in Euripides’ play), the Greek woman who volunteered to die instead of her husband. H. D. was thirty years younger than Freud; she would have liked to donate to him some of the years left to her.

However, even the interpretation within the metaphor can evoke, and in this case did evoke, a negative transference:

“She is perfect,” he said and he meant that the image was of the accepted classic period, Periclean or just pre-Periclean; he meant that there was no scratch or flaw, no dent in the surface or stain on the metal, no fold in the peplum worn down or eroded away. He was speaking as an ardent lover of art and as an art collector. He was speaking in a double sense, it is true, but he was speaking of value, the actual intrinsic value of the piece; like a Jew, he was assessing its worth; the blood of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob ran in his veins. He knew his material pound, his pound of flesh, if you will, but this pound of flesh was a pound of spirit between us, something tangible, to be weighed and measured, to be weighed in the balance and—pray God—not to be found wanting!16

Anti-Semitic ideas surface, but they are immediately transformed: a Jew knows how to assess value in monetary terms. He demands his pound of flesh. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are named, but Shylock is only implied. His pound of flesh symbolizes the imaginary phallus he is asking her to give up. All too quickly for her own therapeutic goals, H. D. transformed the hostility of the pound of flesh into the covenant of a pound of spirit.

In his introductory lectures to psychoanalysis (SE, 16, p. 285), Freud enumerated three major blows that science inflicted on the self-esteem of man. The first one came from Copernicus, when he showed that the earth was not at the center of
the universe. The second came from Darwin, when he proved that man descended from the animal kingdom. The third blow Freud assigned to himself, for he showed that man is not a master in his own house because he does not know his unconscious. In a state of health, the ego feels secure in its worthiness, in the trustworthiness of the reports it receives from the unconscious, and in its perceptions of the outside world. However, in neurosis, the ego feels uneasy. It comes up against the limits of its power, becoming confused and sometimes unable to even trust its own perceptions. It was in the company of Copernicus and Darwin that Freud wished to be remembered. History has not yet rendered its verdict; it is possible that he will be remembered in a different context, in a line that extends from Plato to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

Otto Fenichel, one of Freud's leading disciples, saw Freud's contribution to science to be that he taught us to look on mental life with the same objectivity with which physics, chemistry, and biology have viewed the phenomena of the external world. Before Freud, the nineteenth century accepted a compromise: science could through medicine be applied to the body, but the mind had to remain an area reserved for philosophy and religion. Freud's contribution was to subjugate the mind to the laws of science, or, as Fenichel put it, "The object of psychoanalysis is the irrational, but its methods are rational."

In an encyclopedia article written in 1923 (SE, 18, p. 235), Freud defined psychoanalysis as first, a procedure for the investigation of mental processes; second, a method of treatment of neurotic diseases; and third, a collection of scientific information accumulating into a new scientific discipline. I have shown elsewhere that this tripartite division of psychoanalysis made comparisons with other sciences difficult; it tended to isolate psychoanalysis.

In his open letter to Romain Rolland, Freud described his lifework somewhat differently:

You know that the aim of my scientific work was to throw light upon unusual, abnormal, or pathological manifestations of the mind—that is to say, to trace them back to thepsychical forces operating behind them and to indicate the mechanisms at work. I began by attempting this upon myself, and then went on to apply it to other people and finally, by a bold extension, to the human race as a whole. (SE, 22, p. 239)

This very wide scope of psychoanalysis raised the question as to who should practice it. In 1926 Theodore Reik, a prominent but nonmedical member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society who had made significant contributions to the psychoanalytic understanding of religion, was sued for the Austrian equivalent of malpractice. In his defense, and in the defense of other nonmedical psychoanalysts, Freud wrote the essay "On The Question of Lay Analysis." There he stated:

In the mental life of children today we can still detect the same archaic factors which were once dominant generally in the primeval days of human civilization. In his mental development the child would be repeating the
history of his race in an abbreviated form, just as embryology long since recognized was the case with somatic development. (SE, 20, p. 212)

