

Research Grant Proposal

Submitted to

Binghamton University Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (I-GMAP)

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Research Project Title: Winning Hearts and Minds amidst Ethnic Furies

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Collaborators:

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Award Requested: \$5.000

Project Description

Abstract

We propose to study minority group perceptions towards the government in a setting vulnerable to ethnic cleansing and genocide. We argue that the presence of a violent non-state actor (VNSA) claiming to represent the minority group, and existence of conflict polarizing ethnic identities and generating security threats, condition how minorities perceive, interpret, and react to the government policies. That said, our goal is to study the triangle of relations between Government, VNSAs, and minority ethnic group relations, and the trends on ethnic polarization by the strategic interaction of these actors. We seek to understand why and how governments fail to appease the increasing tensions at the societal level, or even contribute to it, and how the very presence VNSAs and their tactics shape government strategies that may lead to genocide. Instead

of focusing on violent government strategies towards minorities, which have been amply studied, our focus is on government's attempts of concessions towards minorities. In so doing, we aim to explore when non-violent strategies work, and when they fail and perpetuate ethnic polarization?

By doing a micro-level survey in Turkey, we aim to understand the Kurdish appraisal of government efforts of conciliatory approaches. The Turkish government has initiated a series of concessions in the last ten years to the Kurdish population driven by the need to sever the citizens' loyalty from PKK. Yet, the polls show that Kurdish identity is more salient than ever. This is what drives our interest: how and when do government's conciliation efforts pay off, when do such efforts contribute to existing polarization? Understanding the conditions for the former means ethnic furies can be reduced to a simmer before they boil.

Our contribution is threefold: 1-We are looking at a unique set of government strategies, non-violent, in a setting conducive to mass atrocities. While many scholars analyzed harsh government responses, discrimination, exclusion as a predecessor to genocide, the use of conciliatory strategies has gone unnoticed. In many cases, they have been planned or undertaken by governments along with violent strategies. Why haven't they worked? 2-Our study sheds light on the link between actions and perceptions. Government actions, even conciliatory ones, may have unintended consequences, leading to a different set of perceptions dependent on the ethnic lens. So, how do the Kurds perceive government's concessions? 3-Lastly, the relationship between the government and a minority group is dependent on the third actor, VNSA who is fighting for the loyalty of the same constituency. VNSA conditions this relationship. We can't understand perceived threats to group identity unless we incorporate the role of VNSA's.

Introduction

After the gas chambers in Nazi Germany, the machete insanity in Rwanda, and the massacre of thousands in Srebrenica, the international community has vowed over and over again, "No More!" The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) act was unanimously adopted by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit, and imposes the right and responsibility of each state to protect its citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Despite the promise, many believe RtoP has not been effective as a rallying call to action (Hehir, 2010; Traub, 2010). Today, as the Rohingya Muslims are being targeted by military and religious groups in a brutal campaign of dehumanization, subjected to war crimes such as arson,

rape and killing, the issue always comes back to: Is the threshold met? Whether the issue is competing norms, state interests, or the lack of consensus on the applicability of the doctrine, the most effective solution to genocide and ethnic cleansing comes from preventive action. This is where we strive to make a contribution in the literature.

Violent events such as genocides are rare occurrences. Yet, the consequences on the human aspect of such events make it of utmost importance to try to understand the latent conducive factors and the triggers that set them to motion. Goldsmith et al. (2013) in their forecasting model refer to this as a two-stage process, the first stage being the likelihood of political instability, the second as genocide onset. Others define this as the culmination of opportunity and emotions (Mc Doom, 2012). No matter how we look at it, genocide has its precedents. Loving neighbors in Yugoslavia turned on one another under the call of the instrumental leaders. But, ethnic polarization there did not occur in one day. When the ethnic furries were boiling, everybody heard its whisper. Posen (1993, 30) explained what was happening in Yugoslavia at the time, “the drive for security in one group is so great that it produces near-genocidal behavior toward neighboring groups.” Similarly, in Rwanda, the seeds of doubt, mistrust, conspiracy were long ago implanted in the minds of the Hutu by politicians against a rising “Tutsi threat”, which were perpetuated by the memories of colonial legacy. State discrimination in the aftermath of independence contributed to this by sharpening group boundaries and saliency. So, when the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front came calling, it was the culmination of all the Hutu had feared. From then on, it was easy for extremists to play on these fears. So, could these cases be prevented?

