That is all his ‘justification of providence’ contains. When he entreats us to be ‘content with providence’ (VIII: 123), what he in effect says is that we should not become paralysed by the contemplation of historical evil. When we ‘contemplate the evils which so greatly oppress the human race’, we should seek to right these wrongs, instead of blaming providence and resigning ourselves to the ‘malaise’ of despair (VIII: 120). That we should be content with providence is therefore not a quietistic claim. Rather it is a reminder of our responsibility in respect of our practical commitments; that history is something we also make, rather than passively suffer. Of course, the belief that our actions will bear fruit, or that providence can be justified according to what reason demands, is difficult to hold onto in our everyday experience of ‘political evils’ (VII: 93). Kant is aware of this. In ‘Contest of Faculties’, he recounts the story of a doctor who remained resolutely optimistic every time he visited his patients, consoling them with hopes of imminent recovery, until one day, on asking one of his patients after his state of health, he receives the reply: ‘I am dying of sheer recovery!’ (VII: 93). The story is instructive with regard to Kant’s own endeavour to construct a ‘philosophical history’. The doctor’s reassurance of imminent recovery sounds hollow, because it bears no relation to the state his patients are in. Similarly an invocation of providence would be empty, if it did not take into account the ‘facts as we know them’. Kant’s ‘philosophical history’ succeeds in combining modesty with ambition. It is modest because it presumes to tell us nothing about divine justice; but it is also ambitious because it offers a ‘justification of providence’ by showing how nature can be viewed as amenable to our practical rational projects.

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He writes, for example,

I am . . . conscious of the identical self in regard to the manifold of the representations that are given to me in an intuition because I call them all together my representations, which constitute one. But that is as much as to say that I am conscious a priori of their necessary synthesis, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all representations given to me stand, but under which they must also be brought by means of a synthesis.

All references to Kant’s works are given by volume and page number of the Akademie edition except for citations to the Critique of Pure Reason, which utilize the customary format of ‘A’ and/or ‘B’ to refer to the first and/or second edition:


By ‘concept’, I mean concept of the understanding. Kant writes, ‘an aesthetic judgment in general can . . . be explicated as that judgment whose predicate can never be cognition (concept of an object) (although it may contain the subjective conditions for a cognition in general)’ (XX, 224). In his resolution of the antinomy of taste, however, Kant does say that judgments of taste are based on a concept. However, it is a concept from which ‘nothing can be cognized and proved with regard to the object, because it is in itself indeterminable and unfit for cognition’ (V, 340). I discuss the antinomy of taste in more detail in fn. 35.

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26I am grateful to Gordon Finlayson, Jason Gaiger, Kimberly Hutchings, Meade McCloughan and the participants in the philosophy seminar at the University of York and the politics seminar at the University of Edinburgh for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful for the comments offered by the anonymous reader for the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
taste as my own. If, as Kant argues in the first Critique, synthesis according to a concept is necessary for self-consciousness, that is, for me to think that it is 'I' who am doing the thinking, then without such a rule governed synthesis in the third Critique, can I really say that it is 'I' who finds something beautiful? In other words, in judgements of taste, can there be a self-conscious self? Or, do we instead, perhaps, lose ourselves completely in the contemplation of a beautiful object?

Although many commentators have argued that Kant does allow for the possibility of the consciousness of something without the use of the categories, often, indeed, with an eye to explaining the possibility of judgements of taste, it is still an open question who it is that is the subject of this consciousness. This paper will argue that there is a self of which we can become conscious when we make a judgement of taste; however, it is not the same as the subject of cognitive judgements. My argument, which is based in part on the much overlooked section §12 of the Critique of Pure Reason, will show that the subject of judgements of taste is what Kant calls a 'qualitative' form of unity. This form of unity, I argue, is what makes synthetic unities possible. By 'synthetic unity', I am referring to the unity of the synthesis of different representations in an intuition. A synthetic unity of representations is thus what is subsumed under a concept in order to make a cognitive judgement. The qualitative unity of the self is therefore the particular form of the subject who takes a 'point of view' according to which such a synthesis can be achieved. I argue that this subject differs from the subject of cognition, which is the subject of the 'numerical', analytic, unity of apperception that makes cognitive judgements by means of the activity of analysis, and which is designated by Kant as the 'I' that thinks.

Since, according to Kant, the 'qualitative', synthetic unity of apperception is presupposed by the analytical unity of apperception, the aim of this paper will also be to show that what in the first Critique is a condition for the possibility of cognition and indeed, self-conscious thought, is in fact what in the third Critique is the subject of judgements of taste. I will thus show that, for Kant, in order to be self-conscious of myself as an 'I' that thinks, I must first be a 'qualitative' self that is capable of judging beauty.