Freud goes on to describe that because the incestuous wishes are powerful in human heritage, they have never been fully overcome. Man therefore grants such wishes to his mythological gods. They can enjoy what mankind had to renounce. The connection between psychoanalysis and the history of civilization led Freud to believe that to confine psychoanalysis to medical education would deprive it of a source of vitality and new ideas:

For we do not consider it at all desirable for psychoanalysis to be swallowed up by medicine and to find its last resting place in a textbook of psychiatry under the heading “Methods of Treatment,” alongside of procedures such as hypnotic suggestion, autosuggestion, and persuasion.... As a “depth psychology,” a theory of the mental unconscious, it can become indispensable to all the sciences which are concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as art, religion and the social order.... The use of analysis for the treatment of the neuroses is only one of its applications; the future will perhaps show that it is not the most important one. In any case it would be wrong to sacrifice all the other applications to this single one, just because it touches on the circle of medical interests. (SE, 20, p. 248)

Such observations lead directly to the question whether psychoanalysis is a scientific discipline to be practiced by people who are trained along professional lines, in the manner of lawyers or dentists, or whether it is a calling to be practiced by persons with a special empathetic capacity to understand other human beings. Strange as it may seem, psychoanalysis is a domain of both art and science.

When a psychoanalyst works with a patient, he works out of an internalized model of treatment, a model he has learned in his training. This model helps him to understand and organize his analysand’s free associations, which, had he not possessed such a model, would otherwise remain inchoate. However, the model has its disadvantages, for the analyst might not hear what is beyond his model. Since Freud’s death, other models have been developed by other psychoanalysts.

Freud’s own model, probably under the influence of archaeology, consisted of three phases (SE, 18, p. 152). In the first, psychoanalysis procures from the patient the necessary information; the analyst listens and asks questions. During this phase, the psychoanalyst waits until the analysand’s history coalesces into a gestalt in the analyst’s mind. The general premises are the same for all patients, but every analysand carries within a unique variation on the general human theme. The variation includes the traumatic events in every patient’s life, such as illnesses, premature separations, and the idiosyncrasies of the parents. It also includes the defense mechanisms each individual built up as a result of his or her past. These defenses, useful as they may have been during infancy, persist even though they no longer fulfill an essential function.
When the psychoanalyst has grasped these interconnections, the second phase of analysis begins. He offers to the analysand his own reconstruction, that is, his understanding of how the person became the kind of person he or she is. It is during this phase that the analyst is particularly active. The reconstruction evokes reactions: pressure, anger, and occasionally gratitude for the understanding that the analysand has received. The period of reconstruction is followed by the third period of "working through," when analyst and analysand go over the reconstruction to make it more accurate. In this last phase, analyst and analysand work as a team. The first two phases psychoanalysis shares with archaeology, but the third is unique to psychoanalysis.

The same can be said about psychoanalytic interpretations given by the analyst to his patients. No two psychoanalysts make the same interpretation. The data patients present as their histories, the dreams they report, the slips of the tongue they make, and the transference relationships they develop, are seldom, if ever, open to only one interpretation. Even after an exhaustive period of free association, room remains for many interpretations. Many of the analyst's interpretations come directly from the storehouse of accumulated psychoanalytic ideas, but the most important interpretations occur to the analyst through a cooperation he receives from his own unconscious. Every psychoanalysis is, to a lesser or greater extent, a voyage of discovery. It is here that no amount of training can take the place of psychoanalytic talent.

In a famous letter that Freud wrote on October 9, 1928, to Oskar Pfister, who was both a Protestant clergyman and a psychoanalyst, Freud asked: "Why have the religiously devout not discovered psychoanalysis? Why did one have to wait for a totally Godless Jew?" The remark raises the question whether Freud discovered psychoanalysis or created it. Today the distinction between discovery and creation is less sharp than it was in Freud's day. In his generation, it was believed that the scientist discovered a secret of nature that hitherto was like a letter written in an ancient and undecipherable script. The idea is still prevalent that what one scientist overlooks or omits, even if he were misled by the data, a later scientist will complete. It is not so with artists. If Shakespeare had not written his plays and sonnets, or if Michelangelo had not painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, no one for all time would have written those plays or painted that ceiling.