Article II of United Nation's 1948 Genocide Convention describes genocide as "*the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.*" Though ethnicity seems to be the key factor here, many ethnic groups coexist peacefully in the world. While studies in intergroup behavior show that being a member of a group structures behavior, and creates perceptions of in-group versus out-group distinction, ethnicity is especially a powerful social identity because it is easily activated and reconstructed due to grievances, shared cultures, myths, histories of group members. But when does ethnicity become relevant? The simplest answer is when threats to group identity occur (Mc Doom, 2002).

Threats: The Role of Violent Non-State Actors and Strategies by the Government

If ethnic polarization and threats to identity are the keys to mass atrocities, we need to understand how such a conducive setting is created. We focus on one such context: conflict. Intrastate conflicts and VNSA's increase the saliency of ethnic identities within a society (Uzonyi, 2015). Genocide studies mostly focus on the initiators (i.e., governments and/or paramilitary groups supported by governments) and victims (individuals belonging to an identity group) as the main actors, attention is rarely riveted on the role of violent non-state actors. From Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi rebel group in Rwanda to Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur, violent actors have contributed to the politicization of ethnic identity, heightening security concerns and threats, thereby fueling the violence targeting civilians.

The very presence of insurgent groups or terrorist organizations, regardless of what they fight for, contributes to the polarization within the society, as they largely rely on ethnic or ideological cleavages to achieve their demands. At the societal level, targeting civilians and/or military personnel of one identity group in the name of the other jeopardizes the notion of a “unified nation,” and leads to the creation and reinforcement of ethno nationality. When an in-group vs. out-group dichotomy becomes salient, an ethnic awareness surges as a result of increased threat perception, group boundaries become more rigid (Stein, 1976). Mobilization of collective identity by VNSAs crystallizes divisions between groups, and fosters in-group cohesion against a perceived out-group threat. In such a context, group identity dominates over individual identity and becomes the means of survival. So, once group boundaries are set, and both sides perceive threat emanating from the very existence of each other, then it is only a matter of time before ethnic cleansing of a weaker group becomes the means through which a stronger group can sustain or challenge the status quo. And, as argued above, VNSAs are the catalyst of this vicious cycle.

But VNSAs serve another purpose, as well. By challenging the legitimacy of governments, they tempt governments to respond back with policies that may directly or indirectly deepen ethnic polarization. For example, beginning from the end of 1980s, Turkish governments' tactics to defeat the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) resulted in the further marginalization of Kurdish society. Though the Turkish government imposed many policies to

defeat PKK and to claim the allegiance of the Kurdish minority, the end result was anything but further escalation of the conflict. To clear the fighting grounds of PKK, and to ensure the safety of the people, the government forcefully evacuated villages in the rural parts of Southeastern Turkey, pushing the people to immigrate to urban centers, leaving their homes behind. But, this did not win any hearts. On the contrary, it backfired. In a setting where both the PKK and the government fought for the loyalty of the Kurdish citizens, any mistake had its repercussions. This policy not only generated grievances among the migrants, but also triggered hatred among the members of second generation kids whose families were rooted out from their origins. Hence, among the immediate and long term consequences of such policies were the increased enmity towards the government, support for PKK, and a spread of in-group vs. out-group animosity, the very conditions that have led to ethnic cleansing or genocide in other places.

Overall, we will be analyzing how government policies towards ethnic minorities, conditional on VNSA strategies, shape group boundaries and content which in return affects the lens through which they see threats. Again, our approach differs from other scholars not only because we are interested in preventive action, but also because we are interested in the preventive action by the government, the very actor that is responsible from genocide. Government efforts to drive a wedge between populations through years of official or nonofficial exclusion, discrimination, and complicity in genocide in cases such as Srebrenica, Darfur, and Rwanda are well known. What we do not know much about is the window of opportunity, the conciliatory approaches, which they failed to utilize, or utilized poorly in the events preceding genocide. Unlike what it looks on the onset, many governments, at times, have taken steps, most of which were half-hearted, towards minority groups, the very groups they exterminated when they failed to gain their loyalty.

For example, Habyarimana enacted a northern quota rule to distribute resources to the less developed northern region, where both the Tutsi and Hutu lived. This policy alleviated in-group favoritism among the Hutus, but failed to eradicate out-group negativity towards the Tutsi. Had Habyarimana's strategy worked to eliminate some of the polarization between the two ethnic groups in the North, we could have had a different Rwanda today. Similarly, Saddam Hussein, fighting against a Kurdish insurgency, who tried to exterminate the Kurdish population by a chemical attack in 1987-88 was the same person who said in his National Assembly Speech

eight years ago: “*Let people live and choose their own path. We believe that our Kurds must have autonomy. This does not conflict with the unity of Iraq. Those who have Kurds and who do not want to grant them autonomy, that is their business*” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1980). Often times, the very presence of VNSA’s up the competition over the loyalty of minority groups, forcing governments to make some conciliatory effort in winning their allegiance. So, we ask, what goes wrong?

