Dear Readers,

Thank you for taking an interest in the *Binghamton Journal of History* published by Binghamton University’s chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, the history honor society. The journal proudly provides undergraduates with the opportunity to have high quality research projects published as articles. The journal also provides graduate students experience as the editors who select and review submissions and publish the journal’s annual issues.

The editors are excited to present in this volume a selection of undergraduate articles that span several time periods, geographical regions, and methodologies. We also include in the final pages of this volume information regarding Phi Alpha Theta, Binghamton University’s Research Days, the History Department’s Combined BA/MA Program, and the Minor in the History of Science, Technology, & Medicine.

We appreciate the support of Phi Alpha Theta and its members as well as the History Department who have helped make the publication of this journal possible.

Sincerely,
The Editorial Board
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Nebuchadnezzar II and Babylon: Building Personal Legacy Through Monumentality

Roan Fleischer

Despite having been founded in the third millennium B.C., when Nebuchadnezzar II ascended to the throne of Babylon in 605 B.C., the city he inherited was hardly a thriving metropolis, even by ancient Mesopotamian standards. During the Neo-Assyrian Period (ca.880-612 BC), Babylon traditionally enjoyed significant autonomy due to its status as an important religious sanctuary. This situation, however, began to change for the worse in the 7th century BC, when in 689 the city was sacked by the Assyrian king Sennacherib due to its role in a rebellion.\footnote{Marc Van De Mieroop, \textit{A History of the Ancient Near East ca. 3000-323 BC; Second Edition} (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 248, 253-55.} The destruction of Babylon was highly controversial due to the city’s status as a major religious center, and because of this, Sennacherib’s son and successor, Esarhaddon, attempted to rebuild Babylon. Unfortunately, Esarhaddon’s efforts were reversed when one of his successors, Ashurbanipal, besieged the city, destroyed its walls, and set the royal palace ablaze in 649 BC.\footnote{Paul Kriwaczek, \textit{Babylon: Mesopotamia and the Birth of Civilization} (New York NY: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010), 257.} Nebuchadnezzar’s forty-three-year reign was one dedicated to reconstructing and revitalizing the city of Babylon. It was the Babylon built by Nebuchadnezzar that amazed Greeks such as Herodotus and Alexander the Great. Through his relentless...
building efforts and commission of numerous inscriptions, Nebuchadnezzar achieved two goals: he brought Babylon back to its former glory as well as ensured that his name was eternally remembered.

Babylon was the home of the supreme god of the Babylonian pantheon, Marduk, whom the Babylonians believed lived in the temple Esagila. Located next to Esagila was a ziggurat. The Babylonians believed that Marduk created the foundations for this ziggurat, located at the center of the world. The ziggurat of Babylon, called Etemenanki, was the largest such building in Mesopotamia by the end of Nebuchadnezzar’s reign. Its magnitude was legendary to Greco-Roman authors and served as the inspiration for the Biblical “Tower of Babel.” Most likely, early on in his reign, Nebuchadnezzar began reconstruction of Etemenanki and although people from all over the Babylonian Empire made up the labor force, Nebuchadnezzar and his sons also took part in the laying of the mud bricks that became the foundation of the ziggurat. The ziggurat was under construction during the reign of Nabopolassar, Nebuchadnezzar’s father. It is likely that upon his ascension to the throne, Nebuchadnezzar continued his father’s work on Etemenanki.

Babylonian kings’ authority and legitimacy was strongly dependent on the approval of the Marduk priesthood. Thus, kings devoted a significant amount of resources to building projects dedicated to Marduk. Although Nebuchadnezzar built the ziggurat of Babylon to its greatest height in both physicality and notoriety, his ziggurat was just one of many built over the history

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4 A stepped pyramid with a temple located on the top.
6 Bottero, 116; Gn. 11:1-9.
of Babylon. His father, Nabopolassar, began to set the foundations of Etemenanki which Nebuchadnezzar had elaborated on after his father’s death in 605. Alexander the Great dismantled the ziggurat to build his own one on the same site. Unfortunately, Alexander died before completion and now only the ziggurat’s foundations survive. However, Herodotus provided a glowing if not possibly exaggerated description of the Etemenanki:

The temple is a square building, two furloughs each way, with bronze gates, and was still in existence in my time; it has a solid central tower, one furlough square, with a second erected on top of it and then a third, and so on up to eight. All eight towers can be climbed by a spiral way running round the outside, and about halfway up there are seats for those who make ascent to rest on. On the summit of the top most tower stands a great temple with a fine large couch in it, richly covered, and a golden table beside it. The shrine contains no image and no one spends the night there except (if we may believe the Chaldeans who are the priests of Bel [Marduk]) one Assyrian woman, all alone, whoever it may be that the god has chosen.

The construction of Etemenanki was vitally important for the reign of Nebuchadnezzar. As the king of Babylon and the Babylonian Empire, Nebuchadnezzar had to cater to the Babylonian priests as well as display his reverence for the gods.

8 Wiseman, 71.
The power of the Marduk priesthood is truly evident through an examination of the reign of Nabonidus, one of Nebuchadnezzar’s successors. Nabonidus was particularly devoted to Sin, the Babylonian moon god, which became a major bone of contention between the king and the priests of Marduk. In 552 BC, much to the chagrin of the Marduk priesthood, Nabonidus left Babylon and relocated to Teima in the Arabian Desert because of its status as a sanctuary for Sin, leaving his son Belshazzar as ruler of Babylon. The decision to leave greatly offended the Marduk priesthood and facilitated the Persian king Cyrus II’s conquest of the Babylonian Empire (539 BC) as Babylonian cities (Babylon included) offered little to no resistance to the Persians. A Babylonian text produced during the reign of Cyrus details the discontent in Babylon during the reign of Nabonidus saying, “By his own plan, he did away with the worship of Marduk, the king of the gods; he continually did evil against Marduk’s city.” By reconstructing Etemenanki, Nebuchadnezzar remained in the favor of the Marduk priesthood, and Marduk himself, which was important for establishing and maintaining legitimacy.

Although the reconstruction of Etemenanki was a major highlight of Nebuchadnezzar’s reign, it was the walls of Babylon that truly convey his individual agenda; the creation of a personal legacy. The walls built by Nebuchadnezzar were truly massive, and surrounded the entire city, whose perimeter spanned about ten kilometers. The city was enveloped by an outer and inner wall, as well as a moat that encompassed the city. In addition, the east side of the city was fortified to a level beyond that of the

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rest of the city. It was surrounded by a third wall outside of the moat and reinforced with an additional moat.\textsuperscript{14} Completely surrounded by water, Babylon was essentially a fortified island.\textsuperscript{15} Towers were placed at intervals of eighteen meters and eight gates controlled entry throughout the city.\textsuperscript{16} Closed off with gates, the moat ensured the security of Babylon’s waterways.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, the walls were very thick. The inner wall was six and a half meters thick and the outer wall three and a half meters, making the city seemingly impenetrable (Figure 1).\textsuperscript{18}

The inscriptions on the walls of Babylon provide insight into Nebuchadnezzar’s agenda. In one inscription, which was located between the walls and the outer moat Nebuchadnezzar says, “no pillaging robber might enter into this water sewer, with bright iron bars I closed the entrance to the river, in gratings of iron I set it and fastened it with hinges. The defenses of Esagila and Babylon I strengthened and secured for my reign an enduring name.”\textsuperscript{19} Through this inscription, Nebuchadnezzar clearly wanted his construction projects to be associated with him even long after his death. This point is furthered by the thousands of bricks discovered by archeologists with Nebuchadnezzar’s name inscribed on them.\textsuperscript{20} The inscription also indicates how Nebuchadnezzar wanted to be remembered. He emphasized his role as a protector of both Babylon and Marduk to remind his subjects of the benefits of his rule. As king, he did right by both his people and his god in ensuring the protection of their city. Another inscription that provides valuable insight into how Nebuchadnezzar imagined his reign saying:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Saggs, 164.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Sack, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Saggs, \textit{Babylonians}, 164.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Sack, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Saggs, \textit{Babylonians}, 164.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Sack, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Van De Mieroop \textit{Ancient Near East}, 277.
\end{itemize}
In order to strengthen the defenses of Esagila that the evil and the wicked might not oppress Babylon, that which no king had done before me, at the outskirts of Babylon to the east I put about a great wall. Its moat I dug and its inner moat-wall with mortar and brick I raised mountain-high. About the sides of Babylon great banks of earth I heaped up. Great floods of destroying waters like the great waves of sea I made to flow about it; with marsh I surrounded it.  

In the inscription, Nebuchadnezzar attempted to link himself to the mythical hero Gilgamesh. Gilgamesh is credited in Mesopotamian mythology with building the walls and ramparts of the city of Uruk as well as creating temples for the deities Eanna, Anu and Ishtar. If there was a historical Gilgamesh is beyond the scope of this paper. However, regardless of whether Gilgamesh did exist, his story resonated throughout Mesopotamian history and Gilgamesh was a role model for Mesopotamian kings. Nebuchadnezzar was aware of how Gilgamesh achieved eternal fame and was quick to emulate him. By stating he was the first king to surround Babylon with walls, Nebuchadnezzar attempted to have his subjects think of him as a “Babylonian Gilgamesh.” In the previous description, Nebuchadnezzar created a dichotomy between Babylon and Babylonians, and everyone else they came into contact with. He emphasized his desire to protect the city from the forces of evil. Because Nebuchadnezzar stated that all its

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21 Sack, Nebuchadnezzar, 66.
22 Sack, 67.
enemies were evil, he essentially said that during his reign, Babylon was a force for good.\footnote{This argument would have been laughable to Babylon’s neighbors. Especially during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar, Babylon was very aggressive militarily; particularly in the Levant.}

Although Babylon’s walls were very impressive, Mesopotamia had a long tradition of kings enhancing the fortifications of their respective cities. In fact, according to Ronald H. Sack, “virtually all Mesopotamian rulers from whom we have records considered defense of their capitals...to be keys to eternal fame.”\footnote{Sack, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 67.} Nebuchadnezzar’s walls, however, deserve special recognition. Not only were they large and monumental, but also very practical. The walls of Babylon presented a more than a formidable obstacle to would-be assailants. In addition to their defensive function, the walls also served as a reminder of the greatness and power of Nebuchadnezzar both during and after his lifetime.

Nebuchadnezzar’s architecture was not limited to the public sphere. In addition to improving the city’s religious sanctuaries and defensive structures, Nebuchadnezzar also built a lavish palace for himself, known in English as the “Southern Palace” due to its location in the Southern portion of the city known as Babil.\footnote{Sack, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 73.} While this palace was under construction, Nebuchadnezzar resided in the palace that had formerly belonged to his father, Nabonidus.\footnote{Wiseman, \textit{Nebuchadrezzar}, 55.} The “Southern Palace” was located to the west of his father’s palace.\footnote{Sack, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 73.}

Nebuchadnezzar spared no expense in the construction of “The Southern Palace” and used only premium materials. Blue
enamelled bricks decorated the upper walls and the doors were made of cedar and ebony. The woods were either “encased in bronze or inlaid with silver, gold and ivory.” In addition to being made of lavish materials, the “Summer Palace” was truly massive. The palace had five courtyards and a huge throne room which measured 7700 square feet. Nebuchadnezzar claimed that he cut down at least some of the trees used to build his palace. Such a claim was another attempt by Nebuchadnezzar to link himself to Gilgamesh. Just as Gilgamesh and his companion Enkidu conquered the forest by killing its guardian, Humbaba, Nebuchadnezzar did the same by felling trees and using them to build his new home. Nebuchadnezzar built several palaces in Babylon, but they paled in comparison to the “Summer Palace,” in both splendor and significance.

No discussion regarding the reign of Nebuchadnezzar would be complete without at least mentioning the legendary Hanging Gardens of Babylon. Although the Hanging Gardens were listed among the Seven Wonders of the World, they remain shrouded in mystery. The Hanging Gardens captured the imaginations of classical authors such as Berossos, Herodotus and Diodorus, who provide glowing accounts of the Gardens that emphasize its splendor. Unfortunately, they do not provide the location of the Gardens. According to Berossos, the Hanging Gardens were erected to please Amytis, one of Nebuchadnezzar’s Persian concubines. Amytis became homesick after arriving in Babylon. The Hanging Gardens were meant to replicate the mountainous meadows of her homeland to make Amytis’ life in

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33 Sack, *Nebuchadnezzar*, 73.
Babylon more enjoyable.\textsuperscript{34} It is difficult to determine where exactly Amytis was from because Greek authors tended to use Persia and Media interchangeably. The sack of Nineveh shows that Babylonia and Media had close ties but it is entirely possible that Nebuchadnezzar had diplomatic connections with Persia as well.

Although no known Mesopotamian sources discuss the Hanging Gardens, classical authors provide descriptions of them. According to Diodorus, the Gardens were massive, standing fifty cubits high and had walls that were twenty-two feet thick.\textsuperscript{35} According to Assyriologist D.J. Wiseman, a cylinder inscription credited to Nebuchadnezzar describes an architectural project in which Nebuchadnezzar constructed a mountain-like structure out of mud-brick, which could be a reference to the Hanging Gardens.\textsuperscript{36} In both Herodotus’ and Diodorus’ works, the Hanging Gardens were not built by Nebuchadnezzar but by Semiramis, a mythological Mesopotamian queen.\textsuperscript{37} Berossos, however, states that it was in fact Nebuchadnezzar who built the Gardens.\textsuperscript{38} Berossos is a more reliable source than Herodotus regarding Babylonian history because not only was he a native Babylonian who lived in Babylon, but he was also a priest of Marduk.\textsuperscript{39} Most

\textsuperscript{34} Saggs, Babylonians, 167.
\textsuperscript{36} Wiseman, \textit{Nebuchadrezzar}, 56-7.
\textsuperscript{37} Sack, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 74.
\textsuperscript{38} Joseph.\textit{Ap.} 141, in Gerald P. Verbrugghe and John M. Wickersham, \textit{Berossos and Manetho, Introduced and Translated: Native Traditions in Egypt and Mesopotamia} (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 59. Because Berossos’ works have not survived into present day, we are reliant on authors such as Josephus who have transcribed some of his writings.
\textsuperscript{39} Verbrugghe and Wickersham, \textit{Berossos and Manetho}, 13.
scholars agree that Berossos used Babylonian texts that either have not survived antiquity or have not yet been discovered when recording his works. Although no clear archaeological evidence for the Hanging Gardens have been discovered to date, the classical authors were in agreement that the Gardens did exist and were in fact located in Babylon. Clearly, Mesopotamians in the first millennium BC had the technology to create the Hanging Gardens, as the Assyrian king Assur-nasir-apli II claimed to have used a network of canals to create a magnificent garden at the city of Kalhu. The garden was home to a wide variety of exotic plants, such as pomegranate, ebony, cedar, juniper and frankincense, as well as an artificial waterfall. In addition, the gardens in the Palace Without Rival at Nineveh, built by Sennacherib, were “laid out in terraces and supplied with a sophisticated watering system.” Furthermore, Berossos’ testimony must be considered reliable due to his Babylonian heritage as well as his role as a priest of Marduk; one of the most important people in Babylon even during the Achaemenid and Hellenistic periods in which he lived. In addition to carrying out religious tasks, Babylonian priests were also important for their roles as record keepers.