The argument of the paper will proceed as follows: In section 1, I explain the connection between synthesis by means of concepts and self-consciousness in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. In section 2, I explain the difference between the synthetic and the analytic unities of apperception, and also how they work together to make judgment possible. In section 3, I show that in the Critique of Pure Reason, the synthetic unity of apperception is a qualitative unity of the self that is necessary, but not sufficient, for judgements of cognition. My argument in this section focuses on Kant's discussion of qualitative unity in §12 of the Critique of Pure Reason. There, Kant describes this unity as the 'unity of the theme in a play, speech or fable' (B114). Elsewhere, he describes it as a 'point of view' (Gesichtspunkte). In section 4, I will show that the subject of judgements of taste is best understood as the qualitative unity that Kant discusses in §12 of the first Critique. In this section, I shall show that Kant's four moments of the 'analytic of the beautiful' are not only determinations of judgements of taste, but of the subject of judgements of taste who must take a certain 'point of view'. I conclude with some comments on the relationship between the subjects of the first and third Critiques.

TRANSITIONAL APPERCEPTION AND SYNTHESIS

Although Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that I can have no knowledge of myself as a substance or a soul, since such a self cannot be an object of spatial or temporal intuition, he nevertheless claims that I can be self-conscious and that I can represent myself to myself in thought as an 'I' that thinks. This section will explain the argument in which Kant's shows that that the possibility of self-consciousness requires the transcendental unity of apperception. It will also explain what exactly Kant means by the 'self' of which we are conscious.

along with the subject that thinks and the subject that takes a point of view, there is also the subject that wills. This third idea of subjectivity is beyond the scope of this paper, however.

I will focus primarily on Kant's discussion of the unity of apperception in the B edition of the transcendental deduction, rather than the A edition version, as this is Kant's later, more considered view on the topic.
According to Kant, to be capable of thinking is the same as to be capable of being self-conscious. In other words, if I am not able to say to myself that I am the one who is thinking of a certain representation, then I am also not capable of thinking of it. This is what Kant means when he writes in §16 that, the I think must be able to accompany all of my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else would at least be nothing for me.

(B131-132)

What Kant means by 'the I think' is the consciousness that what is now being thought is being thought by me, a self that thinks. It is thus the expression of self-consciousness. For Kant, it is not possible to think of a representation without also being able to be conscious that I am the one who is thinking it, because, for him, thought is not a bare state of consciousness, but an activity in which representations are judged to be of objects by means of concepts, or rules. Thought thus requires the possibility of self-consciousness because only if I can be conscious that I am following a rule can I really be following a rule.

What makes self-consciousness, and hence thought, possible, is the 'original apperception', or transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Kant describes this faculty as 'that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation "I think"', which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation' (B132). He explains, 'the manifold of representations that are given in a certain intuition would not altogether be my representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness' (B133). The transcendental unity of self-consciousness is thus necessary in order for me to be able to think according to rules because it is what guarantees that the I that accompanies one representation is the same I that accompanies the next. If the I that thinks 'x' and the I that thinks 'y' were not the same, then there would be no way that 'x' and 'y' could be connected according to a rule, since there would be no self that would be conscious that a rule was being followed. Without the consciousness that a rule is being followed, no rule is being followed.

By guaranteeing that the I that thinks is 'one and the same', the transcendental unity of self-consciousness is thus also the unity of a self that can be conscious, since it guarantees that when I think, I am conscious that there is an I that is doing the thinking. In this way, I can only be conscious of myself as a self that thinks, if it is also possible for me to connect representations according to rules.

10See B94; 'thought is cognition according to concepts'.

But what exactly is the nature of this self of which I can become conscious when I think according to a rule? Kant says that it is a 'thoroughgoing identity of the apperception' of the manifold, which is that of an I' that in all consciousness is 'one and the same' (B133). In the A edition deduction, Kant says that transcendental apperception, 'this pure, original, unchanging consciousness', is what 'should necessarily be represented as numerically identical' (A107). By 'numerical identity', Kant is referring to the identity of an individual thing that is identical with itself in every respect, such as the identity that is expressed by a proper name. This identity of self-consciousness thus acts as a principle of unity since it unifies everything that it thinks, and indeed that it can possibly think, as all being something that is thinkable by it. Thus, the self of which I am conscious when I think is an I' that is numerically identical in all of my thinking.

THE SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC UNITIES OF APPERCEPTION

To summarize what has been said so far, we can say that, according to Kant, thinking is thinking according to rules, and such thought is only possible if it is also possible to become self-conscious that I, as a self-identical thinking self, am the one who is doing the thinking. Kant calls this fundamental ability to become conscious in thought of an I' that thinks, the transcendental unity of apperception. Yet, in explaining how this self-consciousness is possible, he makes a distinction between the analytic unity of apperception and the synthetic unity of apperception. He writes,

this thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of the manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis... Therefore, it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one. (B133-134)

Here Kant calls the self-identical I' that thinks, the 'analytical unity of apperception', and he says that the representation of this identity is only possible under the presupposition of a synthetic unity of apperception. In other words, I can only be conscious of myself as an I' that thinks if I can also combine a manifold of representations in one consciousness according to a rule. In this passage, Kant is really just articulating further his discussion

of the transcendental unity of apperception. The transcendental unity of the 'I' that thinks is what he now calls the analytical unity of apperception. The synthetic unity of apperception takes on the role of the unity of consciousness that can synthesize representations according to rules. Without this ability to form a synthetic unity, we would not be able ultimately to think, or to analyse, since there would be nothing in the mind to think about.\textsuperscript{12}

