In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties.

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. He writes, “the pleasure in the beautiful is neither a pleasure of enjoyment, nor of a lawful activity, and not even of a contemplation involving subtle reasoning in accordance with ideas, but of mere reflection” (5: 292). According to Kant, it is this pleasure of “mere reflection” whose universality we claim when we make a judgment of taste. Yet Kant does not make explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. If, as Kant writes, reflection is the activity by which we “make concepts possible” (20: 211), what does this activity of “making concepts possible” have to do with a feeling of pleasure?

The relationship between the feeling of pleasure and reflection lies at the heart of the CJ. For Kant, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is one of

Correspondence Address: Melissa Zinkin, Department of Philosophy, Binghamton University (SUNY), Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA. Email: mzinkin@binghamton.edu

0020-174X Print/1502-3923 Online/12/050433–21 © 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2012.716194
Melissa Zinkin

three “faculties of the mind”. It is the “faculty of feeling”, which, like the other two faculties, cognition and desire, has its own a priori principle (20: 245). According to Kant, the faculty of feeling “fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties” (20: 244–45). As part of the system of our cognitive faculties, the pleasure of “mere reflection” cannot therefore be a mere contingent effect of reflection, but must have a necessary connection to it. Yet, Kant never makes clear what this necessary connection is and in what way feeling is to be included in the system of our cognitive faculties.

In fact, although in his “Deduction of judgments of taste”, Kant provides a deduction of our right to claim the universality of the feeling of pleasure once we have this feeling, he never explains why we must have it in the first place when we engage in “mere reflection”. As he presents it, Kant’s deduction of taste is not meant to prove that we must all be capable of the pleasure of taste, but rather only that if one feels this pleasure, then one is justified in claiming that this feeling has universal validity and that others ought to feel it too. Kant begins his deduction with the hypothetical statement “if it is admitted that in a pure judgment of taste the satisfaction in the object is combined with a mere judging of its form” (5: 289), and then proceeds to argue that such a feeling can be universally valid, since we all have the same cognitive faculties. But why should we “admit” that in the “mere judging” of the form of an object, we feel any satisfaction? Kant’s deduction, while arguing that everyone must have the same formal conditions of judgment, does not show how these cognitive faculties must relate to the feeling of pleasure that is necessary for a judgment of taste, such that, by virtue of having these faculties, we must also be capable of the pleasure of taste (cf. Guyer, 2007, pp. 287–88).

That we feel any satisfaction in the mere judging of the form of an object is not, for Kant, something that can be empirically determined. Many commentators have noted that there is an uncertainty built into Kant’s account of judgments of taste, since we can never be certain that our judgment of taste is pure. For Kant, what distinguishes the pleasure in taste from that of the agreeable or the morally good is not the way the pleasure feels, but rather the representation to which it is related. The representation to which the pleasure of taste is related is a purposive form, whereas that of a sensation is a sensible object and that of the good is an end in which we have an interest. Since, for Kant, we can never be sure whether our pleasure is really in the purposive form of a representation rather than in an object in which we have an interest, we can never be sure whether we have really made a pure judgment of taste. But such a doubt about whether we have really made a pure judgment of taste can easily lead to skepticism about whether we have a faculty of feeling and are even capable of such judgments. Yet, Kant thinks that we all must have a faculty of feeling and that taste is a “universal human sense” (5: 356). This paper will show why Kant thinks this.