The Ishtar Gate is one of the most recognizable pieces of Mesopotamian architecture that has survived to the present day, serving as a reminder of the greatness of Babylon in the sixth century B.C. The Ishtar Gate was re-discovered by Robert Koldeway in 1889, and since 1930, the Ishtar Gate has been

40 Sack, Nebuchadnezzar, 75.
41 Wiseman, Nebuchadrezzar, 59.
43 Verbrugghe and Wickersham, Berossos and Manetho, 13, 16.
displayed in the Pergamon Museum in Berlin. The Ishtar Gate was colorfully decorated; the bricks above street level were covered in a blue enamel glaze and animals such as dragons, and bulls were painted on as well. The choice of lions and dragons was a highly calculated decision by Nebuchadnezzar. The dragon, called *mushhushshu* in Akkadian was heavily associated with Marduk as well as the god Nabu in the Babylonian religion (Figure 2). Nabu was the god of writing and wisdom as well as Marduk’s son in the Babylonian mythological tradition. The god Nabu would have been very important to Nebuchadnezzar. Nebuchadnezzar is the Hebrew version of the name Nabukudurri-ursur which means “Oh Nabu, Protect My Offspring” in Akkadian. The Akkadian version of the name of Nabopolassar, Nebuchadnezzar’s father (Nabu-apla-usur) shows that Nabu was a particularly important god to the kings of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty. Nabopolassar was the founder of the dynasty and his father unknown as he is not mentioned in any Babylonian writings, most likely because Nabonidus’ father was not from an elite Babylonian family. However, the decision to name his son Nabu-kudurri-ursur indicates that Nabu was a god that Nabopolassar was particularly fond of. The bulls were most likely featured because they were sacred to Ishtar, the goddess to whom Ishtar Gate was dedicated, as well as being heavily associated with Adad, the god of weather (Figure 3)

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45 Leick, 247.
The Ishtar Gate marked the entrance to the Processional Way, a road about a half a mile in length from the Festival House outside the city’s walls, through the Ishtar Gate, and ending at Esagila in the center of the city. Like the Ishtar Gate, the walls along the Processional Way were lavishly decorated with bricks coated in blue enamel. The Processional Way featured depictions of lions on its colored bricks, an animal that does not appear on the Ishtar Gate (Figure 4). Lions are ubiquitous in Mesopotamian art from the first millennium BC, however, their inclusion on the Processional Way was not meaningless. Lions were often associated with kingship in Mesopotamia, where hunting lions was a kingly activity. The Assyrian kings decorated their palaces with reliefs depicting lion hunts. The association with lion hunting and kingliness dates to the time of Gilgamesh. After the death of his companion Enkidu, Gilgamesh shot at a group of lions with his bow in a fit of rage, killing many of them. Gilgamesh was very important in Mesopotamian mythology as he was credited with establishing many of the expectations and traditions of Mesopotamian kingship.

The Processional Way became a mechanism for Nebuchadnezzar to display his kingly authority to his people. Nebuchadnezzar reinforced the Processional Way with very durable burnt bricks which were “laid in bitumen, hardened with the insertion of limestone slabs.” In addition to reinforcing the

53 At no point during one of these hunts was the king at risk. The king hunted the lions from the safety of his chariot using a bow and arrow while the lions were trapped by the king’s soldiers who used their shield to form a wall, preventing the lions from escaping.
bricks, Nebuchadnezzar also raised the elevation of the roadway itself by adding new layers of earth upon the previously existing ones.\textsuperscript{56} Next, the reinforced bricks were laid on top of the earth. The overhaul of the Processional Way was vital for Nebuchadnezzar’s reign because the Processional Way was the route used for many celebrations that provided the king an opportunity to both connect with and display his power to his subjects. The Processional Way was used for the ceremonial arrival and departure of the Babylonian army of which the king at the head.\textsuperscript{57} The Victory Parade, which went along the Processional Way provided a valuable opportunity for the king to display his power.\textsuperscript{58} A celebration of military success allowed the king to remind his subjects of his military strength through means other than intimidation. Mesopotamian kings relied on the display of military authority to reinforce their legitimacy and Nebuchadnezzar was no exception. In his inscriptions, Nebuchadnezzar reminded his subjects that he not only ruled Babylonia but many other territories as well. In addition, Nebuchadnezzar also reminded his subjects that he ruled at the consent of Marduk, and that the conquest of foreign peoples was a task that the god entrusted in him. The following inscription serves as a prime example of the rhetoric that Nebuchadnezzar, through scribes, distributed during his reign:

\begin{quote}
The widespread peoples, whom Marduk, my lord, entrusted to me, whose shepherdship the hero Samas gave me, the totality of countries, the whole of all inhabited regions, from the Upper Sea [Mediterranean Sea] to the Lower Sea [Persian Gulf], remote countries, the peoples of the widespread inhabited regions, kings of distant mountain regions and faraway islands in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{56} Wiseman, 62.
\textsuperscript{57} Leick, \textit{Mesopotamia}, 265.
\textsuperscript{58} Wiseman, \textit{Nebuchadrezzar}, 63.
the Upper and Lower Sea---whose lead ropes, Marduk, my lord placed into my hands in order to pull his chariot pole---I conscripted...for the building of Etemenanki I imposed the work-basket on them.⁵⁹

Nebuchadnezzar’s kingship was contingent on the approval of Marduk. It was through the will of Marduk that Nebuchadnezzar expanded the borders of the Babylonian Empire and conquered its neighbors. Nebuchadnezzar used corvee labor to complete his building projects, and was very aware of which actions his subjects may not have always approved of. In an effort to portray military conquest and expansion as well as the use of corvee labor in a positive light, Nebuchadnezzar actively associated these activities with the will of Marduk.

One of the most important religious celebrations in Babylon was the New Year’s Festival. The New Year’s Festival featured a procession of gods that travelled the route of the Processional Way from Esagila to the Festival House (route outlined in Figure 1).⁶⁰ The New Year’s Festival lasted twelve days, and, “during the festival, the gods were exalted to not only renew time...but the universe itself, as if the gods were re-creating the universe in order to launch it once again into continuing duration.”⁶¹ The New Year’s Festival was a very serious celebration that required both the presence of the king and the cult statue of Marduk to be properly carried out.⁶² When Nabonidus abandoned Babylon and moved the capital Teima, the

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⁵⁹ BE 1, I 85, in Stephen David Vanderhooft The Neo-Babylonian Empire and Babylon in the Latter Prophets (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999), 36-37.
⁶⁰ Leick, Mesopotamia, 265-6.
⁶¹ Bottero, Religion, 158.
⁶² Leick, Mesopotamia, 265.
New Year’s Festival could not occur which was seen as a great offense against the gods by the Marduk priesthood. On the fifth day of the New Year’s Festival the king had a face-to-face encounter with the cult statue of Marduk. When the king arrived in the cella; the room where the statue was kept, the priest removed the royal scepter, sword and shield from the king. After removing the king’s personal effects, the priest struck the king across the cheek, grabbed him by the ear, and forced him to bow down to Marduk. Then, in the presence of the god, the king said, “I did [not] sin, lord of the countries. I was not neglectful (of the requirements) of your godship. [I did not] destroy Babylon; I did not command its overthrow...the temple of Esagila, I did not forget its rites. [I did not] rain blows on the cheek of a subordinate...I did [not] humiliate them. [I watched out] for Babylon; I did not smash its walls.” The statement made by the king to Marduk shows how important the New Year’s Festival was, not only to the Babylonian religion, but also to the Babylonian kingship. By stripping him of his sword, scepter and shield, the priest made it clear that despite his lofty position in the Babylonian hierarchy, the king was still subordinate to the gods in general, and Marduk in particular. If the stripping of kingship iconography did not effectively communicate this point, the way the priest laid hands on the Babylonian kings certainly did. The previous quote also reveals what were the most important tasks for a Babylonian king to accomplish during his reign. It was explicitly communicated that the king acted as a protector for both the city of Babylon and the people who resided in it. The king was expected to make sure that city had adequate defenses and that the gods were properly taken care of. By rebuilding the walls of Babylon and renovating Esagila and Etemenanki, Nebuchadnezzar ensured that Marduk approved of his rule. Furthermore, Babylonian kings were not supposed to abuse their power by harming their subordinates. Although neo-
Babylonian kings commanded an expansive empire, they were still bound by the rules of the gods.

Nebuchadnezzar’s reign lasted forty-three years and he participated in his fair share of New Year’s Festivals. By constructing the Processional Way, Nebuchadnezzar set himself apart from previous Babylonian kings. The Processional Way passed through the Ishtar Gate and the walls of Babylon and ended at the center of the city at the site of Etemenanki and Esagila. These structures were either built, or significantly renovated, during Nebuchadnezzar’s reign and were public works that benefitted Babylon’s earthly population as well as paid homage to its deities. By connecting these buildings with one street, Nebuchadnezzar built a memorial to himself, which he passed through in celebration at least on a yearly basis. His subjects were reminded of Nebuchadnezzar’s greatness, even when festivals were not taking place, as Processional Way took pedestrians on a tour of monuments built by Nebuchadnezzar. Nebuchadnezzar was apparently aware that the Processional Way highlighted his architectural achievements because later in his reign he extended the Processional Way so that it bypassed his luxurious Summer Palace (Figure 1). This section of the road often referred to by scholars as “The King’s Highway” further supporting the idea that Nebuchadnezzar was actively building a personal legacy during his renovations in Babylon.\footnote{Wiseman, \textit{Nebuchadnezzar}, 63.}

Nebuchadnezzar spent his reign carefully cultivating his personal legacy. During those forty-three years, Babylon was transformed into the largest and grandest city in Mesopotamia. The works of Nebuchadnezzar such as Etemenanki, the Walls of Babylon and the Hanging Gardens captured the imagination of Greeks such as Herodotus, Diodorus and Alexander. Nebuchadnezzar wasted no opportunity to display his power and cement his legacy. The Processional Way was a monument in and of itself. It connected all his greatest works by placing them along the same road so that anyone who travelled along the Processional
Way would be flooded with reminders of the greatness of Nebuchadnezzar and his restoration of Babylon.
Figure 1 “Map of Babylon showing select buildings,” “Internet Archive” accessed April 2017, https://archive.cnx.org/resources/29dc5900c854ead22f3717e34027519c567b311/Babylon%20map1.jpg.
Figure 2 “Babylon Ishtar Gate Dragon, “Ferrell’s Travel Blog Commenting on biblical studies archaeology, travel and photography,” accessed April 2017, https://ferrelljenkins.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/babylon-ishtar-gate_dragon_berlin_fjenkins081614_5688t.jpg.
Figure 4 “Lions ‘striding’ with decorated flowers along the processional way in ancient Babylon,” Bible History online, accessed April 2017, http://www.bible-history.com/archaeology/babylon/ishtar-gate-lions1.jpg.
The Creation of the American Meal and the Cultural and Class Ramifications behind Every Bite

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“As American as apple pie.” How did early Americans create a culinary culture that became so iconic? Food is more than just sustenance. It offers a unique lens with which to examine a society’s culture through class, racial and ethnic dynamics, and economic structures. Following the surge of commerce based on natural resources during the 16th and 17th centuries, Americans explored freedom to experiment with European recipes, Native American food traditions, diverse ecology that boasted plentiful natural resources throughout the Americas, and West African culture and ingredients that were able to come together on one plate. However, during the 18th century, the culmination of tradition and food in American kitchens solidified societal standards and hierarchies, and were exemplary examples of stratification within early American society. In examining food as a frontier in both Northern and Southern identities in America, its value as both a means to express culture through cuisine and as a commodity that ultimately exemplifies cultural imperialism and social hierarchy that existed throughout the early nineteenth century in both Northern and Southern states.

Prior to American Independence, early colonists had relied heavily on English practices of food preparation and consumption. The colonists’ aim to emulate the English dish was indicative of a higher social class as well as availability to similar resources. By the eighteenth century, American colonists had
well surpassed their struggles for starvation and reliance on Native American foodstuffs and preparation, and focused their efforts their own diet and culinary style that aimed to mirror that of England. The meals that became commonplace on American tables during the eighteenth century “duplicated the range and variety of foods grown and eaten in Europe, particularly England,” and exemplified a certain higher status of English food as a model, as well as a starting point for the creation of uniquely American recipes.\(^1\) The solid establishment of the American colonies, abundance of harvest, as well as the new plethora of foodstuffs available through trade availed colonists from all over the East Coast to enjoy the freedom of selecting certain items and certain recipes and incorporating them into dishes that appeared on their own tables.

The notion that English food and culinary practices served as a model for American colonists during the eighteenth century, even after the Revolution, is key in comprehending the cultural origins of the American meal. In this sense, the concept of food as a frontier may be erroneously conceptualized by historians as simply a “carrying over” of English customs and dishes to America, when the basis of the American meal masks much more complex social and cultural relationships. Although the English practice of food served as an upper-class model to imitate, it by no means encompassed the wealth of natural resources, early Native American influences, and surplus through trade that boasted the American colonists’ economy and way of life. While the ingredients and food choices made available by natives were initially considered during times of settlement in the seventeenth century, early Americans conceptually viewed English foodstuffs and culture as inferior, casting the notion of “savagery” and negative connotation on much of natives’ practices.

\(^1\) Trudy Eden, *The Early American Table: Food and Society in the New World* (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 100.
The American colonists’ use of English culinary practices and ingredients as a model was simply that—a model to serve as a standard. It seemed logical that upper-class colonists sought to emulate the British meal simply because it was familiar to them. The adoption of English practices, such as the incorporation of multiple meats into meals, may have served as a statement of reinforcement of “their British identity,” or the notion that “scarcity and monotony” were no longer issues that American colonists faced in terms of preparing a meal during the mid to late eighteenth century.\(^2\) Whatever the cultural statement that colonists aimed to proclaim in terms of the make-up of their meals, they held their ability to boast of surplus and a wider range of ingredients in comparison to England noblemen in high esteem.

Using English genteel standards of cuisine served as a model to fuel early colonists’ “dreams” of dishes and food culture, but ultimately remained a nearly impossible goal to reach up until the mid-seventeenth century. As early Jamestown colonists faced perils of malnutrition and starvation during a large influx of early settlers, they abandoned any intentions of emulating upper-class English dishes.\(^3\) The English model of cuisine was of little importance to colonists during first settlements of the seventeenth century. They opted for utilizing native ingredients and styles of food preparation not as an act of peace of cultural acceptance, but as a means of survival. As colonists became more aware of and adept at utilizing the natural resources available in the New World, their cuisine and high-esteemed meals began to reflect that of upper-class European culture, with small integrations of native practices.

The plethora of natural resources within much of the colonies and the western frontiers was demonstrative of the wide

range of ingredients and crops that made their way onto the American plate. Food surpluses within the colonies as well as increased availability of salt to preserve goods led not only to the flourishing of foreign trans-Atlantic trade, but to increased inter-colonial trade as well. The surplus of fish, apples, and flour-based foods from New England became staples of Southern meals, and likewise the meats and fruits from Virginia made their way into the diets of New England citizens, so much so that the colonies depended on each other for staple ingredients to round out their increasingly complex diets.\textsuperscript{4} Even before considering the effects of the trans-Atlantic trade on the American diet and previous English influences on food culture and practices, natural resources played a large role in shaping early American culinary practices. The resources within the New England, middle, and Southern colonies that became integrated into the new “American meal” exemplify the frontier-nature of American diet.

Throughout the colonies from North to South, the emergence of distinct dishes shaped the American food frontier in the eighteenth century, and was enhanced by the inter-colonial trade. As New Englanders came to embrace corn and heavily incorporated it into their diet, they witnessed a systematic rejection of corn from their Virginian counterparts. The importance of English food philosophy was emphasized the adoption of corn as an “equal substitute” for wheat, and showcased the New England colonists’ acceptance of new ingredients and resources into their diet as they saw fit. Considering the vast amount of harbors and trade that New England participated in, they could have easily continued using wheat as a staple of their diet, but instead adopted corn into a diet that slowly became distinct to the region throughout the seventeenth century into the eighteenth century.

The composition of the New England diet during the eighteenth century reflected both the availability of resources as well as cultural influence from English recipes. Incorporating the

\textsuperscript{4} Hooker, \textit{Food and Drink}, 34.
maize that was cultivated in abundance in their rocky soil, New England citizens came to serve “hasty pudding,” also known as “cornmeal mush” with milk or molasses on a typical New England breakfast plate.\(^5\) Utilizing the recipe for a wholly English wheat dish and incorporating “native tradition” into their cooking, New Englanders took both standard English recipes as well as Native American staples of “mush” into the creation of a new “American” dish. New Englanders recognized the abundance of corn that Native Americans had incorporated into their meals centuries before, and chose to use cornmeal as a substitute for wheat. When recreating an English dish of “stirabout porridge,” they chose to add molasses to create a sweet dish as opposed to the cornmeal that natives used as a base for savory meat stews.\(^6\) The creation of a staple breakfast dish of eighteenth century New England breakfast demonstrated the influence of both English and native standards of food intertwined with the availability of resources within the area in order to create a new American meal.