We can understand better Kant's distinction between the synthetic and analytic unities of apperception by referring to Kant's discussion of the relationship between synthetic and analytic unity in §10 of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} where he states that there is a 'guiding thread' that leads to the 'discovery of the pure concepts of the understanding' from the logical forms of judgement (A76/B102). Kant writes,

The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general…

(A79/B94)

Here, the 'function' that Kant is referring to is that of each of the twelve categories, or the concepts, of the pure understanding. This function, he says, works as both an analytic and a synthetic unity. As an analytic unity, it makes possible a judgement involving concepts, and as a synthetic unity it brings a transcendental content into the pure concepts of the understanding that are used in a judgement. According to Kant, both synthesis and analysis are required for cognition of an object, and the act of synthesis is logically prior to that of analysis. Synthesis is the activity of combining representations and analysis is the activity of analysing, or 'dissolving' (B130). It is by means of the analysis of what has previously been synthesized that a judgement is produced. Since a synthesis is achieved according to rules, the subsequent analysis of it, which is what forms a judgement, is what makes explicit the rule that synthesized these elements in the first place.\textsuperscript{13} For example, a hypothetical judgement is the analysis of representations that have been synthesized according to the category of causality. I can make the hypothetical judgement that, 'if the sun shines, it will warm the stone', only if I have previously conceived

\textsuperscript{12}That is, we humans. According to Kant, 'an understanding through whose representation the objects of this representation would at the same time exist, would not require a special act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness' (B138–9).

\textsuperscript{13}See A69/B94. See also Beatrice Longuenesse, \textit{Kant and the Capacity to Judge} (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000) 95.

of the sun as a cause. Only then can I connect the sun and the stone together according to the hypothetical form of judgement and say that the sun is a cause.

Kant's point in general regarding the relationship between synthesis and analysis is that 'we can represent nothing as combined in the object without combining it ourselves' (B130), which is just to say that analysis always presupposes synthesis. With regard to the analytic and synthetic unities of apperception, Kant is thus arguing that unless there is a synthesis produced by the synthetic unity of apperception, there would be nothing for the analytic unity of apperception to analyse. The synthetic unity of apperception is thus the form of consciousness that produces the original synthesis of representations that the analytic unity then thinks. It is thus not the function of a particular category that synthesizes the manifold of intuition, but of the form of a consciousness in general that makes possible any combination of representations. In order for the analytic unity of apperception, the self-identity of the 'I' in all of our thoughts, to be possible, there must therefore be various representations already combined in the understanding for it to analyse.

The 'I' that one is conscious of in thought can thus be understood as the explicit form of the self that is implicit in the original combining of representations. The synthetic unity of apperception is thus the unity that can collect many representations together in one form of consciousness such that they can in turn be 'accompanied' by the 'I think' of the analytical unity of apperception, be analysed, and consequently be capable of being called 'mine' and of being the objects of my cognition.

From what has been said above, it should be clear that for Kant the self that makes a cognitive judgement, the 'I' that thinks, is the analytical unity of apperception. As a self-identical 'I', this form of consciousness makes analysis possible by guaranteeing that the analysis of a concept to produce a judgement will be performed by one and the same unity of consciousness. However, this analytical unity of apperception is only possible if the understanding has already synthesized representations according to a rule, for it to think. But what, then, exactly is this synthetic unity of apperception? What is this form of self-consciousness, which, according to Kant is what makes it possible to synthesize representations according to rules, and thus, ultimately, to think? This, I will argue in the next section, is the self, considered as a qualitative, as opposed to a numerical, or quantitative unity. It is the self that takes a point of view, like the theme in a play.

QUALITATIVE UNITY

If the self of which I can become conscious when I make a cognitive judgement according to concepts is the numerical, analytical, unity of the
I' that thinks, is there, then, a different self of which I could become conscious when, in making a judgement of taste, I do not use any concept? Such a self would not be the self-identical self that makes possible the unity of representations in thought. Instead, I will argue, it is a self that first makes possible the synthesis of the manifold of representations by isolating those representations that are to be synthesized from those that are not to be, and thus by discerning, or judging, what is to count as a candidate for synthesis in the first place. The self that does this is not the numerical unity of the self, but a qualitative unity of the self.

In the very first section of the B edition transcendental deduction, §15, Kant mentions this qualitative form of unity. In §15, Kant's aim is to explain how it is possible to represent a synthesis of a given manifold. His point is that the representation of a synthetic unity as a unity, that is, as something that can be thought by means of a concept, is only possible if we are the ones who combine the synthetic unity of the manifold and thus make of it something that we can represent to ourselves. He writes,

Combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination; rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of this combination possible. This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination a priori, is not the former category of unity (§10); for all categories are grounded on logical functions in judgments, but in these combination, thus the unity of given concepts, is already thought. The category therefore already presupposes combination. We must therefore seek this unity (as qualitative, §12) someplace higher, namely in that which in itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use.

(B130-131)

In this difficult passage, Kant is explaining the two-stage process involved in producing a representation of the manifold. First, we combine the manifold, which produces a synthesis. However, only when we then represent this synthesis as a unity, and thus synthesize it according to a concept are we able to represent the synthesis as something. The first form of representation can thus be said to be what is in turn made explicit by the representation of the unity that is provided by a concept.