If Freud had not lived, would someone else have discovered psychoanalysis? The answer is difficult for psychoanalysis, as we have seen, and consists of many parts. It is conceivable that someone would have discovered infantile sexuality, and that someone else would have discovered transference, and perhaps another person would have hit on the idea that dreams can be used for therapeutic purposes. But it is not plausible that one man would have made all these discoveries in the exact sequence and order with which Freud made them. In other words, Freud's discoveries, like the work of the very great artist, would never have been duplicated. There was nothing inevitable in the discovery of psychoanalysis. The decision whether to rank Freud among the great scientists or the great artists must be left open.
NOTES

1. I had the privilege of reading the inscription at the opening of the Freud Museum in London and have commented on it in M. Bergmann, "Moses and the Evolution of Freud's Jewish Identity" (1971); reprinted in Judaism and Psychoanalysis, ed. M. Ostow (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1982), pp. 115–42. It reads, in part:
   
   My dear Son,
   
   It was in the seventh year of your age that the spirit of God began to move you to learning. I would say the spirit of God speaketh to you: "Read in My book; there will be opened to thee sources of knowledge and of the intellect." . . . Since then I have preserved the same Bible. Now, on your thirty-fifth birthday I have brought it out from its retirement and I send it to you as a token of love from your old father.
   
2. The so-called Hebrew Enlightenment began in France after Napoleon, in the period after the 18 Brumaire coup d'état, offered the Jews of France a choice between returning to Israel or full citizenship in France. The "Sanhedrin" (the cultural-religious body that guided the affairs of Jewish life in France) voted for citizenship. The aim of the movement was to introduce the culturally and religiously isolated Jews into the mainstream of European life. See S. W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, 2d ed., 18 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952–69).

3. Max Müller, the renowned German philologist and Orientalist, lived in Oxford much of his life. He developed the theory that myths originated from metaphors describing natural phenomena.


FREUD'S LIBRARY AND AN APPENDIX OF TEXTS RELATED TO ANTIQUITIES

Wendy Botting
J. Keith Davies

"I have sacrificed a great deal for my collection of Greek, Roman and Egyptian antiquities, and actually have read more archaeology than psychology..." (letter to Stefan Zweig, February 7, 1931). In this emphatic statement, the founder of psychoanalysis hoped to correct Zweig's unflattering opinion of his personality, but in doing so, Freud undoubtedly overstated the emphasis of his reading. As Peter Gay has commented (above, p. 16), this "very exaggeration testifies to the privileged place his antiquities held in Freud's mental economy." That Freud's fascination with antiquity extended to his reading is amply borne out by the contents of his library. His intellectual interest and grasp of the antique world had a depth and breadth complementary to his passion for collecting.

Europeans for centuries had been fascinated by the remains and monuments of classical antiquity which testified to the existence of past and seemingly superior societies. During the cultural upsurge of the Renaissance, the heritage of antiquity was taken as an ideal and a model.

The works of Johann Winckelmann (1717-68), who is considered to be the founder of classical archaeology, did much to spread and popularize a notion of an idealized classical culture, particularly in Germany, and had a great influence on Goethe. Winckelmann's declaration that "the only way for us to become great... is to imitate the Greeks" became a manifesto for Germanic culture, and this objective came to dominate the educational systems of Germany and Austria. Greek and Latin were taught, and classical history, literature, law, and mythology came to provide a common frame of reference for the educated classes throughout Europe.