However, the example of cornmeal mush as a “new” American dish is problematic when taking into account the English dish “stirabout porridge,” that it modeled, as well as the use of a crop considered sacred to Native Americans in the New England region. The systematic harvesting of corn was so vitally important to many Native American tribes’ culture, it “organized village life” through the ways it was planted, harvested, and used in spiritual ceremonies.\(^7\) This cultural importance of corn was inherently lost after the mass harvesting that went into producing enough crop to allow New England colonists with enough cornmeal mush every morning. This was ultimately problematic for native groups, who held the corn crop in high esteem. New England colonists’ use of corn as a basis in their early morning meals and “creation” of an American dish ultimately strips the

\(^5\) Hooker, 40.
corn crop of its Native American roots and cultural importance. Even during the eighteenth century, after the establishment of major cities in New England, food carried much cultural value and served as a lens through which to recognize the initial cooperation and later systematic marginalization of Native American culture, and the role that culinary arts played in defining racial distinctions and hierarchies.

The range of possibilities open to middle colonists on the food frontier was ultimately made possible through the fertile soil and large amount of land access to cultivate crops in demand. Like the physical landscape of much of the middle colonies, the possibilities for the creation of well-known dishes in the middle colonies during the eighteenth century remained seemingly endless. The middle colonies boasted an abundance of potatoes, and mirrored both German and English demand for the crop. German and English culinary practices of incorporating copious amounts of potatoes into meals ultimately shaped one of the middle colonies’ most staple ingredients. The English colonists preferred potatoes incorporated into their diet with roast beef-based meals, as did the German population with potato soup, a recipe they had brought across the Atlantic. In *American Cookery*, one of the first, popular, and entirely American cookbooks, published in 1796, Simmons described the potato as a staple that are valued for its “universal use, profit, and easy acquirement.”

Along with the potato’s versatility for harvesting, it held Western European cultural value in European cuisine, which aided in the root’s success and widespread acceptance and celebration within the middle colonies. The large impact that Western cultural imperialism had on cuisine throughout the middle colonies transcended through most records of recipes.

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8 Hooker, *Food and Drink*, 34.
While emphasis was placed on detailed descriptions of the various methods to prepare and cook meats, as per upper class European standards of consumption and philosophy, mention of produce remained “minimal in texts …with one glaring exception: potatoes.”\textsuperscript{10} Potatoes became one of the few upper-class exceptions of a valued and demanded vegetable. Accepted by lower class as the “Irish potato,” the root’s impact on Americas remained inherent for centuries afterwards, due to its versatility to grow in the fertile soil of the area, as well as the effect it had on trade. Even before considering the preparation of potatoes, the acceptance of the vegetable into American society based on its Western European “roots” as well as its adeptness to grow well in American soil relay both implications of cultural hierarchy, as well as economic values.

The middle colonists’ transformation of the potato from their previous cultural backgrounds into an “American dish” relied mainly on preparation. The importance of frying potatoes in the creation of a wholly American cuisine was evident throughout various recipes from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which described the method of frying in cuisine as commonplace amongst other vegetables and dishes in the middle colonies region. Again, the availability of resources, mainly fertile land suitable for growing, as well as Western cultural standards of food preparation played a critical role in shaping “newly” American meals and of America’s food frontier through cooking methods into the nineteenth century.

Interestingly enough, as versatile as the potato was in the middle colonies, it was outshone by sweet potatoes and yams in the Southern colonies.\textsuperscript{11} The importance of availability of resources is emphasized through the large plantations and land plots that Southern colonies boasted as the main contributing

\textsuperscript{10} Carroll, \textit{Three Square}, 38.
\textsuperscript{11} Hooker, \textit{Food and Drink}, 50.
factor for their economically prosperity through cultivation and commerce. Colonists in the Carolinas during the eighteenth century celebrated high quality food harvest, surpassing the level of crop variety and quality of that of English nobility across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{12} However, even with the increased diversity of dishes and overall quality of ingredients, the notion of an entirely vegetable and root based dish or even a non-meat based dish was deemed bizarre by English nobles overseas, despite slowly becoming accepted and prominent in the South.\textsuperscript{13} This cultural shift in the American palate, especially by Southern planter nobility, ultimately marks a shift in culinary tradition defined by region, as the sweet potato was not only esteemed as a harvested crop, but also as a staple in Southern dishes.

In comparison to the substitution and cultural “borrowing” of recipes and ingredients to remake a traditional English breakfast dish in the New England colonies, Southern colonists recognized the profits of diverse vegetable cultivation and consumption, even deviating from the basis of Western European ideals of culinary arts and philosophy in the gradual creation of Southern “soul food.” While Southern colonists did not completely reject Western cultural ideals through their cooking, they took the widespread development of agriculture as an industry through both cultivation and trade into account in drawing ties to ingredients and culinary practices deemed “higher class” by both Europeans and early Americans.

The socio-political ramifications of the creation of Southern culinary traditions and recipes during the eighteenth century were seemingly incalculable. The effects of the trans-Atlantic trade with Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean and the proximity and ease of access to resources perpetuated commerce through exploitation of cultural values and cheap labor. Yams became a widely popular ingredient in many Southern recipes, which colonists incorporated into stews, meat dishes, and plates

\textsuperscript{12} Eden, \textit{American Table}, 101.

\textsuperscript{13} Carroll, \textit{Three Square}, 39.
served over rice. Even the gentility in England, who had previously rejected vegetable-based dishes, were all too eager to incorporate it into their dishes following the trans-Atlantic trade. English culinary artists, as a result, eventually made yams a key feature in various meals, linking the cultivation and preparation of the root to those of carrots grown in England.\textsuperscript{14} Without a doubt, the trans-Atlantic trade had lasting effects on cultural diffusion and adaptation of customs and goods into European, American, and African societies. The rejection of the origins and roles of such goods from their respective regions and the implications of the systematic adaption of goods without their cultural value and reverence remained an underlying theme for Southern colonists as they came to incorporate such items into their everyday meals.

Contrary to the institutional rejection of West African culture within the American colonies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by white elites, the yam and its traditional use in culinary arts originated from West African traditions. Comprising about forty percent of West African diet for centuries prior to the trans-Atlantic trade, the root’s cultivation and consumption in Africa personified communal and religious significance. Africans revered the yam in religious contexts as well as in societal and economic realms, as it played a large role in sacrificial offerings as well as in population growth through reliance, rather than simply sustenance.\textsuperscript{15} Slave traders and Southern white plantation owners made clear, culture-disrupting decisions with the exploitation of African labor in plantations while celebrating the exotic nature of the yam in their upper-class suppers. The Southern colonists’ disassociation between African


\textsuperscript{15} Anne L. Bower, \textit{African American Foodways: Explorations of History and Culture} (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2007), page 19.
laborers and their traditions of yam cultivation and its associated cultural bearings exemplified the systematic Western imperialist ideals that were masked by “soul food” and perpetuated by the rejection of African culture and religious values or traditions.

As colonists throughout the New England, middle, and southern regions began to experiment and create their own distinct food culture, their reliance on English standards began to diminish during the mid to late eighteenth century. Awareness of local ecology and resources, as well as access to trade, came to overpower the desire to emulate English dishes, and American cuisine began to take shape as a result. While early American dishes were arguably still “simple” and “unpretentious” in comparison to those of their English counterparts across the Atlantic, early Americans were able to enjoy a different type of comfort – one that emphasized their surplus and abundance of food rather than one that praised what showed up on a plate. While there were still distinctions that were visible in the various dishes of different social classes within eighteenth century America, the correlation between food, and economic and population growth were clear. American food was becoming as independent of British nobility as was the American state.

America’s gradual independence from English cuisine was different from their declaration as a separate nation. America’s “culinary declaration of independence” was more of a silent gesture of cultural distinction, one in which they embraced their food surplus and ability to cultivate and trade different crops within the American nation. While this “culinary declaration” was not explicitly stated, Americans had made both subconscious and conscious efforts to distance their food practices from those of England. The arrival of an increasing amount of immigrants also

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16 Hooker, Food and Drink, 61.
17 James E. McWilliams, A Revolution in Eating: How the Quest for Food Shaped America (NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 302
aided the “dilution” of English tradition in American kitchens, as the mixing of ethnic traditions brought new standards and culinary practices to American kitchens. A subconscious exemplification of culinary distinctions between English and American standards was present in the correlation between America’s food and booming economy during the late eighteenth century following the revolution.

Nearing the end of the eighteenth century, the impact of local markets and ability to trade between states proved promising for the emerging nation. Trade between states in northern and southern regions provided room for population growth, as well as a prosperous economy that remained beneficial for the new nation. Experienced in both northern and southern culture, Emily Wharton Sinkler described the usefulness of Charleston markets in South Carolina as beneficial, adding different ingredients she was not able to cultivate on her husband’s plantation into her recipes. Sinkler’s accounts are especially insightful, as they allow for a comparison of her childhood Pennsylvania home traditions with that of her husband’s southern plantation. While ingredients and foodstuffs obtained in Charleston markets were not necessary for basic food consumption, Sinkler’s enthusiastic descriptions of the markets and of the ingredients and goods she was able to obtain from her hometown in Pennsylvania exemplify the role of America’s early booming economy. Expanding personal recipes and having the ability to obtain goods and ingredients from other parts of the nation played a large role in the early Americans’ development of new American cuisine, and show a growth, from previous dreams of emulating English genteel recipes to food surplus that

18 Hooker, *Food and Drink*, 94.
ultimately led to a booming economy and greater freedom to experiment with the creation of newly American dishes.

Amelia Simmons’ publication of the first American cookbook in 1796 marked a transitional period following the emergence of the new food-centered republic at the turn of the century. Simmons’ recipes mirrored the revolutionary period and new forms of thinking during the new republic, and included directions for making Federal Pan Cake, Election Cake, and Independence Cake. These recipes called for Indian meal, rye flour, and lard as ingredients, which Simmons instructed to fry “to the proper consistency of pancakes.” 21 While the first American cookbook offered a variety of cooking and food preparation tips, from preserving vegetables to stuffing veal leg, the mix of English-influenced dishes and newly-American dishes exemplified the autonomy of American cooks to utilize the resources around them. As many of the recipes included key ingredients, such as pumpkin and squash, the incorporation of American ingredients and the breaking away from English culture within culinary arts was beginning to make its way into American culture following the revolution into the 1800s. 22

In tandem with colder temperatures in northern states, weather and availability of ice were major players in determining what street vendors had available in the marketplace. The “increasing use of ice” in the early nineteenth century showcased early American desires to preserve meats and vegetables, ultimately “branching out” the recipes from which they could prepare new meals. 23 As fresh seafood became widely popular, the New England area markets began to feature oysters, clams, and other seafood, which made their way into both elite American eateries, as well as American homes. Harbors and trade remained

22 Simmons, American Cookery, 28.
23 Hooker, Food and Drink, 101.
largely important, especially throughout major metropolises along the northeastern coast. However, as with any major trading port and market, class distinctions became more evident based on expense of goods and ingredients, leading to stratification of social classes that Americans clearly displayed through what showed up on dishes.

It was no secret to early Americans that the key to a great dish was fresh ingredients, but living in larger cities in northern states, individuals of all classes were given few options: buy fresh, grow their own, or preserve. A large portion of the introduction of *American Cookery* details Simmons’ tips on how to choose the freshest fish of each species in market, even warning of early markets’ tricks to feign freshness through appearance and use of preserves. Preparation of seafood dishes in northern states’ kitchens demanded use of ice for easy preservation of freshness as well as quick use. The reliance of ice as a preserving agent ultimately prompted Americans’ frequent trips to markets to acquire ingredients for meals involving oysters, clams, or fish. Because of the high amount of preparation and preservation resources that was required for seafood dishes, fresh seafood was regarded as an upper-class food, especially throughout the 1820s in establishments of fine dining and taverns across the northeastern coast.

While lower-class homes had access to fish and other seafood in Northern states, its presence on a dinner table was more a rarity than their aristocratic counterparts, thus widening the gap between upper- and lower-class meals. As abundant as seafood was in the New England area, even with the use of ice, preservation and freshness remained important factors in determining culinary and class hierarchy during the early nineteenth century. Even with regards to the plethora of variety of fish found in the Chesapeake area, newly American dishes and

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recipes that arose as a result, even came to “greatly impress” the English overseas, further attesting to the various ways in which food masked social and class differences.\textsuperscript{25} As detailed by the many entries for different types of fish preparation and selection in \textit{American Cookery}, the availability of such a vast variety of seafood gave upper-class cooks more freedom to experiment with new dishes, even to the point where English dishes became increasingly viewed of as “plain” and bland during the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{26}

In many ways, food preservation marked a new terrain for preparation and recipes on the early American food frontier. Especially prevalent in northern states due to colder weather and more applicable conditions to use ice within the home, preserved foods eventually became staples of American diets. Iceboxes enabled the buying of foodstuffs in much larger quantities, as well as allowed for advanced planning of meals, leading to the concept of “leftovers.”\textsuperscript{27} Preserved foods created a newly separate category on the American food frontier during the turn of the eighteenth century, one which seemingly transcended widely evident class differences and came to commodify prepared foods that were made to last.

A preference for preserved foods did not only apply to meats and savory foods, but to fruits and vegetables as well. While the method of preserving produce was certainly not a new practice, it became increasingly widespread and commonplace in the American kitchen throughout the late eighteenth century, requiring meticulous care in order to jar and preserve. The practice of making “preserves” mirrored the increasing surplus of crops that became increasingly more accessible throughout the

\textsuperscript{25} Eden, \textit{The Early American Table}, 44.
\textsuperscript{27} Hooker, \textit{Food and Drink}, 102.
eighteenth century. Detailing items from peaches to strawberries, Simmons devoted an entire section of the first American cookbook to “preserves,” which instructs on carefully preparing the fruit, cleaning, boiling, and jarring mostly exotic, tropical fruits that would be abundant in southern states.  

While fruit preserved transcended special frontiers, being prevalent in both northern and southern states, Simmons’ inclusion of primarily tropical fruits and publication in the New England area suggests that Americans in northern states were able to savor rich, southern fruits. Though fruit preserves were commonplace in both northern and southern states, their wide acceptance and prevalence, even with regard to the stigmatized class distinctions surrounding “non-fresh” foodstuffs, signifies that food was ultimately commodified throughout early America, and hid class stratification.

Although hotels and taverns had existed in major northern cities during the eighteenth century, the emergence of restaurants and luxury hotels reflected “necessary, convenient, or pleasurable” reasons for dining out. Especially prevalent in major northern cities, restaurants began aiming to emulate hotels in terms of serving meals outside the home. While hotel menus offered Americans in northern states to “eat out,” as an alternative to home cooking, meals offered were often simple in nature, lacking elaborate preparation or ingredients. Even while Americans came to momentarily revere French cuisine as the new model for nobility to emulate, efforts made to integrate French ingredients and styles of cooking into hotel menus proved “unsatisfactory.” American culinary artists during the 1820s came to rely heavily on local markets to supply ingredients for

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29 Hooker, *Food and Drink*, 141.
30 Hooker, 143.
their menu. For example, oyster bars became increasingly popular in New York City during the early nineteenth century, and drew travelers for a genteel setting serving fish, meats, pies, ales, and, oysters. Signifying a new culture of the American food frontier surrounding desires to dine out, many restaurants and similar establishments competed in order to offer Americans venues with which to satisfy their cravings and offer an alternative to home cooking.