What kind of government policies are effective when ethnic identities are already rendered salient and antagonistic by the presence of VNSA’s? When do government efforts to gain the loyalty of minorities work, and when do they lead to group backlash, further adding to polarization? Genocide is the point at which governments give up, the point where any hope of gaining the allegiance and loyalty of the minority group is lost. If we can find out, why and when such government efforts fail, we can prevent the point of no return. We seek to understand how minorities perceive and react to government efforts of conciliation in such contexts. In this project, that is what we want to uncover.

Long Term Prevention:

Conflict prevention and conflict resolution have been core themes in conflict studies. Our goal is to study the latter. Surely, pausing the hostilities between the government and a minority group is important, surely pausing violence is exemplary, but curing the disease requires a different approach. Long term prevention starts with conciliatory policies that address the grievances of minority populations. Our project gets at the crux of the problem by highlighting:

- 1-The failures and successes of the initiation and implementation of such policies
- 2-The factors that affect and shape public perceptions when such policies take effect

Without understanding the above, we can’t arrive at conflict resolution. One elite interview we conducted over the phone (a test case) revealed some of that dynamic in the context of Turkey, there were great friendships that had taken place between Turkish military officers and Kurdish people amidst war zone. These relationships were forged because the Turkish military responded to the needs and cries of the local population, serving their needs by supplying teachers,

delivering food supplies, health care, all using the personnel and funds of the military. This was rapprochement between two ethnic identities at the local level. One of the anecdotes, for example, was about an old Kurdish woman who reprimanded children for stoning a military car. Another was about soldiers integrating with the local population. M.U (Personal Interview, 2018) said:

“It was the reinitiation of terrorism. I was in Yuksekova, Hakkari. You know about 15th of February, the day Ocalan was captured. All the locals close shops on that day and various protest events take place. We were meeting and discussing what to do. The gendarme commander said we should go early in the village and chat, drink tea with the locals. We all agreed. On the 15th of Feb, we, a group of ranked officers, went to each shop one by one. We chatted, purchased goods. That day, all the shops remained open. The shopkeepers greeted us very nicely. That night, my phone never stopped ringing. Nothing bad happened in the city. Every local person I knew called me and said, ‘*This is it. This is what we want to see.*’ PKK threatened them, but couldn’t do anything. If only one shopkeeper had opened his shop, they would have killed him, harmed him. But everybody had. So, PKK was desperate. It made us very happy to see the locals react that way to our initiative. The most important reason why the locals support PKK is because they feel unsafe.”

Our work is going to be presented at Turkish and international conferences, and we will get the chance to share our findings with NGO’s, academicians and policymakers (see Project deliverables)

Place of Study

We would like to conduct a micro level survey in Turkey. The reason for specifically focusing on Turkey in this research is four-fold: 1) the presence of a salient and relevant identity-based cleavage between Turks and Kurds, 2) ongoing conflict between Turkish Armed Forces and PKK –a group demanding more rights and autonomy for ethnic Kurds living Turkey which feeds saliency and pushes the government to react, 3) PKK resorting to terrorism in targeting ethnic Kurds which further polarizes the public, 4) a sequence of nonviolent

government strategies in the last decade which aim to alleviate but end up stirring in-group vs. out-group dichotomy. These factors all influence how a non-state armed actor and the government compete to win the allegiance of Kurdish citizens, how the government counteracts against the tactics of the non-state armed actor, and how citizens react to the government's attempts of concessions. Once we have insight about these puzzles, then we can also contribute to the stability and peace ex ante.

Project Feasibility and Support

With the support of I-GMAP research grant, we will be able to conduct this research and contribute to the research on the onset of genocide and mass atrocities. We are confident that this research will have important academic and professional implications, and provide researchers and policy-makers with great insights about the causes of successes and failures of some non-violent strategies employed ex-ante. This project has interdisciplinary impact, beyond political science, we borrow heavily from social psychology to understand the attitude of people amidst threats and how the lens of identity shapes perceptions towards government concessions. Furthermore, because we are interested in analyzing the failures of initiating and implementing the public goods targeting a minority group, the implications of this research should equally be relevant in the public policy/administration field.