During the early decades of the nineteenth century, as a result of Napoleon's Egyptian campaign and the building of the Suez Canal, all things Egyptian became fashionable and antiquities flooded into Europe. A systematic and disciplined study of the ancient Egyptians was made possible by the eventual decipherment of hieroglyphic script by J.-F. Champollion in 1822. The study of the Egyptian language opened up to examination the entire culture of this vanished civilization—its customs, law, social practices, and, perhaps most important, its religion. Many scholars were also motivated to investigate historical and archaeological evidence for confirmation of biblical scripture.
This was the intellectual environment in which Freud grew up and which reflected his own predisposition: “I am reading Burckhardt’s History of Greek Civilization, which is provoking me with unexpected parallels. My predilection for the prehistoric in all its human forms remains the same” (letter to W. Fliess, January 30, 1899).² Freud’s researches were directed not only to the early childhood experiences of the individual but also to the origins of civilization and culture.

At the basis of Freud’s library are detailed technical reports of numerous archaeological excavations. Archaeology had developed from mere antiquarianism or outright treasure hunting and looting into a methodical and disciplined study, and during Freud’s lifetime it entered what might be seen as a golden age of exploration and discovery. The accounts of all the most famous practitioners found their place on Freud’s shelves: Heinrich Schliemann’s Iliss, Mykenae, and Tiryns; Wilhelm Dorpfeld’s Troja und Ilium; Sir Arthur Evans’s account of his work at Knossos, The Palace of Minos; and the world-famous discovery by Howard Carter, The Tomb of Tut-Ankh-Amen. The presence of more obscure reports, specialist periodicals, technical handbooks, and topographies testify to Freud’s close interest in current developments in the field.

Other volumes deal with the whole range of artifacts being discovered in the course of excavation, examples of which Freud had in his own collection or which were to be found in the much larger collections of national museums. Freud’s interest was eclectic, and this is reflected in his library. Topics include sculpture and figurines, ceramics, painting and frescoes, amulets, vases, glass, and jewelry, as well as the large-scale monuments and architecture of antiquity.

At an interpretive level, the library contains reconstructions of the past in the form of narrative histories, cultural histories, and speculative anthropologies. Freud cites the work of Darwin, Sir James Frazer’s Golden Bough and Totemism and Exogamy, and William Robertson Smith’s Lectures on the Religion of the Semites as sources on which he drew. Also represented are the works of Andrew Lang, James Breasted, Sir Ernest Wallis Budge, and Sir Gaston Maspero.
As Freud's interests changed and developed, so did his library. It appears that he disposed of volumes as they became damaged or no longer held his interest. He was also in the habit of giving away books to relatives, friends, and colleagues. The library underwent a more radical sorting when it was divided and packed while Freud waited to flee from Vienna in 1938. His biographer Ernest Jones describes the act laconically: "There were many ways of killing the weary time of waiting. Freud went through his books, selected those he wished to take to London and disposed of the ones he no longer wanted."

Estimates of the number of books in the collection in Vienna and the number moved to London are necessarily approximate, but the contents of the Berggasse 19 library are thought to have numbered some 2,500 volumes in 1938. That Freud elected to move his archaeology books is an indication of their importance to him in the final period of his life. In the end, about two thousand books, almost the entire library, were moved to London, where they are now housed at 20 Maresfield Gardens, Freud's London address and today the Freud Museum.

Other smaller collections of the books that remained from the Berggasse 19 library lie scattered today in several locations in Europe and the United States. A number of essays have been written on the status of the books that Freud did not move to London, studies generally concerned with authenticating them as once having been part of his library, but further investigation into these collections is necessary.

Those books not kept by Freud were passed to a Viennese dealer, Paul Sonnenfeld, who then sold most of them to antiquarian bookseller Heinrich Hinterberger. (Sonnefeld kept approximately seventy titles, which are now in the Special Collections Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) Hinterberger advertised the collection (along with hundreds of other books not belonging to Freud) as that of "a famous Viennese scientific explorer," Dr. Jacob Schatzky, librarian of the New York State Psychiatric Institute, recognized this as a description of Freud, and he acquired the collection for the Institute in 1939. These books are now in the Special Collections Division of the Health Sciences Library at Columbia University in New York City.

There is also a small group of books from Freud's personal library, gathered from various sources, at the Sigmund Freud Haus at Berggasse 19, Vienna, now a museum.