Demand for restaurants and similar venues across northeastern American cities was just as important as the demand for specialty dishes. The emerging culture of “dining out” originated during the 1820s and 1830s, becoming especially prevalent in northern cities. However, just as integration of different cultural culinary practices was illuminative of an increased commodification of food, the restaurant culture that swept the nation also demonstrated socio-economic distinctions within northern American society. Completely separate from the culture of taverns, restaurants and luxury hotels offered white, upper class citizens to enjoy the elite lifestyle of “dining out.” Preserving a certain genteel culture within American restaurants was important in success, and created a less systematic opportunity to segregate northern citizens based on class. The emergence of restaurant culture in northern cities during the early nineteenth century commodified food in an entirely new way one that witnessed the segregation of class, and the creation of elite dining culinary culture.

While intrastate trade facilitated commonalities between cuisines in both northern and southern states, “Southern provisions” and “soul food” developed as entirely separate cuisines and cultures than those of their northern counterparts due to their drastically different socio-economic structures. Southern states’ economies and societies heavily relied on the plantation system, which had profound impacts on both slave and white-master cuisine. While incorporation of slave-culture was almost

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32 Grimes, 38.
universally frowned upon, acceptance, and later sub-conscious reliance, on slaves for knowledge of food preparation and unique dishes became integral for the creation of staples of southern food. Southern cuisine became centered around the socio-economic system that relied on slaves as a nexus for food preparation for white plantation owners, as well as for knowledge for use of African ingredients.

Although slaves comprised of the majority of the population throughout much of the Southern states, they were ultimately marginalized by the societies through which they were governed. Not only did state legislation strip slaves of their rights, but slave culture and West African roots were often treated with ill-regard and condescension. As southern states’ economies came to heavily rely and revolve around the slave-plantation economic model, their culture, and state of identity, were commodified as a means of cheap labor. Plantation economy deprived slaves of their autonomy and rights in order to capitalize and spur economic growth through cash crop cultivation. However, as slaves became increasingly integral to economic and social growth in southern states, particularly in Mississippi and other areas of the southern frontier, their influence on foodstuffs and preparation completely contradicted that of state and societal consensus. In a way that would devalue their cultural roots and identity, slaves were given a silent voice in the southern kitchen by wealthy plantation owners.

Slaves found that their voices were silenced by white plantation owners – except within the kitchen. As their unique knowledge of food preparation and use of ingredients exotic to early Americans, slaves’ culinary arts provided “more than physical sustenance,” but a means that enabled slaves to “preserve their African heritage.”33 However, further analysis of the “freedoms” of slaves throughout the plantation and the kitchen, proves ethically problematic, as their knowledge of exotic

It is no secret that most plantation masters owned slaves and cultivated cash crops in order to make a profit, and the slaves’ diet exemplified such capitalist ideals. The notion and practice of barely keeping slaves alive, feeding them inferior food, was definitely exemplary of their sole economic purpose within the southern plantation system. Food given to slaves, as a result of capitalizing on labor and increasing profit, was often “insufficient.”

Racial power and cultural deference aided in establishing hierarchies within southern plantation households, where white slaveholding women, as “household administrators,” held their own form of autonomy in controlling domestic standards, including cooking and culinary practices. While domestic slaves were at a higher rank than field slaves, they were required to possess a more refined showcase of respect and intelligence. Racial and class distinctions remained clear in that even domestic African slaves were serving white, wealthy families. The role that white women on plantations played in supervising and directing domestic slaves within the kitchen, and the dishes that were served as a result, are effective in illustrating how food masked racial and cultural hierarchies in southern plantation states.

Food preparation allowed slaves to combine ingredients and cultures in the kitchen, especially as they were given some autonomy for preparing meals for their masters. Southern food greatly reflected a wide plethora of cultures; slaves with origins over different areas of West Africa came to America, and were able to blend cultural practices and food traditions in an entirely new way, made possible for markets. In addition to combining

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34 Hooker, *Food and Drink*, 65.
different West African culinary practices and ingredients with American ingredients, slaves were also exposed to Native American, American, and European styles of food. While slaves were still property under their masters, white owners gave domestic slaves a higher amount of autonomy and freedom in preparing meals, even if their work and culinary creations went without acknowledgement or thanks to their individual effort or the sophistication of their food culture.

Arguably one of the most important aspects of soul food, African spices came to be vital in savory and sweet dishes, making them “more interesting” while offering new culinary freedom to experiment with them. Simmons includes use of spices only in sweet dishes in her cookbook, including them as key ingredients in rice pudding and shrewsbury cake. More commonly used in savory dishes, such as the use of hot malagueta and pili-pili to flavor pork, stomachs, ears, feet, intestines, and various other types of dinner meats. Integration of imported African spices with the surplus of natural resources and meat sources found within America’s western frontiers served as concrete examples of cultural mixing that commodified and prized “soul food” and aspects of newly American dishes that marginalized inclusion of key West African ingredients and culture.

With African roots in both cultivation and cooking, rice appeared on many traditional southern dishes, which is exceedingly illuminative of the cash crop’s prevalence and value in the Carolinas. Even into the nineteenth century, rice became “synonymous” with low country cooking, making it a continued staple of southern dinners, as well as profitable harvest for trade. Its incorporation into American economy as a cash crop, let alone

38 Bower, 48.
39 Simmons, American Cookery, 25, 38.
40 Bower, African American Foodways, 48.
41 LeClercq, Plantation Household, 64.
a dietary staple, loses its cultural origins in West Africa, where it was celebrated as a statement of cultural identity.\textsuperscript{42} Even commodified within southern plantation kitchens, knowledge of rice cultivation was extremely valuable for cash crop cultivators, who sought to own slaves with knowledge to both grow and cook rice.\textsuperscript{43} In Charleston aristocratic cuisine, rice was incorporated into all courses, serving as bases in pies, soups, breads, stews, waffles, and casseroles.\textsuperscript{44,45} Considering rice’s primary function as a cash crop in Carolina plantation society and as a means to facilitate economic growth and possible class flexibility among white Americans during the early 1800s, its’ prevalence in both savory and sweet meals in plantation households showcases the ways in which American dishes and foodstuffs masked cultural, racial, and class hierarchies and relationships.

Just as plantation kitchens were settings for cultural diffusion and mixing, southern markets also showcased wide ranges of ingredients from different cultures that came together. Shipments from northern cities, which experienced higher volumes of European-imported goods, culminated in Charleston markets, and aided in facilitating international interconnected culinary traditions and recipes.\textsuperscript{46} Anne Royall, who visited the Charleston Market in 1831, exclaimed at the wide plethora of produce, including “every species of orange”, squash, “a great variety of fruits, and all nuts of the globe,” demonstrating the

\textsuperscript{43} Carney, 95.
\textsuperscript{44} Schenone, \textit{Over a Hot Stove}, 89.
\textsuperscript{45} The National Council of Negro Women, \textit{The Historical Cookbook of the American Negro} (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 35.
massive effect that southern markets that followed the Charleston market model had on cultural mixing and the creation of more culinary freedom in having more room for experimentation and chances to obtain unique, exotic ingredients.\textsuperscript{47} While markets showcased ingredients from various areas around the globe, including cultures that were both praised and frowned upon, the landscape of American food, particularly soul food, was shaped and defined by inter-cultural relations and hierarchies. The culmination of ingredients that featured West African, American, and European food styles would be deemed as wholly American, rather than an amalgamation of various cultures.

Throughout the mid eighteenth to early nineteenth century, American food and culinary culture expanded as its own frontier, encompassing an increasingly large amount of ingredients and traditions of food preparation transcending cultures throughout the world. As Americans came to create their own unique culture separate from that of their European predecessors, they came to commodify food. Early Americans utilized it as a means to create “newly” American dishes while systematically silencing races and cultures deemed inferior, namely native and West African traditions.

While Americans initially used English genteel ideologies of fine cooking as a model to emulate, they eventually came to realize that it was undesirable, through either food shortage or recognition of the plethora that American ecology boasted in terms of access to natural resources. Distinctions between various areas of early America also came to develop their own culinary cultures, boasting of dishes that became uniquely bound to distinct geographic regions, ultimately contributing to their cultural identities. Through markets, restaurants and oyster bars, northern Americans showcased class stratification, as higher class came to value “dining out” culture, and lower class came to embrace preserved foods and recipes that entailed ingredients that

\textsuperscript{47} Anne Royall, \textit{Ms. Royall’s Southern Tour, Vol. 1} (Washington, D.C., 1831), 7-9.
were able to last. In northern states, gaps between upper- and lower-class Americans were evident in a comparison of what appeared on their plates, as well as what venues they frequented.

With a distinctly different economic system that embraced plantations, southern states came to show that early versions of “soul food” were actually combinations of ingredients and cooking practices transcending continental borders and cultures. While domestic slaves were able to operate with some autonomy, especially with gathering ingredients in southern markets, their owners ultimately silenced them, as their culture and knowledge of food preparation came to be labeled as “American” – credited to and celebrated by white elite.

While the food frontier is not concretely defined, culinary practices that developed and recipes that became widely accepted as “American” were commodified and highly valued. While the creation of American food as a mixture of different practices of preparation, knowledge of ingredients, and access to plentiful natural resources came to define American cuisine, it masked cultural and class distinctions at the end of the eighteenth century into the early nineteenth century.
On November 11, 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith triumphantly addressed the people of Rhodesia via radio from the capital of Salisbury. After years of diplomacy, debate, and political tension Smith finally announced Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain. A confident Smith stated, “the end of the road has been reached” and Rhodesians had “struck a blow for the preservation of justice, liberty, and Christianity.”¹ In London, Smith’s announcement was met with anything but celebration. In a speech before Parliament, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson condemned the declaration as “an illegal act” and a treasonous “act of rebellion against the Crown.”² However, despite these aggressive words

from Wilson, the British government did not use military force in reaction to Smith’s actions. In fact, during an address before Parliament just ten days prior, Wilson personally assured Rhodesians that a “thunderbolt in the shape of the Royal Air Force” would not destroy Rhodesia.³

It is important to understand exactly why, despite his combative posturing, Wilson never authorized military force to settle the crisis created by Smith and the UDI. It is not disputed that Britain was militarily stronger and better organized than Rhodesia, and any war between the two would have led to a British military victory. However, political realities within both Britain and Rhodesia made war an unattractive option for the British government. Wilson faced strong opposition to the war from both sides of the political spectrum which turned any military action into political suicide. Wilson also found very few allies within Rhodesia who would side with the crown against the rebellious actions of Smith and his cabinet. Furthermore, both Wilson and his predecessors were concerned that any overly aggressive actions would lead to regional instability. This paper will argue that Wilson’s inaction toward Rhodesia was due to political and societal complications within Britain and Rhodesia, which could have damaged Wilson’s reputation both at home and abroad.

Historians fiercely debate the events and circumstances surrounding the Rhodesian Crisis. In his article “An Intricate and Distasteful Subject,” Phillip Murphy argues that military intervention in Rhodesia was impractical and imprudent for Wilson to authorize. Murphy argues that by the time of the UDI announcement, the possibility of military action became an “immovable feature of the British official mind” due to the

“fatalism surrounding earlier plans.” Murphy gives weight to the notion that British soldiers would have been disinclined to fight a war against their ethnic kin, citing the reluctance of British soldiers to fight against Ulster Protestants in Ireland several decades prior. According to Murphy, Wilson partly based his decision on a set of “concrete objections to an invasion” compiled by the government of Harold Macmillan in 1961. The pessimism surrounding tactical insufficiencies prevented Wilson from authorizing military force to end the independence crisis. Murphy concludes by stating that, while the British were militarily stronger than the Rhodesians, they could not sustain any type of long-term occupation.

Carl Watts provides a differing opinion to Murphy’s thesis by stressing the importance of the socio-political environment of Britain over military restraints. In his article “Killing Kith and Kin,” Watts argues that British military intervention would have been possible, but that Wilson’s hands were tied by economic and political factors rather than strategic considerations. Allegiance to the British government outweighed any kind of racial sympathies that British soldiers may have had for their white Rhodesian counterparts. However, while racial sympathies would not prevent British soldiers from following orders, they could still affect the mindset of the general public. Therefore, it was “publically prudent” for Wilson to downplay the feasibility of military action because of “popular sympathy for Rhodesian ‘kith and kin.’” Watts makes the point that Wilson was concerned that a prolonged war in Rhodesia would hurt the Labour Party’s re-election chances and believed that while non-intervention would anger some, it was less likely to hurt his election prospects.

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4 Murphy, 749.
Historian Martin Loney supports Watts’ argument. In his book *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response*, Loney maintains that Wilson based his decision not to invade Rhodesia on pragmatic politics. Loney argues that Wilson believed that engaging with Rhodesia on the basis of Smith’s racist policies, and a “progressive policy on race was not likely to gain Labour any support.” Furthermore, Loney asserts, based on the immigration policy of the time, that Britain itself was a racist country and Wilson was fully willing to allow the existence of a white supremacist government in Rhodesia to combat the creeping threat of communism in Africa. Loney works under the assumption that British government policy, for both Labour and the Conservatives, subtly encouraged the white supremacist and colonialist ideology of Smith at the expense of Rhodesia’s black majority.

Unlike Watts and Loney, Elaine Windrich dismisses the notion that the socio-political atmosphere of Britain restricted Wilson’s actions. However, she also rejects Murphy’s argument that a military invasion and occupation of Rhodesia was not feasible. In her book *Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence*, Windrich argues that not only was the political climate in Britain favorable to the prospect of military intervention, but Wilson’s inaction hurt his popularity within both Parliament and his own party. Most Britons viewed Ian Smith as a traitor to the Crown and approved any action by Wilson to put down an act of sedition such as the UDI. While some agreed with the racist rhetoric of Smith, it paled to those who saw UDI as a blatant slap in the face of the Empire. Even Wilson’s rivals in the Conservative Party would have been forced to admit that UDI was tantamount to treason and that “rebellion against the Crown could not be condoned.”

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Murphy, Watts, Loney and Windrich all seek to explain the rationale behind Wilson’s decision not to engage in Rhodesia militarily, and each focus on strategic, societal or political obstacles. Although Murphy makes several interesting assertions on the ineffectiveness of the British military, too much of his argument seems based in speculation. Senior members of British government and military may have been concerned about the possibility of ethnically similar British and Rhodesian soldiers locked in conflict, but they still developed detailed plans on a theoretical invasion of Rhodesia until the official UDI. However, it is not wrong that the fear of a mutinous action by British soldiers prevented senior officials from acting upon the plans they created. Murphy also makes convincing claims about the unfeasibility of a sustained occupation of Rhodesia, but it can be argued that this concern was as much political as tactical since many in Britain were loathe to see an occupation similar to the American occupation of Vietnam. The fact that she dwells more on why Wilson could have ordered military action and less on why Wilson abandoned such plans also compromises Windrich’s argument. Her claim that Wilson’s inaction cost him support within the country is also dubious considering Wilson’s later electoral success and general popularity following the Rhodesian crisis.

Both Watts and Loney correctly identify political and social problems as the principle handicaps to Wilson’s plans, although Loney may reach too far in declaring that Britain was too inherently racist to follow through with a Rhodesian invasion. While Wilson had some sympathies towards white Rhodesians, it is dangerous to discount his policies as inherently racist. Loney’s “evidence” exposing Wilson and his ministers as racist is suspect at best. This paper will proceed in a similar vein to Watts’ main argument: that the political and social turmoil he faced at home hampered Wilson rather than the tactical impossibilities of a theoretical war with Rhodesia.

It is important to first understand that Wilson’s predecessor, Harold Macmillan, also experienced the political
and social problems regarding a potential Rhodesian UDI. Macmillan already engaged in private talks with regional African leaders about the UDI a year prior to Wilson’s electoral victory. In a letter addressed to the then-President of Tanganyika Julius Nyerere, Macmillan expressed concern that excessive pressure on the Rhodesian government might cause it to become hostile towards British interests in the region. Macmillan was especially worried that attaching terms to Rhodesian independence that they would find “wholly unacceptable,” such as a requirement for black majority rule, would “effectively drive Southern Rhodesia into the orbit of the Republic of South Africa.”