This discussion of how it is possible to represent the mere synthesis of the manifold by means of a concept evidently leads Kant to ask what is the form of unity that is used to make the original combination, or synthetic unity, of the manifold. His answer is that this form of unity cannot be the quantitative form that pertains to the category of unity, since what he is looking for is the form that makes the combination possible that precedes the use of the categories. Instead, he says, it is a

'qualitative' form of unity and refers us to §12 of the Transcendental Analytic. 14 Despite the fact that it is one of the few sections that were added in their entirety to the B edition of the first Critique, §12 has not received much, if any, attention by commentators. Yet, I believe that here, in Kant's discussion of the qualitative form of unity, one can begin to find an answer to our original question about the subject of the Critique of Judgment. In §12, which follows Kant's presentation and explication in §10 and §11 of his own table of categories, he notes that the ancients also had a priori concepts of objects, which 'are expounded in the proposition, so famous among the scholastics: quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum (every being is one, true and good)' (B113). Although he himself does not explicitly list oneness, truth and goodness in his own table of categories, Kant explains that these are not categories he neglects. Indeed, he argues, 'the one, the true and the good', which had been supposed by the ancients to be the transcendental predicates of things, are really 'nothing other than logical requisites and criteria of all cognition of things in general' (B114). Kant's point is that the one, the true and the good are really qualities of the cognition of things, not qualities that are the objects of cognition. In other words, a concept must have the 'quality' of being unified in order to meet the criteria for being a possible cognition. 15

14In an interesting discussion of this passage, Paul Crowther notes that the unity in question here is, of course, not the category of unity, but rather self-consciousness itself. This mode of self-consciousness should not be identified with empirical states of self-awareness wherein we are explicitly aware of ourselves as being such and such a person. It is much more fundamental; and can best be described as the capacity to ascribe experiences to oneself. Crowther, however, fails to comment on the fact that Kant calls this a 'qualitative' unity. Paul Crowther, 'Judgment. Self-Consciousness, and Imagination', Kant's Ästhetik, edited by H. Parret (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 1998) 125.

15Norman Kemp Smith writes that this section of 'no intrinsic importance', A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Humanities Press, 1962, 200. Wolff writes, 'the explanatory part which follows the Table is devoted principally to a justification of several of the more unfamiliar categories and requires no comment'. See R. P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1973) 67. Paton notes that Kant's discussion, although 'ingenious', now 'has at the most an historical interest'. See H. J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience (New York: Macmillan. 1951) 309. Longuenesse briefly refers to Kant's mention of a 'qualitative unity' in B131 in a footnote. She writes, 'this “qualitative unity” is no doubt the transcendental unity of apperception. But the transcendental unity of apperception generates the a-priori representation of a complete unity of our representations, whose intuitive form is the unity of space and time' (op. cit.) 241-2. Although Longuenesse does not refer to §12, I think her interpretation can be made consistent with what Kant says in this passage once one understands the qualitative unity that Kant speaks of there as a unity of what is sensibly given to the mind for conceptual determination.

16He explains that it must be unified ('in so far as by that only the unity of the comprehension of the manifold of cognition is thought'), true (with regard to 'everything that may initially be derived from it') and good (in the sense of the perfection, or completeness of the consequences, that can be drawn from it) (B114). In this paper, I will be focusing only on what Kant says with regard to the criterion of unity.
Kant calls these qualitative criteria ‘logical’ because they have to do with thinking in general and what is required for ‘every cognition’ (B114). He writes,

From this it is obvious that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition in general, transform, through the quality of a cognition as a principle, the three categories of magnitude, in which the unity in the generation of the magnitude must be assumed to be completely homogeneous, here only with respect to the connection of even heterogeneous elements of cognition in one consciousness.

(B114–115)

In other words, by considering cognition in general as something qualitative, as something that is subject to certain qualitative criteria, the quantitative categories required for judgements of experience, are transformed. When quantitative categories are transformed into qualitative ones, Kant explains, this makes possible the connection of even heterogeneous elements of cognition into one consciousness. This is because, by sharing in the same quality, many different things can be grouped together; for example, we can say of all of these different things that they are blue. In contrast to qualitative combination, quantitative combination, or counting, requires that its objects be the same, since when we count we can only count units of the same kind of thing; for example, insofar as each of these in a cat, we can say that there are here ten cats. In this way, a qualitative unity merely requires that various representations share something in common in order to count as a possible cognition, not that they be numerically identical.

Unity considered qualitatively as a logical criterion for cognition is thus not the form of unity that is determined by a concept, but one that can be said to evaluate whether what is given to the senses qualifies as material for being synthesized by means of a concept in the first place. In other words, before I can recognize the representations of four legs, a tail, fur and whiskers as belonging together in one object, I must first be able to notice these properties as forming a unity, and to ignore the nearby rug, yarn, baby, door, etc., which are not to be included in this unity. In this way, one says that some representations count as a material for synthesis by means of a concept insofar as they share a quality and thus form a unity with respect to which they can be distinguished from other representations.