To carry out this research, we will be in collaboration with academics and professionals working in other institutions in the US and Turkey. Two of the collaborators of this research are currently in Ohio State University. Efe Tokdemir is a Binghamton University graduate, and currently a postdoctoral fellow of the International Studies Association, and a visiting research scholar at Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University. His expertise is on conflict processes, foreign policy, and public opinion; he is specifically studying the micro-level impacts of policies and strategies pursued by state and non-state actors. He has previously published in prominent journals such as *Journal of Peace Research*, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *International Interactions*, and *International Political Science Review*. Aysenur Dal is a PhD candidate in The School of Communication at the Ohio State University. Her research interest lies in political communication; she specifically explores the

impact of social norms and risk perceptions of vulnerable minorities living in authoritarian settings in predicting their online expression.

Both of my collaborators have previously completed field research in Turkey, and are fluent in Turkish. They have also worked with local institutions and companies in Turkey to conduct public opinion surveys and survey experiments; and hence, they have experience on conducting similar research. As a matter of fact, we have previously worked together in a research project two years ago, with the collective experience, knowledge, and network in our research team; we will successfully complete this project.

Project Deliverables

To reach the academic audience and to show the implications of this research to practitioners, we are planning to present the findings of this research in the following ways:

1. This will be part of our book project, which is currently considered by Georgetown University Press and Michigan University Press. Both publishers asked us to send some sample chapters for review.
2. We plan to publish this in top tier academic journals such as American Journal of Political Science, World Politics, International Organizations, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management and Peace Science.
3. We also to present the findings of this survey at an organized panel at APSA Annual Meeting at Boston, MA, and Peace Science Society at Austin, TX next year.
4. To reach non-academic audience, we will publish our findings in popular mediums such as Washington Post – Monkey Cage, and Political Violence at a Glance. In so doing, this project may inform policy makers and practitioners about success and failures of specific policy choices in preventing mass atrocities and genocides.
5. We plan to incorporate the policy implications of this research by incorporating this work in our class material, such as Politics of Terrorism, Causes of Civil War.
6. Though working with NGO's may be problematic due to the political situation in Turkey, we plan to present this at a conference in Turkey with the participation of prominent academics and practitioners. (Note: We are currently working on holding workshops with

the participation of Bilkent University, Bilgi University, Cukurova University, and Bahcesehir University in Turkey. We have made progress informally, it will take some more time to announce the schedule officially)

Proposed Timeline

- *January – February, 2018:*
 - Preliminary investigations for the field research in Turkey.
- *March – May, 2018:*
 - Final revisions in the project based on the preliminary investigations, continued conversations and meetings with the collaborators.
 - Completion of questionnaires for public opinion survey and survey experiment.
- *June – July, 2018:*
 - Pilot study of public opinion surveys, and revision of the questionnaires, if needed.
 - Conduct of focus groups.
 - First set of elite interviews.
- *August – September, 2018:*
 - Data management and preliminary analysis of the data.
 - Submission of the book chapters that employs the collected data for the review
 - Presentation of the initial findings in American Political Science Association Annual Meeting and Workshops in Binghamton University and the Ohio State University.
- *October, 2018:*

- Second set of elite interviews.
- Presentation of the initial findings at a conference in Turkey with the participation of academics from various universities as noted above, and practitioners from policy making and implementation circles.
- *November – December, 2018:*
 - Submission of the all book chapters for publication including the chapters employing the collected data.
 - Preparation of a manuscript with the collaborators for submission to a journal, building on the conference and workshop proceedings.

Proposed Budget

Below, please find the narrative of our budget to conduct the proposed research project. As explained below in the additional funding section, my collaborators and I already found resources for a good portion of the budget. From my research package, I could add \$1.850 for the costs, and my collaborators Aysenur Dal and Efe Tokdemir contributed \$5.000, an amount granted by Mershon Center for International Security Studies to complete a public opinion survey in Turkey.

Other Direct Costs – Other Costs	Amount Needed	Narrative
Public Opinion Survey & Survey Experiment	\$9.200	\$8 per person. N=1 150 in Turkey <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Agreed with Infakto Survey in Turkey on the prices and methods. ● Nationally representative survey ● Randomization, sampling, data collection and data preparation is included in the price as well as translation of the variables and questions to English.