It is clear from Macmillan’s letter that senior British officials believed that it was important for Britain to hold significant influence over Rhodesia. Pursuing an aggressive foreign policy or some sort of military action would only alienate potential allies that Britain had in the Rhodesian government and push the Rhodesians towards the reactionary government of apartheid South Africa. Considering that the socially progressive Wilson opposed apartheid South Africa more than Macmillan, it is fair to say that he was loathe to increase the South African government’s influence over Rhodesia. Macmillan’s cautious foreign policy demonstrated that many in Britain were wary of an overly confrontational relationship with Rhodesia and that that caution later impacted Wilson’s policy.

Harold Wilson learned early in his premiership of the political consequences of an aggressive foreign policy regarding Rhodesian independence. Days after his electoral victory Wilson harshly rebuked the actions of Ian Smith and the Rhodesian government for insisting on independence without proper civil guarantees for black Rhodesians, even going so far as to say that UDI would be “an open act of defiance and rebellion and it would

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8 Harold Macmillan, Letter to President Julius Nyerere, May 7, 1963, the National Archives.
be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it.” Wilson based his aggressive policy on the notion that the perceived strength of the British military and the possibility of war would intimidate Smith and force him to abandon his efforts for the UDI. However, contrary to Wilson’s assumptions, this policy emboldened Smith, and during a speech before the Rhodesian Parliament, he accused Wilson of using “blackmail and intimidation” to get his way.

Smith’s condemnation of Wilson’s tactics portrayed the British as bullies attempting to throw their imperial weight around. Wilson’s tough talk even earned him the criticism of The Times’ Salisbury correspondent who decried Wilson’s aggression as “irresponsible behavior” which only served to “unite Rhodesians more than ever before.” This reaction demonstrates that Wilson’s aggressive posturing did not impress people in either Britain or Rhodesia. If the threat of British military intervention provoked this negative reaction, then an actual invasion would have produced a greater backlash against Wilson and his government in Britain and Rhodesia.

Internal politics within Britain also played a part in Wilson’s decision to forgo military intervention. Although Wilson and the Labour Party were victorious in the 1964 general election, their majority of only one seat in the House of Commons meant that they lacked a strong mandate. Not only did this mean the general public did not fully support Wilson and his platform, but also it meant that Wilson needed to keep a strict party whip because a defection by any one MP could have resulted in a devastating legislative defeat. It was therefore prudent for Wilson to avoid controversial issues in the early stages of his government to avoid any defections. Wilson feared the contentious issue of using military force to prevent the UDI could lead to dissent.

10 Salisbury, 10.
within his party and a possible vote of no confidence, spelling the end for his young government.

In a later reflection, then Labour MP Dr. David Kerr articulated the hesitancy of many within the Labour Party to support a proposed incursion into Rhodesia. Recollecting the atmosphere within the Labour Party, Dr. Kerr said that, “events were not going in Vietnam in such a way as to persuade the left wing of the Labour Party that similar incursions into Rhodesia…was a practical proposition” and within the Labour Party itself “there was no instinct for the use of force at all.”\textsuperscript{11} This also came at a time when Wilson’s government was in a precarious position and would have been enough to give Wilson serious doubts about the practicality of military action. He could not win any support from a conflict that drew comparisons to the United States’ controversial war in Vietnam. The division within the Labour Party was also not a secret to the public in 1965. After a meeting with Wilson in London, Dr. Hastings Banda, the Prime Minister of Malawi, declared that he knew that “no British Parliament would ever give any British politician power to use the armed forces to solve Rhodesia’s problem.”\textsuperscript{12} Coming right out of a meeting with Wilson, this statement, made by the leader of one of Rhodesia’s neighbors, gives credence to the assertion that many within Parliament wanted to avoid turning the Rhodesian problem into their Vietnam.

Not only did Wilson find opposition to the possibility of military action within Parliament and his own party, but he also found an unlikely obstacle in the Royal Family. The Royal Family normally recused themselves from political matters, especially contentious issues, but that changed when the Duke of Edinburgh gave his opinion on the Rhodesian crisis in the summer of 1965. In a speech before students in Edinburgh Prince Philip, the

Queen’s husband, stated that he believed that Rhodesian independence was inevitable, and that the government should “achieve this result peacefully and quietly.” The Prince’s statements indicated that the Royal Family believed military action was unnecessary and could cause more problems than it would solve. The negative reaction from the Prince put Wilson in a difficult position and made him less likely to authorize military force to maintain consistency with the Royal Family. The remarks by Prince Philip also posed a problem for the possibility of invasion as it further emboldened Ian Smith. The comments allowed Smith to claim some support from the Royal Family (Smith’s Minister of Internal Affairs mentioned the statement “gave comfort to the Rhodesian government”), which undermined Wilson’s ability to authorize military force or use the possibility of it as a bargaining chip.  

Alongside the political difficulties that dogged the possibility of military action, Wilson and his government also found themselves constrained by the economic realities of mid-sixties Britain. In order for Wilson to order an invasion and potentially a long-term occupation of Rhodesia, he needed to be sure that Britain had the resources available for such an operation. However, as Wilson negotiated with Smith on the issue of independence it became increasingly clear that Britain’s economy was not operating at optimal capacity. The problems regarding the British economy were the central component of a meeting between Wilson and his Cabinet in late 1964, which also involved talks regarding the Rhodesian crisis. At the start of this meeting, Wilson delivered the troubling news that the state of the economy was “worse than expected,” with his financial minister clarifying that, although there was no crisis currently, the situation had

“been deteriorating for a long time” with a “deficit in prospect for a long time.”¹⁴

The fact that the British economy faced a large deficit would have made it unwise for Wilson to authorize an expensive military operation in Rhodesia. Not only would financing a war be unwise in such an economic climate, but also funds for the military would have to be cut to protect other vital domestic services. The government confirmed this policy in September 1965 when it published its National Plan, arguing that “the defense sector was detrimental to the economy because it took up about 7% of national output.”¹⁵ This plan, published only months before the Rhodesian UDI, signified that Britain did not have the economic capability to sustain an invasion and occupation of Rhodesia. Furthermore, it would have caused severe problems for Wilson’s government in the eyes of the electorate when Wilson only had a slender majority in Parliament.

Wilson’s reluctance to authorize the use of force in Rhodesia proved to be a politically advantageous move for himself and his party. Aware of some underlying support for Smith’s regime in Rhodesia and the belief that Smith stood for “upholding Christian values, bringing civilization to Africa, and resisting the spread of Communism” and Wilson hesitated to anger this section of the electorate.¹⁶ However, Wilson realized that he had to keep a firm and strong stance against Smith’s actions or he would look like a weak and ineffectual leader. By maintaining the image that he was tough on Rhodesia without committing to an actual conflict, Wilson could appear tough to the electorate without being reckless.

¹⁴ Harold Wilson, Notes on meeting with Cabinet, October 19, 1964, the National Archives.
¹⁶ Watts, 409.
By the final week before the official announcement of UDI, Wilson no longer kept the pretense that he was willing to use military force. In an interview on the BBC’s Panorama, Wilson stated that, although they would not be “pushed around by European extremists”, the British government would not “use force to try and get a constitutional solution.” These statements demonstrated that Wilson had gone full circle on his public stance regarding military force. The end result of Wilson’s political strategy was an “overwhelming electoral victory” and the ability to “implement any policies which might have failed to survive on the basis of their former precarious majority.” This huge electoral victory vindicated Wilson’s strategy of avoiding military conflict in Rhodesia and showed to the electorate that he could be a tough leader without losing a single British soldier in combat.

International politics also factored into Wilson’s decision over whether to authorize military force against Smith’s regime. It should first be noted that African states such as Kenya and Nigeria had government ministers who lobbied Wilson to settle the crisis through force. However, Britain also maintained close allies who had a vested interest in preventing some sort of conflict in Rhodesia. Australia was one such ally that weighed into this contentious issue, and Sir Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, expressed his desire to see the crisis resolved peacefully. Sir Menzies expressed that “the use of armed force would be repugnant to Australians and would inevitably produce ruin and disaster.” Sir Menzies’ was not one that Wilson would have taken lightly as Australia was a leading member of the British Commonwealth and an important ally of Britain on the

18 Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, 83.
international stage. Sir Menzies instead advocated that economic sanctions be placed on Rhodesia, which he stated would be devastating enough for Rhodesia without creating a scenario that would lead to “the use of force with all of its bloodshed and misery.”

This plea for peace may have also given Wilson the resolve to not authorize military force as he knew that at least one of his key international allies supported his decision to not intervene in Rhodesia.

Sources also indicate that the social and racial component to the crisis, specifically the ethnic connection between the British and white Rhodesians, may have played more heavily on Wilson’s decision-making process than was previously thought. Although the threat of British military action extended through the Rhodesian declaration of independence, confidential papers released since the crisis indicate that Wilson gave up seriously considering military action and the theoretical invasion plans that were drawn up for him months prior to the UDI. According to the papers, Wilson already made up his mind not to use force by the summer of 1965, and “Labour ministers accepted the inevitability of UDI.” It appears from these papers that Wilson and his government believed that military action in Rhodesia was not socially or politically feasible and simply bluffed Smith to force him to accept more agreeable terms for independence.

In regards to the specific reason why Wilson disregarded military action, a top civil servant working in the government at the time alleged that force was vetoed because “we don’t do that sort of thing against white ex-colonials,” and “it was clear we couldn’t ask the RAF to fly air strikes against Rhodesian bases.”

The fact that a sizable number of RAF pilots were either born in Rhodesia or flew with Rhodesian pilots during the Second World War and the Korean War provided the rationale behind this logic.


This racial connection between the British and white Rhodesians produced a worrisome theoretical scenario that, at worst, could lead to RAF pilots to refuse to fight their ethnic kin. Even if there was not reluctance on the part of RAF pilots to do their duties, such a conflict could still create social strife within Britain and lead to disaster at the polls for Wilson and the Labour Party.

The use of military force to resolve the crisis regarding UDI not only posed a problem of how white Rhodesians would react, but how black Rhodesians would act. In considering the possibility of invasion, the British had to take into account whether such a tactic would be in the best interests of black Rhodesians. After all, the entire purpose of preventing UDI through force ensured that black Rhodesians were provided with the same civil liberties as their white counterparts. However, as the crisis continued, it became clear that many black Rhodesians were cautious regarding the feasibility of invasion and the problems it might create for them. The meeting to discuss the issue of independence between British officials and important African chiefs and headmen in Rhodesia in early 1965 demonstrated the palpable uncertainty of the black Rhodesians. During this meeting, the chiefs expressed their frustrations over the lack of progress made with the independence process and declared that they were the “true and hereditary leaders of the people of this country” who wanted to “be granted our independence immediately.”

The impatience felt by African chiefs for Rhodesian independence indicates that they were not interested in waiting out a potential British invasion and occupation which would only forestall the independence process. Furthermore, the group of chiefs displayed a willingness to negotiate with Ian Smith and stated that they “did not wish to fight and kill people, but to live their lives as other responsible people did.”

This statement meant that if the British planned on an invasion, they could not be

guaranteed the support or assistance of many African chiefs. This invasion would lead to the British occupation of a territory of many white and black Rhodesians unhappy with their actions. Therefore, any sustained military action by the British would have made Wilson appear as a tyrannical bully to white and black Rhodesians and as a fool to the British public.

A crucial aspect of planning an invasion is the possession of important information about what is happening on the ground in that country. As relations between Britain and Rhodesia became more volatile throughout 1965, the British government attempted to gather intelligence on the mindset and the potential actions of high-ranking members of the government and military of Rhodesia. However, the agents of MI6 assigned to provide information on the Rhodesian crisis soon found this job much harder than they initially expected. Paul Paulson, the MI6 controller in charge of African affairs, discovered that he could find “no anti-Smith group in Salisbury” to undermine or overthrow the Smith government and recounted that the inability of Wilson to stop the UDI was “an intelligence nightmare.”

This recollection from a senior member of British intelligence demonstrates that the British were not prepared to begin an invasion of Rhodesia. The lack of reliable information about what was happening in Rhodesia meant that Wilson could not effectively manage a successful invasion and occupation. The little information that the agents gathered also suggested that support for a British military action was very low in Rhodesia, showing that most “white Rhodesians supported the rebellion.” Furthermore, British operatives failed to recruit any officials in Smith’s administration to their cause. An undercover MI6 agent later reported that he had not “penetrated Mr. Smith’s party” due to his superiors advising him to avoid risks.23 This information suggests that most Rhodesians harbored hostility to potential

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British military action, which made said action a very unattractive option for Wilson.

Throughout the Rhodesian crisis that dogged Wilson in his first year as Prime Minister, he never opted to use military force due to the political and social restraints. As the months dragged on, it became clearer to Wilson and his ministers that military force would be too contentious and only divided people within Britain and the international community. Since Wilson’s primary concern, like most democratic leaders, was reelection, the last thing he needed with a slim majority in Parliament was to engage in a controversial conflict. Therefore, Wilson compromised his initial commitment to black majority rule in Rhodesia and civil rights to ensure his own position domestically. Wilson’s eventual decision did not endear him to those African leaders who wanted him to use military force, but the aversion of a prolonged war relieved the leaders of nations such as Australia, pardoning Wilson’s reversal.

Ultimately, despite Wilson’s decision, there would still be bloodshed in Rhodesia. After UDI, Rhodesia tore itself apart in a civil war between Smith’s government and African nationalists that raged for over ten years. The civil war resulted in Ian Smith giving up power in 1979, allowing for the black majority rule that Wilson initially wanted. It is unclear whether a display of force by Wilson in 1965 could have prevented the death and destruction caused by the eventual civil war while also producing the desired outcome of black majority rule. It is clear, however, that social and political complications factored more into Wilson’s final decision than the prevention of chaos in Rhodesia that would follow.
Politicizing Cancer: Politics and the National Cancer Act of 1971

Daniel J. Kersten

On December 23, 1971, a crowd gathered in the State Dining Room of the White House to watch Republican President Richard Nixon sign the National Cancer Act of 1971. Addressing an assembly of journalists, congressmen, scientists, and activists, a seemingly gleeful Nixon optimistically stated, “I hope that in the years ahead that we may look back on this day and this action as being the most significant action taken during this administration.” He continued, “And now, with the cooperation of the Congress, with the cooperation of many of the people in this room, we have set up a procedure for the purpose of making a total national commitment [to cure cancer].” The tone of the proceedings was quite informal, even comedic at times. Just before signing the bill, the President joked that the pens he was to use were “good” but that “the box is worth more than the pen.”

At the end of the event, a group including Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy (D-MA), the Director of the National Cancer Institute Dr. Carl Baker, and businessman and philanthropist Benno Schmidt posed and smiled for a photograph.

This occasion might give the impression that the legislative process behind the National Cancer Act of 1971 was

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easy, an almost pleasant experience. However, there is much more to the story of the 1971 National Cancer Act. In the first section of this paper, I shall discuss the early stages of the bill. I recount how pressure to have Congress consider increased federal cancer research funding was instigated by what historian Richard Retting describes as “a small but powerful elite composed of private citizens” who were able to advance the issue to a national platform. I then turn toward the perspective of the politicians most involved in the passage of the 1971 National Cancer Act, including: President Nixon, Senator Kennedy, and Representative Paul Rogers (D-FL). Ultimately, I aim investigate the motives for supporting this legislation and the impact it had on these politicians’ careers. Upon examination, the majority of the credit for the 1971 National Cancer Act is attributed to President Nixon; however, other key politicians – such as Senator Kennedy – were given little acknowledgement.

GETTING THE ATTENTION TO CANCER

What I consider the most interesting characteristic about the 1971 National Cancer Act is that there was relatively little national attention pushing for greater cancer research. Cancer was not the leading issue on the minds of Americans as the Vietnam War still raged—and appeared to be intensifying with Nixon’s decision to bomb Cambodia. Domestically, the nation faced mounting political and social instabilities. Racial tensions continued to remain heightened, and other movements, for instance women’s liberation, were challenging the status quo. This is not to suggest that Americans viewed cancer as unimportant. Gallup polls conducted in both 1965 and 1976 found that Americans feared cancer more than any other disease.