Any account of the relationship between the feeling of pleasure and “mere reflection” in the CJ must be able to avoid a skepticism of taste and show how
the feeling of pleasure (and displeasure)\(^3\) is necessarily connected to reflection and hence is part of the system of our faculties. There are two possible ways for Kant to make this connection between pleasure and reflection. Reflection must either give rise to pleasure as a necessary effect of its activity, or pleasure must itself be a condition of such reflection. And indeed Kant makes remarks in the \(\textit{CJ}\) that suggest each of these relations between pleasure and reflection. Recently, there has been much discussion of the nature of the feeling of pleasure and its role in judgments of taste. Commentaries on Kant’s \(\textit{CJ}\) support one or the other of these ways of connecting pleasure and reflection. In what follows, I will argue that none of these accounts is fully accurate, since, in each case, the commentator leaves open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure. If this is possible, then a skeptic of taste is also possible, and taste is not a “universal human sense” as Kant claims. After discussing these accounts, I will then present my own account of the relation between reflection and pleasure in the \(\textit{CJ}\), which I think can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. I believe my view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and hence begin to show how the faculty of feeling is integral to the system of our mental faculties.

**I. Pleasure and reflection**

Before proceeding to my argument for how pleasure and reflection are necessarily connected for Kant, it will be useful to give a preliminary account of what Kant means in the \(\textit{CJ}\) by both pleasure and reflection.

In the \(\textit{CJ}\), Kant defines pleasure as “the consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, for maintaining it in that state” (5: 220). What should first be noted about this definition is that Kant does not ascribe any motivational properties to the object of pleasure, such as that it is something that we want or like or approve. Although he does attribute a causal property to the representation of an object, the representation is not casual because it causes us to want something, but rather because it causes us to maintain the state we are in. Perhaps it can be inferred that what makes us stay in the mental state we are in must be something that we like or want. But Kant does not say that this is a mental state that we want to stay in, only that we \textit{do} stay in that state. Kant’s definition of pleasure is also not phenomenological. As noted above, he does not define pleasure in terms of how it feels, but rather as a certain kind of consciousness. For Kant, pleasure is the consciousness of the causal property of a representation to maintain the subject in the state she is in. Although pleasure is a feeling, Kant does not describe what it feels like, nor does he give any psychological account of the relationship between the feeling and its object. Rather he just describes it as a
certain kind of consciousness, the consciousness that our mental state is being maintained.

In the *CJ*, Kant defines reflection as follows: “to reflect [...] is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible” (20: 211). In reflection, no concept is determined, but rather one is made possible. In determination, by contrast, a concept is determined through a given empirical representation (20: 211). Both reflection and determination are necessary for objective judgments, since it is through reflection on particulars that we come up with a universal concept that in turn is what is used by the determinative function of judgments in making a cognitive judgment of an object. Reflection, however, need not always result in a universal concept nor in a determinative judgment, but can occur on its own. When it does so—as “mere reflection”—it can produce a “merely reflecting judgment” (20: 223), a judgment that is based merely on reflection rather than on the determination of an object by means of a concept. Reflection, or “mere reflection”, is therefore involved in both reflective and determinative judgment. A reflective judgment is a judgment that involves “mere reflection” alone and not determination. A determinative judgment is one that determines an object by means of a concept attained by reflection. When Kant refers to the “power of judgment”, he means this faculty of reflection, which is what leads to either a reflective or a determinative judgment and is necessary for both. He writes that the “power of judgment, in an action that it exercises for itself (without any concept of the object for its ground), [is] the merely reflecting power of judgment” (20: 225).

According to Kant, judgments of reflection are aesthetic judgments. Kant writes that “all our judgments in accordance with the order of the higher cognitive faculties, can be divided into theoretical, aesthetic and practical, whereby aesthetic judgments are understood only the judgments of reflection, which alone are related to a principle of the power of judgment as a higher faculty of cognition” (20: 226). What makes a judgment “aesthetic” is that it involves feeling. Kant writes that in contrast to a determining judgment, which is logical because its predicate is an objective concept, a merely reflecting judgment about an individual object can be aesthetic, if (before its comparison with others is seen), the power of judgment, which has no concept ready for the given intuition, holds the imagination [...] together with the understanding [...] and perceives a relation of the two faculties of cognition which constitutes the subjective merely sensitive condition (*subjective bloß empfindbare Bedingung*) of the objective use of the power of judgment in general (namely the agreement of those two faculties with each other) [...] Since a merely subjective condition of a judgment does not permit a determinate concept...
of that judgment’s determining ground, this can only be given in a feeling of pleasure, so that the aesthetic judgment is always a judgment of reflection. (20: 223–25)

A judgment of reflection can be an aesthetic judgment in those cases where the power of judgment has no concept ready for the given intuition, but still perceives a certain relation of the faculty of the understanding and the imagination. This relation Kant calls a “sensitive condition of the objective use of the power of judgment in general”.