Focus Group	\$600	In Gaziantep and Istanbul, Turkey: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 sets, each set with 15 people \$10 per person in Istanbul • 2 sets, each set with 15 people \$10 per person in Gaziantep
Travel and Accommodation to conduct Elite Interviews	\$2.050	Airfare: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two round way tickets Binghamton, NY – Istanbul, Turkey: \$800 per tickets, \$1600 in total • One round way ticket from Istanbul, Turkey to Gaziantep, Turkey: \$75 • One round way ticket from Istanbul, Turkey to Diyarbakir, Turkey: \$75 Hotel: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 nights in Gaziantep, Turkey, 3 nights in Diyarbakir, Turkey: \$50 per night in average, \$300 in total
Total	\$11.850	*Note: \$5.000 requested from I-GMAP, external resources fund the rest (\$6.850) of the budget.

Plans for Additional Funding

Along with the requested amount from I-GMAP Research Grant, we will also benefit from external sources, and look for additional external funding opportunities to prepare a second wave of this research. Here is a list of the sources of external funds we will be using, and the grants we are planning to apply during this project.

- 1) Aysenur Dal, a collaborator of this project, already committed to contribute \$5.000 for the conduct of this research. She received the award from Mershon Center for International Security Studies to conduct a public opinion survey and survey experiment to investigate risk perceptions of citizens of Turkey in predicting their contentious political expression. Additionally, she is currently applying for another grant from Decision Sciences Collaborative to receive an additional \$3.000 to conduct the same research. We are not accounting this application in our planned

- budget, if she could get the award, this amount would be used for making focus groups in two additional cities with Kurdish predominant population.
- 2) I will contribute \$1.850 USD to the budget from my annual research fund. There is no restriction in the use of this amount.
 - 3) Along with organizing a conference in Turkey, our contact persons have made an offer to apply for the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) grants to extend the scope of the project to further analyze social-psychological determinants of individuals' support or opposition to the non-violent policies of governments, which aim to alleviate inter-group tension.

Statement of Agreement

We understand and accept the conditions of the award. Specifically, we agree to submit a report of activities and accomplishments no later than August 30, 2019. Additionally, we will provide copies of all published and unpublished materials (academic and professional), which stem from this research, and will cite the Institute and Binghamton University as a source of funds.

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Appendix A. Letters of Support

Emails from Aysenur Dal, Efe Ihsan Tokdemir

Selamlar Seden,

Ben Efe'yle de konustum tekrar bugun. Sana da survey icin fiyat ve planla ilgili bilgi vereceğini söyledi benle konuştuktan sonra. Ben Mershon'dan \$5000 doları herhangi bir zaman alıp kullanabilirim. Sadece 1-2 hafta onceden parayı teslim almak istediğime dair haber verip official procedure'i baslatmam gerekiyor. Onun haricinde baska bir kurum, Decision Science Collaborative'den \$3000'lik bir grant'e daha başvurdum ayni proje icin. Olumlu bir haber olursa o parayı da kullanabiliriz tabii ki. Questionnaire hazırlanırken ben ona gore sorularımı ayarliyacagim, ek para gelirse o zaman koymak istedim 4-5 sorum daha var buradaki collaboratorlarimla yaptığım bir proje uzerine.

Binghamton'daki başvuru sureciyle ilgili istediğin bir belge olursa lütfen haberdar et.

Görüşmekte uzere,

Aysenur Dal

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Merhaba Seden,

Ben son konuşmamız üzerine Türkiye’de nationally representative survey yapmak için INFAKTO araştırma şirketi sahibi Dr. Emre Erdogan’la konuştum. Daha önce de kendisiyle çalıştım, ve benim yaptığım piyasa araştırmalarında da randomization ve sampling anlamında en başarılı, survey erroru en düşük tutabilen araştırma şirketi INFAKTO. Dr. Erdogan da zaten method uzmanlığı survey olan Boğaziçi ve Bilgi Üniversiteleri’nde çalışan bir akademisyen. Fiyat konusunda kişi başı \$8 dolara yapabileceğimizi söyledi. Özellikle Doğu illerinde de yapılacak düşünülürse çok iyi bir ücret diye düşünüyorum. Toplam 1750 kişi ile yapılacak, ve toplam \$14.000 tutacak.

Bunun haricinde yine anlaştığımız gibi INFAKTO panellerini kullanarak pre/post-survey focus grupları yapabileceğiz. Kişi başı \$10, 15 kişiyle yapılacak, 2 şehirde olacak ve pre/post olmak üzere farklı gruplarla 2 kere yapılacak, ve toplamda focus group \$600’a gelecek.