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2 Richard Retting, Cancer Crusade (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2005), xiii.
Furthermore, cancer received more coverage than any other chronic health issue, even more than heart disease, which was (and still is) the leading cause of death in the nation. Yet it was not a “hot-button” issue, and was certainly not a national priority as President Nixon suggested while signing the bill into law.

The initiative to increase cancer research funding reached Congressional attention not from a massive national outcry, but rather from a group of committed philanthropists and scientists. At the center of the push was a wealthy widower from Manhattan: Mary Lasker. Lasker, whose late husband, Albert, was a widely known advertising executive, had been an influential figure in cancer policies in the United States. She served as an honorary member of the American Cancer Society board and her nonprofit organization, the Albert and Mary Lasker Foundation, actively promoted the work of biomedical researchers. Yet Lasker was not alone in her efforts having a large following consisting of other philanthropists and cancer researchers, including Benno Schmidt and Dr. Carl Baker. This group had a variety of nicknames: “Laskerites,” the “benevolent plotters,” and “Mary’s little lambs” to name a few. Officially they were known as the Citizens Committee for the Conquest of Cancer, established in 1969. Lasker and her team accrued support for their initiative in two ways. First, the Laskerites were able to stir up the public’s attention towards cancer research. Second, they were able to directly influence higher-level government officials and politicians, especially in the Senate. Lasker in particular was quite savvy in networking, a point to which I will return.

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5 Rettig, Cancer Crusade, 20.
6 Rettig, 18.
7 Rettig, 79.
The Citizens Committee for the Conquest of Cancer embraced advertising as a key method for bringing their cause to national attention. This was inspired, in part, by Lasker’s past successes with the American Cancer Society’s marketing but also from the mind of Luke Quinn, a former colonel in the United States Air Force, health and medical research lobbyist, and the American Cancer Society’s Washington D.C. representative.\(^8\) The advertising strategy was simple: be highly visible, relevant, and have a clear message that people could easily support.

On December 9, 1969, the organization released a full-page advertisement in both the \textit{New York Times} and the \textit{Washington Post}. The same ad also ran in the \textit{New York Times} eight days later. In large print, the ad stated, “Mr. Nixon: You can cure cancer.” The ad lambasted the President, declaring, “We spend more each day on military matters than each year on cancer research… [Cancer] is a war in which we lost 21 times more lives last year than we lost in Viet Nam last year.” The ads demanded, “A better perspective, a better way to allocate our money to save hundreds of thousands of lives each year. America can do this… our nation has the money on one hand and the skills on the other… put our hands together and [we can] get this thing done.” At the end was a coupon, which readers could cut out and mail to the White House. The coupon stated, “Dear Mr. Nixon: Cancer research needs more funds. Please provide them in your 1971 budget. Please.”\(^9\)

The Citizens Committee, too, did not solely rely on advertising to encourage greater support of the public. The Citizens Committee and its allies used the news media to keep their demands in the public eye often via news coverage in which journalists and researchers alike decried the lack of funding. One

\(^8\) Rettig, 78-79.

New York Times interview with Dr. Sidney Farber, a respected Harvard cancer researcher and member of the Citizens Committee, noted that “recent Federal budget cutbacks are forcing the [National Cancer Institute (NCI)] to abandon its animal cancer virus program just when years of animal care and observation may provide clues useful for the control of cancer.”

Another article explained that “only fundamental research… offers solid hope for the future conquest of all types of cancer.” Distraughtly, the author continued, “this realization makes all the more dismaying the fact that basic medical and biological investigation is suffering the financial drought now afflicting all Government-supported scientific work.”

One journalist openly criticized the Nixon administration, adding that “the nation has strange priorities indeed when the Government annually pours many billions of dollars into instruments of war against other men while scrimping on funds needed to combat this terrible enemy of all men.”

Lasker and her associates also used public events as another method to garner attention. For instance, the annual Alfred P. Sloan Jr. Memorial Award was given to Mary Lasker in June of 1971 for her work in promoting medical research. This attracted attention by many members of the media. Former President Lyndon Johnson presented the prestigious award to Mrs. Lasker and stated that “it may be that her greatest contribution is yet to come. It may be she will be remembered most for establishing a national, concentrated single agency to attack and cure cancer.” The lavish event, hosted in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, was attended by roughly one thousand people and

received large media exposure.\textsuperscript{13} By getting the attention of the media, whether by advertising, public events, or other forms of print, the Committee was successful in keeping its fight in the mainstream and “the public drum-beating had begun.”\textsuperscript{14}

The Citizens Committee also used direct connections to politicians in Washington, D.C. to push their agenda. Mary Lasker had very close friendships with former Presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson. Johnson even issued Lasker the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1969 for her devotion to supporting medical research, making her one of the first female recipients of this respected prize.\textsuperscript{15} Lasker and her associates including Florence Mahoney, Dr. Sidney Farber, and Benno Schmidt, had connections both in the White House and in Congress, which Lasker called upon personally to aid her cause. Lasker had connections with two key members of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senators Ted Kennedy and Ralph Yarborough, a Texas Democrat and the chairman of the Senate Committee. It was Yarborough who assembled the Panel of Consultants, a group of cancer scientists and activists, which advised the Senate on how to proceed in drafting S. 34 (The Conquest of Cancer Act) and, ultimately, the 1971 National Cancer Act. Yarborough personally invited Lasker to the Panel and then sent Lasker a note commending the activist for her

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\textsuperscript{14} Rettig, \textit{Cancer Crusade}, 80.
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“genius, energy, and will to help mankind.”

Lasker also had the support of other Senators such as S. 34 Cosponsor and most senior Republican on the Senate Committee Jacob Javits (R-NY) and the retiring Lister Hill (D-AL), former chairman of the Senate Committee. Hill and Lasker had a friendship that spanned decades, and he firmly believed that Lasker “[stood] at the forefront of Florence Nightingale, Clara Barton, Madame Curie, and Helen Tussig in [her] wonderful contributions to the health of our people and to the health of all mankind.”

Lasker also had correspondence with Melvin Laird, Nixon’s Secretary of Defense, an important connection which Lasker could use to push her ideas into the White House. On January 14, 1971, Lasker sent Laird a report of the Panel’s recommendations in “hope[s] President Nixon will make his approval of this conquering cancer a part of his forthcoming Health Message.” Eight days later, in his State of the Union address, President Nixon declared he would boost cancer research spending by $100 million and would seek more funding. Nixon then famously stated, “The time has come in America when the same kind of concentrated effort that split the atom and took

man to the moon should be turned toward conquering this dread disease. Let us make a total national commitment to achieve this goal.” Another high-ranking member of the Citizens Committee and the Panel of Consultants, head of Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Company Elmer Bobst, also had close personal contacts to the White House. Bobst was a “virtual uncle” to Nixon’s children.

Through advertising and other forms of public attention, the Citizens Committee for the Conquest of Cancer was able to bring together “high issue salience and interest group pressure [which] pushed cancer onto the national agenda, subjecting it to quick and politicize[d] decisions.” Furthermore, this group of well-connected philanthropists and researchers used associates in higher positions of the federal government to further their cause.

“YOU HAVE MY ATTENTION:” CONGRESS AND NIXON BEGIN TO ACT

In the previous section, I analyzed how the Citizen’s Committee, primarily Lasker, used their political ties to push their initiative. Here I assess the other motives of key political players in the National Cancer Act of 1971, including Senators Yarborough, Kennedy, and Javits, as well as Representative Rogers and, of course, President Nixon.

Lasker and her followers obtained the attention of members of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare first and it was through this committee of the Senate that the first pieces of legislation were proposed to the Congress. Importantly,

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this committee was the one with which Lasker and her colleagues had the most connections. The former chair of the committee during the bill’s drafting, Senator Hill was a longtime close friend of Lasker’s. Senator Kennedy, also on the committee, was close to Lasker as well. Senator Yarborough, who replaced Hill as the committee chair in 1969, was initially skeptical of Lasker as she and Mike Gorman, a Washington, D.C. lobbyist for the American Cancer Society and a close friend of Lasker, initially lobbied for Kennedy, not Yarborough, to be the committee’s chair. However, Yarborough would soon develop a deep respect for Lasker.\(^22\) Yet it was not only Lasker and others on the Citizen’s Committee which were influential in these politicians’ decision to tackle cancer.

The two men who introduced the first bill, S. 34 or The Conquest of Cancer Act, to the Senate were Senators Kennedy and Javits. This bill was by far the most radical as it called for the NCI to be moved out of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and have its director appointed by the President.\(^23\) By making the NCI an agency independent, the fight against cancer would be an issue outside of the NIH, garnering cancer significantly more attention—and, therefore, resources—than other health-related issues. This idea concerned a large community of medical researchers, including the Director of the NIH Dr. Robert Marston.\(^24\) Both Javits and Kennedy had long histories of supporting health during their tenures in the Congress. Javits, born into a poor immigrant family and raised in a tenement in Lower East Side of Manhattan, held that “one of the most basic problems for the underprivileged is the issue of health.”\(^25\) Although he focused much of his twenty years on the Labor and

\(^{22}\) Rettig, *Cancer Crusade*, 80.

\(^{23}\) Rettig, 134-5.

\(^{24}\) Rettig, 166-7.

Public Welfare Committee towards greater state funding of medical services and emphasizing the need for more preventative-based care, Javits was quite proud of his efforts towards medical research.  

Kennedy had a history of addressing issues of healthcare as well. His oldest sister, Rosemary, was mentally disabled and he witnessed the harrowing effects of her lobotomy in his youth, frequently citing it as the reason for his dedication to addressing issues of health. However he, much like Javits, focused mostly on providing greater access to care, especially preventative care. When Yarborough lost reelection in 1970, Kennedy, along with Javits, was pressured by the soon-to-be-ex Senator to champion the cause of defeating cancer. Kennedy, initially skeptical about the importance of the initiative, asked Benno Schmidt if the country could afford such expenditures. Schmidt answered bluntly, “My strong personal view is that not only can we afford this effort, we cannot afford not to do it.” After that, Kennedy was out on the frontlines alongside Lasker, Schmidt, and the others.

Representative Rogers, too, had experience with health-related legislation. He had been, for many years, the second-ranking member of the subcommittee of public health of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Rogers was known in the healthcare legislative field for his far-reaching investigation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1966 for its organization of health activities. However, in terms of cancer research legislation, Rogers was not well known. In fact, the proponents of the cancer bill underestimated how important Rogers would be in the passing of

[^26]: Javits, 292.
[^28]: Clymer, 173.
[^29]: Clymer, 173.
the bill. When Rogers finally became the chairman of the subcommittee in 1971, he emerged as their major adversary.  

Due to his experience with the HEW investigation, Rogers was quite skeptical of the Senate’s proposed bill—S. 1828 (also known as “An Act to Conquer Cancer”), not the radical Kennedy-Javits Bill but another, more moderate bill heavily influenced by President Nixon. For Rogers, he believed that the current framework, keeping the NCI inside of the NIH, was adequate enough to achieve the goal of curing cancer. Additionally, Rogers did not want to be controlled by a health lobby and refused to be identified as being close to a bill influenced by Kennedy. Rogers was irritated that Kennedy was considered the “Mr. Health” of Congress, despite Rogers himself having more experience in health legislation than Kennedy.  

For these reasons, Rogers put up an intense fight against the Citizens Committee and its associated lobbies and won as the House’s version of S. 1828 failed and his H.R. 11302 (billed as “the National Cancer Attack Act of 1971”) passed. He was in part aided by the fact that Lasker and her gang did not have the same connections inside the House as they did in the Senate. Furthermore, Rogers was aided by the commotion raised of the biomedical community who were concerned by the impacts of passing such a bill, especially for the strength of the NIH.

Senator Yarborough, on the other hand, did not have such a rich history in healthcare legislation. Yarborough was appointed head of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee after another Democratic Senator, Wayne Morse of Oregon, failed to be reelected in 1968. Before this, he had focused most of his efforts towards education issues. Yet, when Lasker and Mike

30 Rettig, Cancer Crusade, 199.
31 Rettig, 199-201.
33 Kirk, 98-100.
Gorman pushed for Kennedy to assume the position of chairman, a suspicious Yarborough began to listen. Ultimately, Yarborough saw the cause to be worthwhile, enough so that after he failed to be re-nominated by the Republican Party in 1970, he urged Kennedy and Javits to continue in his footsteps and made The Conquest of Cancer Act his last piece of legislation to be considered before the Senate.

Finally, President Nixon’s desires to address the issue of increased cancer research funding did not stem from a longstanding history with health policy either. In fact, Nixon had very little interest in cancer research funding and was considering cuts to federally funded cancer programs. Yet, by 1971, Nixon had essentially reversed his entire position, becoming a vocal proponent for the increase in cancer research expenditures. Nixon, being the savvy politician he was, could sense that public sentiment was leaning towards increasing cancer funding, especially after seeing the impact of several pro-research ads ran nationally and an Ann Landers’ April 20th nationally syndicated column. Landers, a close friend of Lasker, wrote a scathing piece in which she lambasted the Government for spending $125 per person on the war in Vietnam yet only $0.89 per person on cancer research. She told readers to write their senators, explaining to readers that “today you have the opportunity to be a part of the mightiest offensive against a single disease in the history of our country.” As a result of the advertisements and Landers’ column, between 250,000 and 300,000 letters swamped the offices of the U.S. Senate. Later estimates place the total

34 Rettig, Cancer Crusade, 80.
35 Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, 173; Rettig, Cancer Crusade, 113.
36 Rettig, 30.
astonishingly close to one million letters. Nixon quickly and publicly sided with the Laskerites, after which Ann Landers boldly declared, “When he figured he couldn’t beat us, he joined us.”

Yet, President Nixon had another reason to join Lasker and her compatriots in their fight. Nixon and his administration existed, essentially, in a state of constant paranoia. As Robert Schulzinger asserts, “Nixon felt threatened by a variety of enemies, real and imagined: Democrats, Congress, the bureaucracy, the press, and what he constantly belittled as ‘the elites’ or ‘the establishment.” With 1972 approaching fast and the possibility of losing reelection, however slight it was in reality, the Nixon Administration moved to keep Nixon’s public image at its upmost. Considering the extensive media coverage of cancer and the public’s fears towards it, joining the cause to increase federal cancer research funding would be an excellent item to put on the President’s résumé. Furthermore, this could crush any possible opponent who might challenge Nixon. In his own party, Senator Javits did have some support but likely not enough to strip the Republican nomination away from Nixon. Instead, it was fears of a potential run by Senator Kennedy for the White House on the Democratic ticket. It was clear that Kennedy’s The Conquest of Cancer Act (S. 34) was garnering a large following in the Senate and in the press. One White House aide wrote: “The Lasker forces are working very heavily to not only secure enactment of the [S. 34] but to see to it that it is

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39 Rettig, *Cancer Crusade*, 177.
Senator Kennedy and not the Administration who receives credit for pushing the cancer research activities ahead.”

Senator Peter Dominick (R-CO), guided by President Nixon, submitted S. 1828 “An Act to Conquer Cancer.” It was akin to Kennedy’s bill but, most importantly, kept the NCI within the NIH. What was critical was not the intricate details of the bill but “how the hill was framed and who perceived credit.” Soon after the submission of this new bill, attention all but entirely shifted to Nixon, applauding him for his action, and left Kennedy in the dark. Press coverage focused almost exclusively on Nixon’s cancer bill. When S. 1828 passed in the Senate, one headline read “Nixon’s War Against Cancer Wins Approval in the Senate.” Senator Kennedy was mentioned only twice in the article and the mention focused on Kennedy’s and Javits’ compromise in letting the Nixon bill move forward instead of their own bill. A New York Times report of the signing of the bill, released December 24, 1971, did not mention Kennedy at all except in a photograph caption and a brief mention that he was the “chief sponsor of the Senate bill.” Because of Nixon’s maneuvering, virtually all credit for the new “War on Cancer” was given to him instead of Senator Kennedy.