In §12, Kant defines a qualitative unity as follows: it is the ‘unity of the concept...insofar as by that only the unity of the comprehension of the manifold of cognition is thought, as, say, the unity of the theme (Thema) in a play, a speech, or a fable’ (B114). In his Lectures on Metaphysics of

1794/95, he describes this ‘unity of a play’ as the ‘viewpoint that one imputes with regard to the object’. As ‘thematic’, a qualitative unity contrasts with the unity of identity, or numerical unity, which is the unity of something that is simple and homogeneous and self-identical in every respect. Once something is identified as a cat, for example, that is what it is; it becomes one thing. But in order for various properties to even qualify for consideration as making up a cat, they must first share some quality of catliness. It is by being seen with regard to this quality, from a point of view that can notice ‘catliness’ that certain representations are picked out for unification according to a concept.

A qualitative form of unity is thus not what we recognize by means of a concept, but instead what we first pick out of the manifold of representations as what is to count as subsumable under a concept in the first place. This, of course is the task of the faculty of judgement, which, as Kant describes it in the first Critique, is the faculty of ‘subsuming under rules’ (A132/B172). However, as Kant points out, if (the understanding) wanted to show generally how one ought to subsume under these rules, i.e. distinguish whether something stands under them or not, this could not happen except once again through a rule. In order to end this regress of rules, Kant concludes that ‘the power of judgement is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced’ (A133/B172). It is my view that this talent that is practised by the faculty of judgement is just that of being able to see in the manifold of representations a thematic or qualitative unity of representations, such that they can ultimately be subsumed under a rule.

A qualitative unity is thus not itself an object that is determined by a concept. Unlike the synthesis of many representations as one thing, such as a ‘cat’, or a ‘hero’, a qualitative unity is a thematic description of representations, which are thought together with regard to the same quality, such as ‘heroic’, or even, ‘catish’. Just as what is heroic can count as being a hero, so can these qualitative forms of unity count as something subsumable under a particular concept. Yet, until they are subsumed, they are not yet objects of thought.

Still, a qualitative, or thematic, unity does have a normative role with regard to cognition, since it is with regard to a theme that something does or does not count as belonging to a combination of representations. If something does not have a heroic quality, then it can not be considered to be a part of a possible heroic thing. This qualitative unity is thus what Kant

‘qualitative plurality’ of the marks that belong to a concept as a common ground. The perfection of the concept is its ‘qualitative completeness (totality)’ (B115).

17See Lectures on Metaphysics, 29: 1000), ‘the word unity is...used differently in the German, Greek or Latin Languages. Namely adjectively, e.g. one says: unity of the play, of the lecture, truth of the proposition, of the perfection of the thing. This means the viewpoint (Gesichtspunkt) that one imputes in regard to the object’.

18See Henrich (op. cit.) 263.

19Even a ‘fatal flaw’ is heroic when such a characteristic is thought as combined with other heroic traits.
has in mind in the passage from §15 of the deduction cited above; it is a unity that is 'presupposed by all concepts of combination'. Before we can even say that something is a substance, for example, we first have to be able to pick out of the manifold those representations that are to be combined according to this category. What Kant calls the qualitative unity of the concept is thus the unity of what a concept synthesizes that enables it to be understood as something that has been meant to be thought by means of a concept.

It is likely that Kant's use of the word 'theme' to describe this kind of unity comes from Alexander Baumgarten. In his Reflections on Poetry, Baumgarten writes, 'By theme we mean that whose representation contains the sufficient reason of other representations supplied in the discourse, but which does not have its own sufficient reason in them'.22 For Baumgarten, a theme thus is what provides the sufficient reason for the connection of representations in a discourse. If we want to know why X, Y and Z are connected, the answer is that they are all based on a certain theme. Yet, here the sufficient reason is not, as it is for Leibniz, the reason for the truth or the existence of a thing, but is instead the reason for the connection between representations. Thus, Baumgarten writes,

If poetic representations which are not themselves themes are determined through the theme, they will be connected with it. Therefore they will be connected among themselves. Therefore they follow each other in order, like causes and effects. Therefore, the degree of similarity observable in the succession of representations is the degree of order in the poem. Now it is poetic for poetic representations which are not themselves themes to be connected with the theme...therefore order is poetic.23

A poetic, or thematic, order is thus one that connects representations among themselves by virtue of some similarity that can be observed to a greater or lesser degree. I believe this form of unity is what Kant means by a qualitative unity, since this is what provides the criterion for determining which representations belong together.

Let us now look back to Kant's statement at the opening of §16 of the first Critique, that 'the I think must be able to accompany all of my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else would at least be nothing for me'. We can now see that along with the analytic unity of apperception, the 'I that thinks, there must also be what can be called a synthesizing self, which unifies the representations that are to be thought by finding something common in them and making it possible for them to belong together. This is implicit in Kant's qualification of his statement that the representations would be impossible, with the additional phrase, 'or else they would be nothing for me'. Here he is acknowledging that representations that are not accompanied by the numerical unity of apperception are still possible as mental entities that are 'in' me, although they are not yet anything for the 'I that thinks'.24 My consciousness that I am the one who is thinking of something is not necessarily the same form of consciousness that I have when I merely 'contemplate' a representation.25 Although I cannot yet 'think' of this representation as mine, there is some sense in which it still belongs to me. For this form of consciousness, the representation just needs to be in my mind in some way.26 And what determines what is to occur in my mind in this way, or what is to count as a mental representation that I can ultimately think of, is just what I consider as having the quality of being 'in' me, or of fitting into a thematic form of unity, which, in this case, is my self. In other words, the representations that I think of as 'mine', when I think of them as the objects of my thought, must already have been made part of me to begin with, or else there would be nothing represented in me to think of at all. It is this ability to discern which of the manifold of representations are suited ultimately to become the objects of my thought that I am attributing to the qualitative unity of the self, which is that form of self-consciousness that can form a synthesis of the manifold of sensible representations.