In the passage above, Kant indicates that even when reflective judgment leads to an objective determinative judgment, rather than to an aesthetic judgment, it still has the same “sensitive condition”. This “sensitive condition” is just the feeling that Kant refers to as the pleasure of “mere reflection” (5: 292), and the pleasure “merely in the judging (without a sensation of the senses or a concept)” (5: 281), which is the pleasure we take in the beautiful. For Kant, there is therefore a way that, in judging, we “perceive” the relation between our cognitive faculties as a feeling. Yet Kant is unclear about just what is the relation between reflective judging and the feeling of pleasure. Must the perception of harmonious play of our cognitive faculties involve a feeling of pleasure? This “sensitive condition” of the objective use of the power of judgment is just what a skeptic of taste would deny. A skeptic could claim that he does not feel anything with regard to his own mental activity and yet gets by just fine. If we are to understand correctly Kant’s account of the pleasure of “mere reflection”, we must see how his account avoids the possibility that there are human beings who are perfectly capable of cognition and yet have no faculty of feeling. In order for Kant to prove that when presented with a purposive form, we must all be capable of a feeling of pleasure in the consideration of it, Kant must have an account of the pleasure of reflection such that this feeling is necessarily connected to the harmonious activity of our cognitive faculties, which the skeptic himself admits is necessary for cognition. In this way, a skeptic would have to admit he is at least capable of the pleasure of “mere reflection”, even if he has never felt it.

In my view, the “merely sensitive condition” of the objective use of the power of judgment should be understood to be a necessary—although merely sensitive—condition of it, since it is a condition of reflection. Before I provide my account of how the feeling of pleasure is a condition of reflection, I will first discuss the accounts of several contemporary philosophers and gauge them against a possible skeptic. I will argue that none of them get the connection between pleasure and reflection quite right, since they all leave an opening for a skeptic of taste and hence allow for the possibility that the capacity to have a feeling of pleasure in “mere reflection” is a contingent property of the human mind and not part of its systematic unity.
II. Contemporary accounts of the relation between pleasure and taste

The view that the pleasure of taste is an effect of our cognitive activity can be represented by Guyer’s account of aesthetic judgment. According to Guyer, “the pleasure in the beautiful is the conscious effect of the subconscious free play of the faculties” (2009, p. 207). One of the reasons why Guyer is led to his view that the feeling of pleasure is the effect of “the non-rule-governed exercise of reflective judgment” (Guyer, 2007, p. 99) is that it seems to be the best way to make sense of §9 where Kant states that in the judgment of taste the judging of the object precedes the feeling of pleasure (5: 217). Yet Guyer also notes that the “judging” of which the feeling of pleasure is an effect cannot itself be the judgment of taste. This is because Kant writes that the judgment of taste involves the claim to the universality of one’s pleasure, and this implies that the pleasure must in some way come before the judging. Guyer’s solution to this problem, namely that “Kant describes the pleasure as both the product of the judgment and the ground of determination for judgment” (2007, p. 99), is to argue that there must be two acts of judging in a judgment of taste. The first, which has the feeling of pleasure as its effect, is the “simple reflection or estimation” on an object (ibid., p. 140); the second is the judgment about that pleasure, which is the judgment that that pleasure is universally valid. It is this judgment that is the actual judgment of taste.