When the National Cancer Act of 1971 was signed into law the day before Christmas Eve 1971, it was billed as a Christmas gift for the nation. However, to determine the

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43 Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, 175.
45 “Nixon’s War Against Cancer Wins Approval in the Senate,” Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1971, 1.
singular impact of this one bill on the political careers of each of the aforementioned politicians is essentially impossible. There are too many confounding factors which may influence public opinion of politicians. For instance, during this time, President Nixon was removing troops from the incredibly unpopular Vietnam War. According to polling results compiled by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research of Cornell University, Nixon’s approval rating from the period of November 23, 1971 (one month prior to signing the bill) to January 23, 1971 (one month after signing the bill) remained constant at 50 percent while his disapproval rating increased from 37 to 39 percent. Similar data for Senators Kennedy, Javits, Yarborough, and Representative Rogers are unavailable. However, since Yarbrough failed to secure his party’s re-nomination in 1970, it is fair to conclude that his efforts did not greatly improve his political career.48 In hindsight, it seems clear that Nixon received most of the credit for the War on Cancer. Even the NCI seems guilty of giving the credit to President Nixon. In its “Milestones” section, the NCI credits Nixon for “follow[ing] through on his promise [on fighting cancer]” when he signed the 1971 National Cancer Act; yet, it gives credit to neither Kennedy nor Javits.49 In conclusion, the National Cancer Act of 1971 is a unique piece of legislation. First, it began with a small group of dedicated philanthropists and cancer researchers who built public and Congressional support for something which was not a “hot-


48 Rettig, Cancer Crusade, 102.
button” issue. Yet, this small group, the Citizens Committee for the Conquest of Cancer, managed to bring cancer to the national stage and get legislation passed in only a few years’ time. This was done via the press—using advertising, public events, and other press coverage—and the manipulation of personal contacts in the federal government. Secondly, the 1971 National Cancer Act demonstrates the power of the personal and career motives in the making of policy decisions. Ultimately, the National Cancer Act of 1971 gave nearly $1.6 billion to search for a cure to cancer.  

Furthermore, the bill brought greater public attention to the issues of cancer research and policy. The bill’s proponents had hoped that cancer would be cured by the United States’ 200th Anniversary if such legislation passed. Although there have been major advances in the treatment of cancer in the decades since the bill’s signing, the war against cancer continues to be waged. The National Cancer Act of 1971 is a striking example of how money, publicity, and politics intersect at the national level to produce legislation.

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Beyond the President: The Carter Administration and the Making of the Camp David Accords

Ching Long Leon Lam

Jimmy Carter’s humanist ideology is perhaps the most identifiable feature of his presidency. The emphasis on human rights “as a defining issue in foreign policy” is perhaps the most recognized legacy of his four years in the White House.¹ The Camp David Accords of 1978, a landmark pact between Egypt and Israel with the United States as mediator, was a direct product of Carter’s policy orientation. The long periods of negotiation and persuasion reflected the president’s “ambitious and comprehensive strategy,” as well as his unparalleled “time, energy, and ingenuity” working towards peace in the Middle East.² It is not coincidental that both his supporters and opponents emphasized his unprecedented attention to morality in foreign policy.

Much of the scholarship on Carter reflects the influence of the Great Man theory. Most commentators and scholars put the president in the central role, while marginalizing other key

players in the administration. Existing works fail to indicate how Carter’s cabinet shaped administrative policy as most of them only study the moral motivation and religious influence of the president. A misconception thus emerges from the current studies on Carter: while the president proposed his ideal vision of foreign policy with determination, his cabinet was largely passive and uncritical. With praise or criticism focused on the president, his cabinet received minimal attention. This study builds on previous works while further exploring the influence of the cabinet.

This study analyzes the interaction between Carter and the members of his administration in the formation of the Camp David Accords. Carter’s vision of a humane foreign policy both converged and clashed with the more pragmatic outlook of the others in the administration. While Carter showed genuine support for the negotiations between Israel and Egypt, key members of the cabinet, especially Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, provided advice that helped the president realize his goal. In the early stage of Carter’s presidency, Vance and Brzezinski established an agenda and formulated major policy directions for the president. Although Carter’s initiative was integral to the Camp David Accords, Vance and Brzezinski laid vital groundwork and provided valuable guidance imperative to the realization of the peace treaty. Drawing on declassified documents and memoranda for the president, this study argues that Carter only succeeded with the Camp David Accords because of the detailed preparation by the cabinet members.

DECISIVE PRESIDENT, UNIMPORTANT CABINET

Existing literature on Carter-era foreign policy generally focuses on the role of the president. While historians concentrate on Carter’s personal motivation and goals during his presidency,

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political scientists provide a psychological religious explanation to his leadership style. Studies in the field of political science analyze the president’s religious devotion and briefly touch on his interaction with cabinet members. A comprehensive study of the Carter administration leads to a better understanding of the decision-making process.

Recent works by historians generally argue for the unparalleled centrality of Carter in formulating foreign policy. The president, many scholars have suggested, was the only important American contributor to the Camp David Accords. According to this school of thought, American foreign policy was generally considered Carter’s project. Other cabinet members were either characterized as insignificant players, or as advisors without much power. These works suggest that the major responsibility of Carter’s cabinet was to contact different heads of states and promote the president’s idea to an international audience. With a strong presidency and weak secretaries, the picture portrayed by mainstream scholarship shows the direct influence of the “Great Man theory.” The overwhelming focus on the president has hindered our understanding of the cabinet’s influence over the Camp David Accord.

Other academics highlight Carter’s evangelical background as his rationale of proposing a humanist foreign policy. Most of these writings on Carter discuss the president’s faith and inner thinking, but not that of his cabinet members;


5 Mary E. Stuckey, Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), xvii.
because, many scholars simply assumed that the cabinet was unimportant. Other scholars have outlined Carter’s deep religious devotion and describe how the Christian notion of justice shaped his vision of foreign policy. Some academics have explained the president’s preference of personal diplomacy with reference to his religious beliefs. Carter’s Christian identity led to his vision of global religious harmony and partly explained his use of religious language in conversations with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin. Apart from the religious argument, political scientists have also adopted psychological frameworks to investigate Carter’s thinking process. Despite of the plethora of approaches used, the centrality of the president remains unchanged in both the fields of history and political science. The extensive study of President Carter contrasts the lack of study of the Carter cabinet.

More recent publications offer preliminary exploration of the internal dynamics of the Carter administration. Betty Glad’s 2009 monograph articulately discussed the preparation, discussion and frequent exchange of views among Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski immediately before and during the Israeli-Egyptian

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8 An example of this approach is Matthew H. Wahlert, “President Jimmy Carter as a Reluctant Decision-Maker,” *White House Studies* 12, no.1 (2012).
negotiations. Acknowledging the integral role of the cabinet, some researchers outline the conflict within the administration. Luis da Vinha precisely indicated the clash between Carter’s humanist ambition and Vance’s realist consideration. While Carter stressed the need to promote American ideals, his cabinet paid more attention to the feasibility of individual policies. Jeremy Pressman pushed further and showed Vance and Brzezinski’s pragmatist influence on the Camp David Accords. The Camp David Accords was clearly stated as a collective creation. Major cabinet members like Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski were not mere followers of the president, as some earlier works have promoted. They were indeed active participants and in some occasions had a radically different vision from what Carter perceived.

Based on previous findings, this paper traces the preparation and making of the Camp David Accords with special attention to Vance and Brzezinski, two influential actors in the Carter administration. It argues that both figures were vital to the pacts reached. Rather than subordinating to the dominance of the president in the decision-making process, Carter’s cabinet was active and vocal. The two experienced policymakers put the issue of the Middle East on the White House’s agenda and developed early strategies to reach their objectives. Even after Carter’s

decision to focus on Egypt, Vance and Brzezinski were still influential and pivotal to the presidential directive. Describing the Camp David Accords as Carter’s personal achievement is not consistent with reality.

THE ISSUE OF ISRAEL

Many scholars have argued that peace in the Middle East was a major focus of Carter’s foreign policy. In fact, Arlene Lazarowicz claimed that the president was willing to sacrifice his Jewish supporters to make peace negotiations successful. This view has a degree of retrospective bias. Far from regarding the Middle East as the most prominent aspect of his foreign policy, Carter remained disinterested and largely pro-Israel during the 1976 election. He did not make the issue of Israel a pivotal point of his campaign. The call from Department of State for concrete breakthroughs, as well as Zbigniew Brzezinski’s persuasion, changed Carter’s stance. After assuming the presidency in January 1977, Carter incorporated his cabinet’s view on the Middle East into his foreign policy framework. Only at that time did Carter seriously consider mediating a peace negotiation.

The issue of Israel received little attention from Carter during the election. As he states in his memoir, “[his] interest in the region had not begun when [he] moved into the White House.” His knowledge and impression of the area mainly came from his official trip to Israel in May 1973 as governor of Georgia. Carter believed that this trip greatly influenced his support for Israeli defense of its own territorial integrity. He then began to

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14 Carter, 274.
develop a moderately pro-Israel view that shaped his campaign.\textsuperscript{15} In the second presidential debate on October 6, 1976, Carter called for a “clear, unequivocal commitment without change to Israel.”\textsuperscript{16} In the third debate on October 22, he followed a similar line and criticized President Gerald Ford for not defending the interests of Israel.\textsuperscript{17} His speech in the debates not only showed his political move to attract Jewish-American voters but also reflected his own opinions in 1976. As he later confessed, at that time he “had no strong feelings about the Arab countries…had never visited one and knew no Arab leaders.”\textsuperscript{18} Carter, before late 1976, was generally pro-Israel and had no intention to fundamentally change the Israel policy.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s analysis and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s observation from his trip to Israel in mid-1976 genuinely changed Carter’s viewpoint. Political scientist Luis Da Vinha argues that Carter’s foreign policy is largely a product of teamwork. Instead of relying on his own instincts, the president consulted different members of his cabinet and incorporated their views into the final policy framework.\textsuperscript{19} Consistent with the existing viewpoint, the Carter

\textsuperscript{15} Scott Kaufman, \textit{Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration} (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 77.


\textsuperscript{18} Carter, \textit{Keeping Faith}, 275.

cabinet changed his view on the Middle East. Vance believed that “achieving a peaceful and lasting solution of the conflict” was necessary to placate grievances among Arab states on America’s pro-Israel policy and to avoid Soviet infiltration into the area.\(^\text{20}\)

He hoped to replicate the 1973 Geneva Convention, which brought an end to the Yom Kippur War. His argument was almost congruent to the assessment from the Department of State. According to Vance, staff in the State, especially Middle East expert William Quandt and director of policy planning Anthony Lake, provided sound analysis for him.\(^\text{21}\)

Shortly after the inauguration in January 1977, Alfred Atherton and Harold Saunders, two Middle East specialists in the State, prepared an analysis on the matter that largely coincided with Vance’s view.\(^\text{22}\)

Around the same time, Brzezinski shared his personal experience in Israel. During his summer trip, he became critical of Israel’s insatiable demand for territory and instead hoped to make peace with the help of Arab states.\(^\text{23}\)

He later presented his view to the President and suggested a new mindset, one that consulted both Israel and Arab states in solving the problem. Together, Vance and Brzezinski transformed the President’s perception of the issue and contributed to a new way of understanding the conflict between Israel and the Middle East.

The new approach was the foundation of Carter’s Middle East policy. Soon after moving into the White House, the president began preparation for a solution that would bring long-


\(^{21}\) Vance, 165.


term peace to Israel and its neighboring states. In a January 21, 1977 memorandum to Vance, the President requested the State Department to submit a report on the feasibility of fostering peace negotiations in the next six months. On February 14, Vance made a trip to Israel and major Arab states to see if state leaders were interested in a future peace treaty. As Vance indicated, the president authorized him to make decisions on the spot. Carter’s action evidences a substantial change in his view on the Middle East. Initially an unimportant issue, the Middle East problem in early 1977 had become a regional issue of tantamount significance.

PREPARATION FOR A PEACE TALK

Cyrus Vance’s February 1977 trip was the first concrete step towards future negotiation among state leaders in the Middle East. Although Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski all shared the common goal of promoting peace, their visions and methods were quite different. While Vance and Brzezinski hoped to pursue a multilateral approach, Carter stressed his personal relationship with foreign leaders. The President’s emphasis on informal communication led to a surprising victory when Egyptian president Anwar Sadat suddenly decided to visit Jerusalem in November.

In 1977, America’s Middle East policy was largely a result of Vance’s observation and analysis. A National Security Council (NSC) meeting on February 23rd, one day after Vance’s return from the Middle East, identified the major issues at stake.

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and provided a roadmap for Carter. The most important objective in this period was the ambitious goal of bringing Israel and the major Arab states to the negotiating table by September. Members of the NSC agreed that, to complete this task, Washington should outline “a list of concrete steps” with different Arab states so as to make any future peace talks possible.26 Vance’s role was influential at this point in transforming America from a pro-Israel player to an assertive-yet-neutral mediator. The multilateral path pursued by Vance reflected his worldview. Unlike traditional cold warriors like Brzezinski, Vance was more willing to engage with different states and strive for peaceful coexistence among all parties.27 At the same time, Carter’s dependence on Vance was remarkable. In this early period of his presidency, he relied on his cabinet to formulate foreign policy and make important decisions.28 It is not coincidental that Vance’s proposal became the goal of Washington after the February meeting.

Between March and July, Carter met with various heads of state, attempting to build a consensus for a future peace conference. Both Brzezinski and Vance emphasized the urgency

of achieving a sound solution to the deadlock in the Middle East. Carter followed the plan laid out by the NSC made on February 23 and met with leaders of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. At the same time, he gradually developed his vision of foreign policy stressing friendship and trust. More important than making political deals, Carter wanted to understand his foreign counterparts and make corresponding judgments. During his conversations with the heads of state, he often became emotional and emphasized his visceral thoughts. The degree of intimacy between Carter and other heads of state in many cases determined the outcome of his action. His meeting with Yitzhak Rabin was particularly disastrous, as “(the) Israeli Prime Minister and Carter simply did not relate to each other well as human beings and neither could repress his antipathy.” Carter therefore did not make further contact with Israel until Menachem Begin succeeded Rabin in June. There is a remarkable contrast between Carter’s view on Israel and on Egypt.

Carter became more supportive of the Egyptian clauses after meeting Anwar Sadat in April 1977. His relationship with the Egyptian leader was cordial and friendly. The president described the Egyptian leader as one who he “admire(d) more than any other leader.” The personal relationship between Carter and Sadat helped to reshape Carter’s views on the Middle East. Instead of replicating the 1973 Geneva Convention as Vance envisioned, the president was more interested in making a deal with Egypt. His deviation from the established blueprint in the February NSC meeting exemplified his autonomy from his cabinet.

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30 Berggren, “Carter, Sadat, and Begin,” 733.
31 Berggren, 90.
The growing divergence between Carter and others in his administration emerged in mid-1977. The February consensus achieved by the NSC in Washington was largely a creation of Vance and Brzezinski.\textsuperscript{33} While Carter did not directly challenge the proposed multilateral framework, his actions became more independent over time. Carter’s relationship with Vance and Brzezinski was generally warm but far from affable, as the president had few trusted aides in the federal government.\textsuperscript{34} Although he followed Vance’s advice and sought to achieve a multilateral pact in the Middle East, he actually preferred to interact with individual states, or individual state leaders. Some scholars have described Carter’s move as a demonstration of his post-détente foreign policy, in which America abandoned the Cold War mindset and was more willing with cooperate with non-allies.\textsuperscript{35} The president’s radical departure from the past practices was in direct conflict with the February consensus. While Vance and Brzezinski embodied the views of the traditional political establishment, the president hoped to try a new way. These conflicting approaches surfaced in November 1977 when the president successfully persuaded Sadat to negotiate with Israel.