It with regard to this thematic form of the subject that we can see that it is possible to be conscious without also having the content of one's consciousness be explicitly an object for the 'I that thinks'. Paul Guyer has argued that Kant tacitly considers consciousness only from a first person point of view and that he ignores the possibility that from a third person point of view we can be said to be conscious even when we are not


23Ibid., 63.

24Karl Ameriks argues that the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness is an important one for Kant and that 'the thought of the mere existence of a representation in a being is not completely the same as the thought of a representation for that being', Ameriks, 'Kant and Guyer on Apperception', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 65 (1983): 183.

25See Y. 204.

26the judgment of taste is merely contemplative, i.e. a judgment that, indifferent with regard to the existence of an object, merely connects its constitution together with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But this contemplation itself is also not directed to concept.

26Karl Ameriks has addressed the issue of what exactly the 'I think' thinks in a way somewhat similar to mine, 'Understanding Apperception Today', in Kant and Contemporary Epistemology, edited by P. Parrini (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). He writes that the 'I think' does not think an object directly, but instead is completed by a 'that-clause'. According to Ameriks, the 'I think' thinks something that 'must already have some kind of personal quality'. However, instead of saying that this 'personal quality' is really a quality as I do, and something distinct from the self-conscious thought involved in cognitive judgment, Ameriks writes that 'the simplest way to understand this "personal" quality is to presume that the individual representations are already at least implicitly of the form, 'I think that so and so...' (322-3).
self-conscious. According to Guyer, Kant does not make a distinction between self-consciousness and consciousness. On my view, however, it is possible to find this distinction in Kant. Kant does seem to acknowledge that there is a form of consciousness that is not the form of self-consciousness of the 'I' that thinks, when he refers to the qualitative unity that is the synthetic unity of apperception. This is the form of unity of the self who can make judgements of taste. As we will also see, this is a self that can only become conscious of itself when it adopts a third person point of view.

In what follows, I will argue that this qualitative unity of self-consciousness is the subject of judgements of taste. Since, in making judgements of taste, I do not think according to a concept, I cannot be conscious of myself as an 'I' that thinks. Instead, I take the position of a judge, or evaluator. In this way, my consciousness acts like the 'unity of the theme', or, a 'point of view', which distinguishes between what ought and what ought not to belong to it, and which unifies this matter by regarding it as an example of its own theme. As a judge of taste, my 'self' is thus the point of view that can discern what does or does not fit in with the unity of its theme. And in this case, the theme is me; someone who has her own 'point of view'. The subject of a judgement of taste is thus a self that can evaluate what is to count as meaningful for him or her and thus worth considering as a possible object of thought.

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If one can say, in the Kantian spirit, that the conditions for the possibility of a pure judgement of taste are the conditions for the possibility of the subject of a judgement of taste, then it is with regard to the transcendental conditions that make possible such a judgement that we can say what the subject of this judgement must be like. I have argued that when I make a judgement of taste, the self of which I am conscious is not the 'I' that thinks, as in my cognitive judgements. Instead, it is a self that takes a point of view. I believe that the four moments of the analytic of the beautiful can be seen as the criteria for evaluating whether the subject is judging according to the right point of view, and hence as a description of the subject who makes a pure judgement of taste.

The four moments of the analytic of the beautiful are described under the headings of quality, quantity, relation and modality. Under these headings,

respectively, the beautiful is that which is judged 'through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest' (V: 211), 'which pleases universally without a concept' (V: 219), which has the form of purposiveness without a purpose' (V: 235), and, which is cognized without a concept as the object of a necessary satisfaction (V: 240). These moments articulate the requirements for correctly accompanying representations with the 'I judge' in order for something to be judged beautiful by someone. For example, when I take a satisfaction in something without any interest, then I am entitled to judge it to be beautiful. These moments are thus the criteria for attaining the right point of view for judgement, just as the categories are a priori rules for correct thought.

We can see how the subject of taste is in fact the qualitative subject of the synthetic unity of apperception described in the first Critique by looking closely at the footnote to the first moment of the judgement of taste. There, Kant explains his use of the four 'moments' in his analysis of judgements of taste as follows:

The definition of taste that is the basis here is that it is the faculty for the judging of the beautiful. But what is required for calling an object beautiful must be discovered by the analysis of judgements of taste. In seeking the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection, I have been guided by the logical functions for judging (for a relation to the understanding is always contained even in the judgment of taste). I have considered the moment of quality first, since the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful considers this first. (V: 230n)

Here, one should first note that in explaining the moments 'attended to' by the faculty of taste in making a judgement of beauty, Kant writes in the first person. It is Kant the philosopher himself, who is guided by the logical functions of judging in organizing his analysis of judgements of taste. The reason why Kant expresses his point this way is because these are functions that can only be made explicit in a cognitive judgement, and not in a judgement of taste. It is thus only from the perspective of cognition that these moments can be presented. Kant's division of taste into four moments is therefore somewhat artificial, since, when making a judgement of taste, such rules are not explicit to the judge him or herself. The form of the self


28 See Ameriks, 'Kant and Guyer on Apperception', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 1983: 196, for an insightful discussion of Kant's views of various forms of consciousness.
who does make the judgement of taste, for whom these functions are not explicit, but who still 'attends' to their moments, is none other than the qualitative unity of the self described in Section 3 above. It is this form of consciousness that contains its representations 'in itself', without, however, being able to explicitly 'think' them as representing some object of cognition.