An additional five titles, derived from a private collection, are lodged in the Library of Congress, and Anna Freud is known to have given a small number of books to a family friend.
NOTES


5. The current holdings in the museum consist of approximately 1,600 titles (over 2,000) volumes. Also held there is Freud’s collection of his own works in various languages and editions, Freud’s collection of offprints of his articles in various journals, complimentary copies of offprints of articles by other authors, and series of various psychoanalytic journals.

Further complicating the problem of arriving at a total is Freud’s propensity for lending books, and his daughter and coworker Anna’s in-house borrowing. Between 1968 and 1982 an unpublished card catalogue of the London library was compiled by Gertrude Dann (former librarian of the Hampstead Child Therapy clinic, now the Anna Freud Centre), with the help of Sophie Dann. Comparison with this listing reveals that over one hundred volumes now appear to be missing.

To date, the only article on the history of the collection at the Freud Museum is an unpublished manuscript by Dorothea Heckert and Steve Neufeld. “Reassembling Freud’s Library—A Report and Recommendations,” Freud Museum, London, April 1986. The Freud Museum is currently preparing a catalogue of the library for publication.


7. See Eisler, “Freuds Bibliothek.”

8. The proportion of this collection that can be definitively authenticated as having belonged to Freud has been much disputed. See Bakan, “The Authenticity of the Freud Memorial Collection”; Lewis and Landis, “Freud’s Library”; and Eisler, “Freuds Bibliothek.”


10. Eisler, “Freuds Bibliothek.”

11. Personal communication to Freud Museum.
Following is a list of books on archaeology and related areas that are preserved in Freud's last study and consultation room in the Freud Museum, London. This inventory includes specific topics in the arts and crafts of ancient societies, histories of antiquity, including ancient languages and religions, descriptive works on various archaeological sites, and classical art history. Freud owned and read many books concerning anthropology, history, or religion in general, but such titles have not been included in this appendix.


Portoflio of 42 plates of the archaeological site.


Booklet; plans and view maps in envelope.

Boetticher, Adolf. Die Akropolis von Athen: nach den Berichten der Altertumskunde und den neuesten Erforschungen (The Acropolis of Athens, according to reports from the ancients and from the most recent researches). Illus. Berlin: J. Springer, 1888.

——. Olympia, das Fest und seine Stätte: nach den Berichten der Altertumskunde und den Ergebnissen der deutschen Ausgrabungen (Olympia, the festival and its sites, according to reports from the ancients and the results of the German excavations). 2d ed. Illus. Berlin: J. Springer, 1886.


Several marginal markings and underlinings.


Fifteen pictorial postcards in envelope.


Several marginal markings and underlinings.


Bookplate; several underlinings; translations section uncut.


Bookplate.


Some marginal markings, vol. 3 only.

Marginal marking, p. 21.


Many marginal markings and underlinings.


Some marginal markings; signed: Dr. Freud, January 22, 1902.


Some marginal markings.


———. Lysipp und seine Stellung in der griechischen Plastik (Lysipp and his place in Greek sculpture). Illus. Hamburg: Verlaganstalt and Druckerei, 1891.

Signed: Dr. Freud, n.d.; dedicated by author, n.d.


Dedicated by author, n.d.


Dedicated by author, n.d.


Dedicated by author, n.d.


Dedicated by author, n.d.


Signed: Dr. Freud, October 24, 1905.


Müller, Valentin Kurt. Frühe Plastik in Griechenland und Vorderasien: ihre Typenbildung von der neolithischen bis in die griechisch-hellenistische Zeit (rund 3000 bis 600 v. Chr.) (Early sculpture in Greece and Asia Minor: typological development from neolithic times up to the archaic Greek era [ca. 3000-600 B.C.]). Illus. Augsburg: B. Filsrer, 1929.


Marginal markings, p. 5.


Signed: Dr. Freud, February 4, 1899.


Some marginal markings.


Signed: Dr. Freud, September 13, [i]; bookplate.


Thirty-two mounted plates in folder.


Marginal markings, pp. 303 and 310.


Vol. 1 of a series on archaeological practice.

Vol. 2 cut to p. 89 only.