Skype’den ucumuz bir görüşelim derim, Aralık 2017’de bir görüşme de ayarlayabiliriz yüz yüze son halini vermek için survey’e. Lütfen bana geri dönüş yap fiyat ve plan uygun gözüküyor mu diye.

En yakın zamanda görüşmek üzere,

Efe Tokdemir

Postdoctoral Fellow, ISA James N. Rosenau Fellowship

Mershon Center for International Security Studies

The Ohio State University

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Ihsan Efe Tokdemir (Translation)

Hi Seden,

Following our last conversation, I contacted Dr. Emre Erdogan, who is the owner of INFAKTO Research Company, to conduct a nationally representative survey in Turkey. As we have worked previously, INFAKTO is the most successful survey research company when it comes to sampling and randomization of the participants, and the cheapest one given the quality of the survey research. Dr. Erdogan is already an Associate Professor in Bogazici and Bilgi Universities, and his expertise is on survey research. We agreed on \$8 per person price for the public opinion survey. Given that we will also conduct this survey in the eastern parts of Turkey, I think this is a fair price to agree. In total, depending on our budget, 1750 persons will participate in our research, and it will cost \$14,000.

Aside from this, as we agreed, we will also conduct focus groups using INFAKTO panels. It will cost \$10 per person to recruit, and we will conduct each it with 15 persons in two cities, before and after the public opinion surveys. Overall it will cost \$600.

We can Skype three of us on December. So that we can agree upon all the conditions face to face. Please let me know what you think about the proposed budget and the feasibility of the plan.

See you soon,

Aysenur Dal (Translation)

Hi Seden,

I have talked to Efe today. He told me to inform you about the budget and schedule for the research following our meeting. I can utilize the Mershon Award of \$5.000 anytime with the condition of letting them know 1-2 weeks in advance to start the official procedure. Aside from that, I have applied for a grant of \$3.000 from Decision Science Collaborative for the same project. In case I hear a good news, we can also use that money for the research. When we are preparing the Questionnaire, I may add 4-5 questions more for a project I am working on with another collaborator here, only if I can get this grant, and end up with an increased budget.

If you need any document for the application process in Binghamton, please let me know.

See you,

Appendix B. Sample of Elite Interview Questions (Turkish and English versions, as approved from IRB)

- Terorle mucadele donemlerinde Dogu veya Guneydogu illerinde gorev yaptiniz mi? /// Have you participated in the fight against terrorism in East and Southeast Turkey during the conflict?
- Eger yaptiysaniz, hangi ilde, hangi yillar arasinda gorev yaptiniz? /// If yes, in which cities and when?
- Terorle mucadele kapsaminda karargahta bulunmak haricinde aktif olarak operasyonlarda da gorev yaptiniz mi? /// As part of the fight against terrorism, have you actively participated in close combat in urban and suburban areas?
- PKK'nin TSK ile silahlı mucadelesi haricinde yerel halkla girdigi iletisim ve iliskilerle ilgili bilginiz var mi? Ilginç buldugunuz hikaye ve anilarinizi ogrenebilir miyiz? /// What do you know about PKK's constituency relations with the locals? Could you please share any memories, or stories heard from your colleagues?
- Sizce PKK yerel halkla iliskilerinde daha çok zorlayıcı taktikler mi yapıcı taktikler mi benimsiyor? Orneğin daha çok silah yoluyla mi, yoksa para, statu, sosyal hizmetler gibi vaatlerle mi destek ariyor? Kendi ya da arkadaşlarınızın tecrübelerinden yola çıkarak verebileceğiniz spesifik örnekler var mi? PKK'nin stratejilerinde zaman içinde değişiklikler gözlemlediniz mi? Eger cevabınız evetse, bunun sebebinin ne olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? /// Do you think PKK has embraced more coercive or constructive tactics in its relations with the locals? For example, does PKK derive its support by forcing the locals, or providing social services and status, or giving money? Do you have any memories, or stories heard from your colleagues?
- Türkiye PKK'ya karşı silahlı mucadele yürütülen Kürtlere karşı ne gibi yerel politikalar izliyordu bölgede? Ha keza Kürt halkının desteğini kazanmak adına geliştirilen yerelde uygulanan politikalar var mi? Kendi ya da arkadaşlarınızın tecrübelerinden yola çıkarak verebileceğiniz spesifik örnekler var mi? /// What kind of policies did Turkish authorities pursue in the region in addition to the military measures? For example, do you witness any policies to get support of Kurdish people in the region? Do you have any memories, or stories heard from your colleagues?
- Daha spesifik olmak gerekirse, bulduğunuz birliklerde yerel halkla ilişki kurulmasına özen gösteriliyor muydu? Herhangi bir yardım politikası takip ediliyor muydu? Kendi ya da arkadaşlarınızın tecrübelerinden yola çıkarak verebileceğiniz spesifik örnekler var mi? /// Being more specific, were there any specific measures to engage with locals in the units you worked?