Kant's point in this footnote is that judgements of taste must be guided by logical functions in order ultimately to be related to the understanding even though mere reflective judgement does not explicitly follow these rules. The moments of the analytic of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment should thus be understood to describe how the faculty of judgement functions so that it can be related to the understanding. In this way, we can see that Kant's aim here is to describe the ideal functioning of the faculty of judgement so that what it judges aesthetically can in turn be subsumable under the categories of the first Critique and become an object of cognition. The four 'moments' thus describe the conditions that are required for making a pure judgement of taste.

But what kind of conditions are these? As descriptions, and not as rules for how to make a judgement of taste, how can such moments serve as norms for how to make a correct, or pure judgement of taste? How can a correct judgement of taste be distinguished from an incorrect one, if one cannot say that she has followed a rule? This is only possible if the 'moments' of judgements of taste are a kind of standard that I can meet without the same kind of self-consciousness required for following a rule. Such a standard is one that can be met to a greater or lesser degree rather than in an 'all' or 'nothing' sense. Whereas a cognitive judgement is true or false depending on whether one follows the rule that ought to be followed and can be conscious of this rule-following, a judgement of taste is not either true or false, but more or less appropriate, from a minimum to a maximum degree. This is in fact just what it means to say that such a judgement requires feeling. The range of the degrees by which the standard of judgement can be met is what makes a judgement of taste capable of being more or less pure, depending on the extent to which we have abstracted from our representation of the object all that is involved in its existence. Indeed, Kant's statements that refer to the 'mixing' of interest in judgements apply to feeling on the condition, a reflective condition, as it were, that they bend to feeling's resistance and that they distort the straight synthesis authorized in their own realm in order to remain faithful to feeling.

Of course, it goes without saying that the category headings refer to something different in the Critique of Judgment than in the Critique of Pure Reason. However, it is unclear what exactly Lyotard means by this distortion. On my view, as will be clear in what follows, the four moments of judgements of taste are those that actually qualify 'feeling' for its inclusion in cognitive judgements.

about beauty as well as his view that there is only one kind of pleasure to which representations can be differently related, suggest that the distinction between pure and empirical judgements of taste is a matter of degree. The indication that we have met such a standard is thus the particular degree of pleasure that we take in the judgement.

Thus, when we make a pure judgement of taste, we do meet a norm, although we are not self-conscious that we do. However, meeting this norm is no accident. Instead, we are guided by the norm that is implicit in the activity of the synthetic unity of apperception, which, as I have argued, is the qualitative unity of the self. Here, the aim is to produce a unity that is thematic, in which representations are connected to the consciousness of the subject by possessing a certain quality in common, such as the quality of being 'heroic'. When such a qualitative unity is achieved (the subject becomes fully heroic, for example), the subject feels pleasure. A thematic unity is thus one in which all its representations fit in with the perspective, or point of view, of the judge. And when such representations fit, we feel pleasure in having used this faculty appropriately to create such a unity. If, for example, I am an ironic person, I will take pleasure in noticing that pretentious people in an art gallery are commenting on an 'exit' sign. I feel pleasure when things hang together as I feel they ought to, according to my view of the world. A thematic unity of the self thus has its own internal norm, since its representations can fit together more or less well, just as a play can be more or less unified.

However, some points of view are better than others with regard to their capacity to produce the most general and consistent unity. The pure judgement of taste is thus one that is made by the self who takes the 'right' point of view. And this point of view is that which can incorporate all points of view. It is the pure form of a point of view, so to speak, and, as such, it is a universal point of view. The norm for a pure judgement of taste is thus not my own first person perspective. Nor is it the perspective of the 'I' that thinks. Instead, in making a pure judgement of taste, I take a general point of view with respect to which my own point of view can be seen as if from a third person perspective. And this is the way that I can be conscious of myself as a subject of a pure judgement of taste.

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30See, for example, V, 205.
32By being 'fully heroic', I mean that one has the character trait of being heroic, such that she can always be counted on to perform heroic actions. This is in contrast to someone who only performs heroic actions every now and then.
33Hannah Ginsborg has argued that, for Kant, the 'ought' or normativity involved in both aesthetic and teleological judgements concerns the sense in which something is claimed to be as it ought to be, in the sense of 'meant to' or 'supposed to' be. H. Ginsborg, 'Kant on Aesthetic and Biological Purposiveness', in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 329–61.
Here we have the answer to the question with which this paper is concerned. The transcendental subject who is capable of a pure judgement of taste is one who takes the external point of view of a third person in judging. This point of view is in fact that of the sensus communis, which, according to Kant, is the 'ideal norm' to which we refer in making judgements of taste (V: 239). Kant writes of the 'sensus communis' that it is a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (Rücksicht nimmt) (a priori) of everyone else's way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment.