Without realizing that Carter’s view had subtly changed, Vance and Brzezinski and other members of the White House staff


reiterated the importance of a multilateral platform throughout mid-1977. In August, Vance made a second trip to the Middle East in order to persuade state leaders to join the peace negotiation. In an August 2nd telegram to the Department of State, he reported that his goal was to understand the demands and possible concessions of each state and to seek areas of common ground for early communications. Using the 1973 Geneva Convention as reference, Vance hoped to mend ties between Israel and the Arab world through dialogue among all parties. Brzezinski supported his initiative. In an August 30th memorandum to the President, the national security advisor identified the influential members of the Arab League, like Egypt and Jordan, as the target of persuasion. He suggested that Washington should thus enlist support from all member states of the League, with the most influential as priority. It is noteworthy that Vance, having had more conversations with Sadat than Carter or anyone else, remained cautious and uncertain about Egypt’s stance. According to Vance’s August 11th telegram to the State Department and the White House, Sadat’s opinion on future peace negotiations was unclear and certainly not enthusiastic. Even with the personal exchange between Carter and the Egyptian leader, he did not except a prompt step from Cairo to act on her own to negotiate with Israel individually. The contrast between Sadat’s lukewarm response to Vance and his eventual support for American policy is partially the result of Carter’s personal diplomacy.

The Egyptian president’s unannounced visit to Jerusalem was totally unanticipated in Washington. It was also America’s most important foreign policy victory in 1977. Brzezinski’s amazement at this surprising event was indeed justified, as he had no knowledge of Carter’s personal ties with Sadat. The shock of Hermann Eilts, the American ambassador to Egypt was captured in his telegram to the State Department on November 3rd.

According to Eilts, Carter’s private letter to Sadat had impressed the Egyptian leader and influenced his radical decision to take bolder actions for regional peace. Sadat responded to Carter’s trust and friendship by taking a daring step: agreeing to be the first Arab leader to set foot in Israeli territory. 38 One day before, the President had talked to Sadat via phone and persuaded him to move from inaction. 39 Sadat’s new policy not only reflected Carter’s victory, but also reflected a new phase in America’s Middle East policy. The Carter administration started to consider “an initial peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.” 40 November 1977 was truly a watershed moment.

CONFLICTS AND RESOLUTION

Despite of the diplomatic victory in November 1977, the relationship between Carter and his cabinet deteriorated. Both Vance and Brzezinski were somehow dissatisfied with the president’s private conversation with Sadat. 41 Vance, long striving for a multilateral solution, disapproved of the president’s creative method. Brzezinski appreciated the concessions Carter gained from Sadat, but was doubtful of his approach of personal diplomacy. The two members of the administration also held different opinions on the next step. While Vance still insisted on the multilateral Geneva model, Brzezinski supported a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt. 42 Confident in reaching a deal between Israel and Egypt, Carter chose to depart from Vance’s plan and instead focused on bringing Sadat and Begin to the negotiation. By 1978, Carter and his team (except Vance)

38 Berggren, “Carter, Sadat, and Begin,” 749.
39 Carter, Keeping Faith, 296.
40 Vance, Hard Choices, 195.
42 McDonald, “Policy Makers,” 471.
turned away from the multilateral approach, aiming for a deal between Begin and Sadat.

Brzezinski’s support for this approach was vital for Carter when more thorny issues surfaced. The honeymoon period after Sadat’s historic visit was short. Early meetings between the Egyptian leader and Begin were far from friendly. In January 1978, both states returned to an acrimonious exchange of verbal attacks and negotiation abruptly stopped.\footnote{Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, 200-1.} Carter, facing pressure from all sides, became increasingly embattled. Israel was unwilling to make compromises and viewed Egypt with suspicion.\footnote{\textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute January 1977-August 1978}, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013), Document 195, \url{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d195} [accessed 2 Apr 2017].} Sadat’s attitude was similar. On February 4, Sadat threatened to cease all ongoing talks with Israel and end the dialogue.\footnote{\textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute January 1977-August 1978}, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013), Document 211, \url{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d211} [accessed April 2, 2017].} The risk of returning to the extreme antagonisms of the 1973 war was high. Meanwhile, mounting domestic criticism, especially from Jewish Americans, made the president reconsider his approach to the Middle East in mid-1978.\footnote{Carter, \textit{Keeping Faith}, 312.} Amid the political storm and stalled progress, Brzezinski’s affirmation of Carter’s approach was instrumental in sustaining the president’s effort. Throughout this period, the national security advisor showed

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\footnote{Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, 200-1.}
ardent support for the bilateral solution. Although not wholly against a multilateral treaty, Brzezinski regarded the Egypt-Israel pact as a more feasible and less challenging solution in 1978.47 His approval added weight and authority to Carter’s initiative and helped the president regain his sense of hope. Without Brzezinski’s encouragement, Carter might have given up his ambitious Middle East policy.

U.S. action resumed in July when Carter initiated a new round of negotiations in Camp David. In a July 19 meeting mediated by Vance, both Israel and Egypt expressed their willingness to return to peace negotiation.48 At this moment, Vance accepted the Israel-Egypt deal as a transitory process to the long-term goal of multilateral solution. For Begin and Sadat, accepting the American effort of mediation was crucial in showing signs of achievement to the domestic audience. Carter acted swiftly and invited Begin and Sadat to Camp David to start a new phase of talks. Again, the president employed his unique tactic of personal diplomacy, which stressed friendship. To show his sincerity, he directed Vance to bring two handwritten invitation letters to Jerusalem and Cairo respectively.49 As Carter resumed his political project on the Middle East with more determination, Vance eventually acknowledged the value of the bilateral deal. According to his later account, by mid-1978, Vance believed that making peace between Israel and Egypt was a crucial step for

47 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 235.
49 Carter, Keeping Faith, 316. The two letters are available online at Foreign Relations of the United States.
regional stability and served as a first step to a region-wide agreement in the future.\textsuperscript{50} In contrast to his earlier doubts about the bilateral approach, Vance became more supportive of Carter’s action. The Carter administration, after several months of division, rebuilt its unity and now shared a new consensus. The Camp David negotiation, scheduled for September, provided new opportunities for Carter and his cabinet. Desperate for a sound victory, they had high expectations, which put considerable pressure on the new round of talks.

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

All parties involved in the Camp David meetings placed high hopes in the outcome. With a dwindling public approval rating, Carter needed a major achievement to rescue his failing administration.\textsuperscript{51} In preparation for the negotiation, the president devoted unprecedented attention to the Middle East issue and prepared extensively and thoroughly.\textsuperscript{52} The same feeling of urgency appeared in the leaders of Israel and Egypt. Amid fierce attacks from domestic conservatives for their sign of weakness, Begin and Sadat were nervous to have sound and presentable breakthroughs in Camp David to prove the value of their moves. Both states emphasized the necessity of reaching agreement on at least in some issues in order to prevent possible conflicts in the near future.\textsuperscript{53} The first meeting started on September 5, with all participants nervously seeking a solution to their problems.

\textsuperscript{50} Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, 217.
\textsuperscript{51} Glad, \textit{An Outsider}, 144.
\textsuperscript{52} Kaufmann, \textit{Plans Unraveled}, 82.
Vance and Brzezinski actively provided briefings for the president before the negotiations. Both men valued the unique opportunity after years of hiatus in negotiations. Vance and specialists in the State Department conducted comprehensive research and presented their findings to the president.\footnote{Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, 218.} While Vance concentrated on equipping Carter with relevant information, Brzezinski outlined the strategy of active non-involvement. The national security advisor suggested that the president should divert Sadat and Begin from more contentious issues, while at the same time seeking maximum concession from Begin.\footnote{Brzezinski, \textit{Power and Principle}, 253.} As Sadat’s visit of Jerusalem led to his isolation from the Arab world, Washington had an urgent need to save the Egyptian leader and reward his political bet. It is remarkable that both Vance and Brzezinski complemented each other throughout the negotiation. According to Vance, they “worked in the closest harmony” and had a clear division of labor.\footnote{Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, 219.} Earlier discord over the best political approach gave way to the shared political task of overseeing an agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Carter’s personal diplomacy proved its value in the often bitter negotiations. The interactions between Sadat and Begin were never pleasant. Their mutual contempt was obvious and explicit even during their first meeting at Camp David.\footnote{Jimmy Carter, \textit{White House Diary} (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010), 219.} They even threatened to end the talks early without reaching any proposal in the coming days. With both sides refusing to make any compromises, the negotiation almost broke down. Carter’s effort to mend the profound gap between the two leaders was momentous. In various emotive conversations, Carter repeatedly persuaded both Sadat and Begin with reference to their
friendship. As friends of the president, finishing the negotiation with a deal meant doing Carter a favor. His strategic use of personal relationship during the negotiations helped to keep both at Camp David and thus save the American project from a premature death. Dialogue proceeded with mediation by Carter.

Carter’s tactic was particularly effective during the second week of negotiation. The president, after a week of persuasion, gained Sadat’s trust, and hence approval, of the American mediation effort. A breakthrough came on September 12 when Egypt accepted an American proposal. The recognition of Palestine and Yassar Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had long been a contentious topic and hindered any dialogue between Israel and Arab states. Sadat showed his resolve to a peace agreement by relaxing some of his earlier demands. With more financial aid from Washington, the Egyptian leader agreed to establish formal diplomatic relationship with Israel without discussing the issue of Palestine in Camp David. He also gave Carter more leeway in formulating the final treaty. Carter’s yearlong contact with Sadat proved its value. It is not surprising that the difficulties Carter faced when communicating with Egypt seem insignificant when compared with his troublesome conversations with Israel. Without the same degree of intimacy, Begin certainly had fewer reasons to support Carter on a personal basis.

59 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 264.
The partial victory of the Camp David Accords shows the strength and weakness of Carter’s personal diplomacy. With the Palestinian problem virtually untouched, Israel and Egypt at least had their first step in fostering dialogue in the future. The president’s friendship with Sadat made the Egyptian leader more willing to take a political risk and follow American policy. However, Carter’s approach had severe limitations. He failed to act more decisively or to promise future peace efforts during the Camp David talks. His encounters with Israeli officials were also full of obstacles, as his disastrous meeting with Yitzhak Rabin has shown. He often took more time to talk with Israel but gained less when compared with his interactions with Egypt. The Camp David Accords was in this sense a peculiar and somehow lucky product of the Carter administration. The president’s link with Sadat provided the foundation for one of America’s most unusual foreign policy projects.

CONCLUSION

The Camp David Accords resulted from the teamwork among the president and his cabinet. Initially holding a pro-Israel position, Jimmy Carter developed a new understanding of the political landscape of the Middle East after entering the White House. Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, two key members of the Carter cabinet, were the main architects of the president’s Middle East policy in 1977. While they envisioned a multilateral conference like the 1973 summit in Geneva, the president put more attention on relationships with individual leaders. His successful mobilization of Anwar Sadat marked a new phase in American policy. Washington shifted its policy approach to realizing a bilateral treaty between Egypt and Israel by the end of 1977. After a period of political deadlock in the first half of 1978, Carter initiated a series of negotiations between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin at Camp David. Carter’s personal diplomacy

61 Vance, Hard Choices, 225.
62 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 270.
prevailed when the Camp David Accords were signed on September 17, 1978.

The Camp David Accords is the product of a collective effort. While Carter’s role in the decision-making process was profound, his cabinet members were not insignificant players as some works falsely assume. Vance’s early attempt of a multilateral approach and Brzezinski’s later support to the president were both instrumental to the final product in Camp David. While Vance and Brzezinski laid the groundwork of the final product, Carter’s role was nonetheless momentous to the realization of the treaty. Stressing friendship and trust, the president had developed a special relationship with Sadat. This unusual link in international politics became an asset for the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. However, this approach is not easily transferable and universally applicable. Carter’s problematic conversation with Yitzhak Rabin and strained interaction with Begin showed the weakness of personal diplomacy. Without a systematic and coherent framework, Carter’s foreign policy has proved to be unreliable, unstable, and unsustainable.
Welcome to Phi Alpha Theta

Phi Alpha Theta is a professional society whose mission is to promote the study of history through the encouragement of research, good teaching, publication, and the exchange of learning and ideas among historians. We seek to bring students, teachers, and writers of history together for intellectual and social exchanges, which promote and assist historical research and publication by our members in a variety of ways.

The Alpha Theta Epsilon chapter at Binghamton University was chartered in 1996. Membership is open to anyone with a vital interest in history who has demonstrated high achievement in history courses. Undergraduates may join after completing at least four history courses with a grade point average of at least 3.5 (on a 4.0 scale) in those courses and a grade point average of at least 3.3 overall. It is not necessary to be majoring in history. Graduate students need a 3.7 GPA in four or more history courses and a 3.5 GPA overall to become a member.

Anyone interested in joining should contact the chapter’s faculty advisor:

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Research Days

During Binghamton University’s Research Days, the History Department and Phi Alpha Theta host an undergraduate research conference. This provides undergraduates and honors thesis writers who have undertaken substantial independent research with an opportunity to share their work with one another and the History community. The first Undergraduate History Research Conference was held in 2012. The 5th annual conference held in spring 2017 had seven outstanding presentations.

2017 Participants

Steven Lazickas—“Freedom in Shades: Race, Slavery, and Suffrage in New York”

Lindsey McClafferty—“The Imperial Debate: American Reflections on Filipinos and the Subjugation of the Philippines, 1898-1916”

Rachel Blalfeder—“A Valley of Immigrants: Examining Ethnic and American Dynamics in Binghamton, Endicott, and Johnson City in the Early 20th Century”

Ching Long Leon Lam—“Beyond the President: The Carter Administration and the Making of the Camp David Accords”

Elana Weber—“Identity, Gender, or the Erotic: Decoding 13th-15th Century Women Dressed as Men”

Savoy Curry—“Familial Monarchy: The Role of Regnant Queenship in Twelfth Century Europe”

Jiajun Zou—“Perils and Opportunities: Coastal Chinese and Maritime Wokou During the Jiajing Era, 1521-1567”
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At Binghamton University, students have the option of combining a Bachelor of Arts with a Master of Arts in history, completing both degrees in just five years. Students take graduate-level courses that satisfy both graduate and undergraduate degree requirements. The combined BA/MA program provides an excellent foundation for applying to top doctoral programs in history or pursuing careers in journalism, public service, historical parks, museums, and many other areas. Students develop skills that prepare them for occupations that require research, analysis, organization, and reporting. Specific skills include planning and prioritizing work, making persuasive arguments that influence others, processing information, decision making and problem solving, and verbally communicating ideas.

Students chose between the major fields of the United States, Europe, East Asia, Latin America, and the Ottoman Empire and between such thematic areas as women, gender, and sexuality; imperialism and colonialism; environmental history; and science, technology, and medicine.

For more information about the program, please visit the department’s webpage: www.binghamton.edu/history/graduate/combined-ba-ma.html.

Interested students should contact the Director of Undergraduate Studies in History and/or the Director of Graduate Studies in History for more information.
Minor in the History of Science, Technology, & Medicine

The minor in the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine supplements the studies of students majoring in other fields with a coherent, thematic program in History. The minor introduces students to the history of science, technology, and medicine in a variety of time periods, geographic regions, and religious and cultural systems. It grounds developments within science, technology, and medicine in a specific historic context, and it encourages students to consider these developments in relation to broader political, social, cultural, and intellectual trends. It seeks to expose students to historical methodology and historical questions, enhancing and deepening their understanding of the developments of related fields in the life and natural sciences, engineering, medicine, nursing, and environmental studies. Each student completing the minor in the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine develops a program to satisfy the minor requirements in consultation with the department’s advisors.

In order to complete the minor (24 credits), students must take a minimum of 16 credits in courses that explore the theory and method of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine. Students may also include up to 8 credits of coursework that examines specialized context and applications—e.g., courses exploring topics such as race or sexuality—of profound relevance for the history of science, technology, and medicine.

For more information: please visit the undergraduate Advising Office Library Tower 712 or email uhistory@binghamton.edu.
We sincerely thank our History Department faculty and staff listed below. Without them, neither this journal nor our other accomplishments would have come to fruition.

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