Do you or your colleagues engage in any service provision, including giving aid? Do you have any memories, or stories heard from your colleagues?

- Eger yapiliyorduyusa, PKK'nin buna karsi yine yerelde gelistirdigi taktikler oluyor muydu? Ornegin askeri birliklerde yasayan ve calisanlarin yerli halka yardimlarinin onun gecmeye calisan yerel yonetici ya da terror orgut uyesi, sempatizantlari oluyor muydu? Kendi ya da arkadaslarinizin tecrubelerinden yola cikarak verebileceginiz spesifik ornekler var mi? /// If there are such policies pursued by Turkish authorities, have you witnessed or heard any PKK tactics to outbid these attempts? For example, have you witnessed or heard any local authorities or group member that attempted to prevent social services and aid coming from Turkish authorizes, and their families? Do you have any memories, or stories heard from your colleagues?

Appendix C. Sample of Survey Questions

Demography:

D.1. Can you tell me your Year of Birth?

D.2. Sex: 1. Female 2. Male

D.3. Which option below fits best your education status?

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Never went to school/Illiterate | 1 |
| 2. Literate but no school diploma | 2 |
| 3. Primary school diploma | 3 |
| 4. Intermediate school diploma | 4 |
| 5. High school diploma | 5 |
| 6. University dropout | 6 |
| 7. University diploma | 7 |
| 8. Graduate degree (Masters, Doctorate) | 8 |

D.4. Which one among the following describes your employment status best?

1. Unemployed
2. Student
3. Retired
4. Employed in public sector
5. Employed in private sector
6. Own business
7. House wife
8. Other

D.5. Considering the income (e.g. salary, rent, pension, money sent from family members abroad or in the country other business income etc.) of all family members, what is your average total monthly household income?

1. Less than 1000 TL
2. 1001 – 1500 TL
3. 1501 – 2000 TL
4. 2001 – 3000 TL
5. 3001 – 4000 TL
6. 4001 – 5000 TL
7. More than 5000 TL

D.6. Which language do you speak at home?

1. Turkish
2. Kurdish
3. Zaza
4. Arabic
5. Other _____
8. No answer

Questions to be answered by the surveyor

S.1. Size of residence?

1.City 2. Town 3. Village

S.2. Gender of the surveyor

1. Male 2. Female

S.3. During the interview, was the respondent alone?

1. Yes 2. NO

S.4. What is the mother language of surveyor?

1. Turkish
2. Kurdish
3. Zaza

4. Arabic
5. Other _____

Political Interest & Attitudes

POL.1. Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?

- 1 Satisfied
2 Dissatisfied
8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

POL.2. In general, to what extent are you interested in politics?

- 1 Very interested
2 Not interested
3 Slightly interested
4 Not interested
8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

POL.3. To which political party did/do you voted/vote for in the following elections?

Election	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	Other	Non	No-Answer
A. June 2015	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
B. Nov. 2015	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
C. Today	1	2	3	4	5	6	8

POL.4. Now we want to ask about some of your media habits. How frequently do you follow political news through the following media?

	1. Not at all closely	2. Not too Closely	3. Somewhat closely	4. Fairly closely	5. Extremely closely
1. Newspapers, including online editions	1	2	3	4	5
2. Television, including online broadcasts	1	2	3	4	5
3. Social Networking Sites (e.g., Twitter, Facebook)	1	2	3	4	5

POL.5. How often did you use social networking sites to do the following in last three months?

	1. Never	2. Less than once a month	3. Once a month	4. 2-3 times a month	5. Once a week	6. 2-3 times a week	7. Daily
1. Discuss political issues with others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Like, post or comment on anything related to politics, including news stories, opinions, images, or videos.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Share news stories or videos automatically that you view on news websites or blogs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Post or share negative comments criticizing Turkish political leaders or public servants	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IDENTITY

ID.1. What is your ethnic denomination?

- 1 Turk
- 2 Kurd
- 3 Arab
- 4 Armenian
- 5 Jew
- 6 Other
- 7 No-affiliation
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ID.2. What is your religious denomination?