(V: 293-294)

When I judge from the point of view of a common sense, I judge from a perspective that is external to my own private perspective and which thus reveals it to be merely private and subjective. Moreover, from this perspective, I can see how anyone else might judge me and I thus judge 'as it were' from the point of view of human reason as a whole. Thus, in contrast to an objective judgement, which is based upon the a priori conditions of knowledge, which can be grounded in the understanding of one subject alone, what Kant has in mind here is the attainment of a public point of view as a requirement for judgements of taste. This is a point of view that abstracts from its own private perspective in order to be able to incorporate the views of others. When the subject attains this public, external, point of view and thus meets the standards described by the four moments of the analytic of judgements of taste, he or she becomes the subject of a judgement of taste and can appropriately claim that something is beautiful. One's consciousness that one has attained this public point of view in judging is thus the feeling of pleasure in being able to 'communicate one's state of mind' (V: 218), which is due to having a perspective that can be common to all. This pleasure is the pleasure we take in a beautiful object.34

Although Kant does not refer to a 'point of view' explicitly when discussing the sensus communis, he does refer to such a 'Gesichtspunkt' in resolving his antinomy of taste. In making judgements of taste, Kant argues, we must take two points of view in judging. One is that which is private and limited to the judging individual alone. This judgment is not based on a determinate concept, and consequently from this point of view there is no disputing about taste. The other point of view, however, is that 'on which we base an extension of this kind of judgement (of taste) as necessary for everyone' (V, 339). According to Kant, this point of view is that of the rational concept of the supersensible, which is an indeterminate concept. According to Kant, this concept is indeterminate and unfit for cognition; yet at the same time, by means of this very concept it (the judgment of taste) acquires validity for everyone...because its determining ground may lie in the concept of that which can be regarded as the supersensible substratum of humanity.

(V, 340)

It is with regard to this concept that we argue about taste. Whereas cognitive judgements are based on a determinate concept, a judgement of taste can now be said to be based on an indeterminate concept. This indeterminate concept, which is that of the super-sensible substratum of humanity, is the norm to which the subject refers in making a judgement of taste. The 'indeterminacy' of this concept corresponds to the indeterminacy of the thematic, or qualitative self of which we are conscious in a judgement of taste. For this note, I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer who recommended that I take into account Kant's antinomy.


36Hegel, who thought quality preceded quantity as an ontological category, is helpful here. He writes of the 'transition of quality into quantity' that 'when the development of being-for-self is completed...the one as infinitely self-related...this being, in the determination it has now acquired, is quantity' (See G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, translated by A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1991) 177. Here it is also worth noting that another feature of Kant's analytic of the beautiful is that its four moments do not make possible twelve different types of judgement as do the four different category headings in the Critique of Pure

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CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued that when I say, for example, 'the sunset is beautiful', I judge it as someone who has a point of view, like a theme, with respect to which the sunset has meaning. If the judgement of taste is pure, I become conscious of myself as someone who is judging from a public, or third person, perspective and take pleasure in this. The transcendental form of the unity of apperception that makes judgements of taste possible is thus a qualitative, or thematic, form of unity.

It should now also be clear how the qualitative subject of taste is presupposed by the numerical, analytical, unity of apperception. Only if I am capable of qualitatively evaluating representations from my own point of view as representations that can be combined together by me, can I in turn subsume them under a concept and make a cognitive judgement. There is no 'rule' for such evaluation, however; this is just what it means for me to use my faculty of judgement. The transcendental ground of this measure is just me, as a subjective unity, which is like that of a theme that orders a play, for whom some things count as meaningful and worth noticing and others do not.35

Still, there is an ideal form of this unity, to which we refer when we make judgements of taste. This is the unity whose theme is the sensus communis, which unifies its representations by seeing them according to a point of view that can be common to all. From the perspective of the sensus communis, what is considered to be significant by one subject is that which can be considered significant from the perspective of all. When the judging subject takes this ideal point of view, she can also meet the condition in which cognition is possible. This is because in this case, the 'quality' of the qualitative unity of the self is the quality of a unity that can take into account all points of view and as such, it also forms the quantity of a unit, since as a complete unity it is one thing -- a common point of view.36
This might suggest that the self that I am in making a pure judgement of beauty is in the end not really peculiar to me, but is a 'universal self' a public self from the perspective of which 'I am just another 'she', which is not really a self at all. And, I believe, this is in fact Kant's view. However, as the particular selves that we actually are, we rarely make pure judgements of beauty, or attain the ideal point of view, even if we might think that we do. This does not mean, however, that our self has no qualitative unity or that we do not use the synthetic unity of apperception when we judge, it just means that we do not have this unity to the highest degree, nor therefore, do we feel the highest degree of pleasure in our judgements of taste. Instead we tend to have just our own particular qualities, points of view, or themes. These indeed become most evident when we argue about art. And even when we really argue about the facts, we also seem to feel that our own particular worldview is at stake.

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