- 1 Sunni/Hanefi
- 2 Alevid
- 3 Shafi
- 4 Nusayri
- 5 Christian
- 6 Jew
- 7 Other
- 8 No-affiliation
- 9 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 10 Refused (DO NOT READ)

ID.3 Among many identities you have, how would you describe yourself first?

1. Religious Identity (Muslim, Christian)
2. National Identity (Turkish, citizen of Turkey)
3. Ethnic/Sectarian Identity (Turk, Kurd, Arab)
4. Ideological Identity (Liberal, Rightist, Socialist, Leftist)
5. Sectarian Identity (Sunni, Alevid, Shia, Orthodox, Catholic)
6. None of the above (DO NOT READ)

ID.4. How important is this identity for you?

1. Very important
2. Important
3. Somehow important
4. Not important
8. No answer (DO NOT READ)
9. Don't know (DO NOT READ)

ID.5. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

	1. Completely disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neither disagree nor	4. Agree	5. Completely agree	9. Don't know
1. Turks and Kurds can never be really comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends	1	2	3	4	5	9

ID.6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

	1. Completely disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neither disagree nor	4. Agree	5. Completely agree	9. Don't know

1. I would mind starting up a business with a Kurd as an equal share partner	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. I would mind starting up a business with a Turk as an equal share partner	1	2	3	4	5	9

ID.7. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

	1. Completely disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neither disagree nor	4. Agree	5. Completely agree	9. Don't know
1. I would mind if a Kurd who has similar economic background as mine married my son and/or daughter, or someone in my close family.	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. I would mind if a Turk who has similar economic background as mine married my son and/or daughter, or someone in my close family.	1	2	3	4	5	9

ID.8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

	1. Completely disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neither disagree nor	4. Agree	5. Completely agree	9. Don't know
1. I would mind renting my apartment to a Kurdish being a neighbor in the same building	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. I would mind renting my apartment to a Turkish being a neighbor in the same building	1	2	3	4	5	9

ID.9. Have you experienced any discrimination in public institutions because of your ethnic, religious, or sectarian background?

- 1) YES 2) NO

ID.10. Do you think that the state institutions are in discriminative and exclusive treatments against the following groups?

	1. Very discriminative	2. Somewhat discriminative	3. Neither, nor	4. Not discriminative	9. Don't know
1. Kurds	1	2	3	4	9
2. Turks	1	2	3	4	9
3. Sunni	1	2	3	4	9
4. Alevids	1	2	3	4	9

Perceptions of Rights and Freedoms

RF.1. Compared to 1990s, what do you think about the political, social, economic rights of Kurdish citizens living in Turkey?

- 1) Very improved
- 2) Somewhat improved
- 3) No change – same
- 4) Somewhat worsened
- 5) Very worsened
- 6) Don't Know
- 7) No Answer

RF.2. How would you rate the changes in the following cultural rights in the last twenty years?

	1. Worsened	2. Somewhat Worsened	3. Neither worsened nor Improved	4. Somewhat Improved	5. Improved	9. Don't know
1. Ability to speak your own language	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. Broadcasting in your own language	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. Access to education in your own language	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. Access to state services in your own language	1	2	3	4	5	9

RF.2. How would you rate the changes in the following economic rights in the last twenty years?

	1. Worsened	2. Somewhat Worsened	3. Neither worsened nor Improved	4. Somewhat Improved	5. Improved	9. Don't know
1. Economic investments in Kurdish populated regions (e.g. building dams, factories, state housing etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. Financial facilities (tax breaks, micro-credit opportunities, economic encouragements)	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. Local services (e.g., electricity, roads, schools, hospitals)	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. Access to state services in your own language	1	2	3	4	5	9
5. Creation of jobs in government institutions	1	2	3	4	5	9

RF.3. How would you rate the changes in the following political rights in the last twenty years?

	1. Worsened	2. Somewhat Worsened	3. Neither worsened nor Improved	4. Somewhat Improved	5. Improved	9. Don't know
1. Ability to form a political party, political organizations, groups	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. Political representation in the parliament and other state institutions	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. Ability to travel freely	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. Ability to speak freely	1	2	3	4	5	9
5. Security	1	2	3	4	5	9

RF.4. How would you rate the implementation of changes in political, economic, cultural rights to minorities?

- a) Pace: 1) slow 2) fast
- b) Depth: 1) no change 2) limited changes 3) substantive changes
- c) Breadth: 1) basic 2) extensive

RF.5. Overall how would you rate your satisfaction over these changes?

Not satisfied at all (0)

Very satisfied (10)

DK

religious

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