Considering Guyer’s account with regard to a skeptic of taste, we can say that by locating the pleasure as something that is connected to the “simple reflection” on an object, rather than to the judgment of taste, it seems that we might be able to forestall such a skeptic, since a skeptic would have to admit that even he engages in this activity of mere reflection, because it is required for cognition. However, if the pleasure is understood to be a contingent effect of this reflection, the skeptic can nevertheless admit the former, but deny the latter. The problem with the “pleasure as effect” view is that unless some ground is given for a necessary connection between the activity of the cognitive faculties and a feeling of pleasure, the connection between the two is rendered just as contingent as that of any sensible object and its effect upon our senses. The skeptic can still say that he is certain that his mind engages in the harmonious play of the cognitive activities, it is just that he can not feel it. Guyer provides no such ground.4

The view that pleasure is a condition of judgment can be represented by the “intentionalist” accounts put forth by Allison, Ginsborg, and Zuckert. If pleasure is intentional, it could be a condition of reflective judgment since it would provide the “aboutness” that is necessary for such judgment. This view of pleasure has a good chance of withstanding the skeptic, since the skeptic is committed to having the capacity for reflective judgment.

According to Allison, for Kant the faculty of feeling is “an active faculty [. . .] of appraisal” (Allison, 2001, p. 69), and, in a judgment of taste, one judges “through” one’s feeling (ibid., pp. 122, 154; 2006, p. 129). He writes, “the harmony, one might say, is feelingly apprehended” (ibid., p. 54). It is the
sensation through which the subject, in judging, becomes aware of the subjective purposiveness of the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Allison thus locates the feeling of pleasure in the intentional act of judging about the harmony of the mental faculties rather than as the effect of the harmony of the faculties as does Guyer. Allison writes that the intentionality of the feeling of pleasure in the pure judgment of taste is “directed toward the subjective purposiveness of the mental state (the harmony of the free play) in an aesthetic reflection on an object” (Allison, 2003, p. 189), and that the free play of the faculties is the object of such reflective judging (ibid., p. 191). According to Allison, understanding the feeling of pleasure as judgmental in this way is the best way to make sense of what Kant calls an “aesthetic power of judgment”—and a “special faculty for discriminating and judging” (5: 204) (cf. Allison, 2003, p. 129).

Yet, in my view, Allison’s account still leaves an opening for someone to claim that they do not have this “special faculty”. On Allison’s account, as he has stated it, it is possible for someone to engage in the free play of the mental faculties, but to make no judgment about this activity and hence to have no feeling of pleasure regarding this activity. Even if Allison is right that it is in reflective judgment and through the feeling of pleasure by which such a judgment is made that we become aware, or “feelingly apprehend”, the harmony of the faculties, he has not provided any argument for why such an awareness of the harmony of the faculties itself is necessary. What would be lost if someone were to claim that they did not feelingly apprehend the harmonious activity of their cognitive faculties? The harmonious activity of the faculties could still occur and lead to cognition. All that would be lost is one’s capacity to make judgments of taste, which claim the universality of this feeling. And this is precisely what the skeptic claims he does not have; the skeptic says that he cannot make such judgments and that taste is not a universal sense. Allison’s account does not show how this special faculty is one of the three higher faculties of the mind that we cannot do without.

I think that Allison allows for this skeptical opening, since he considers the feeling of pleasure to be intentional in making the reflective judgment about the free play of the faculties, and therefore as something distinct from the purposiveness of our mental state (the harmony in the free play). Yet, when Kant writes about the pleasure of “mere reflection” he seems to have in mind that the feeling of pleasure is necessarily related to that purposive cognitive activity (the “mere reflection”) by which we make concepts possible and not to judgments about this activity. It is interesting to note that whereas Guyer argues that there are two acts of judgment in Kant’s account of taste, Allison ends up with an account where there are two feelings of pleasure in a judgment of taste; one that is connected to the purposiveness of our mental state, and another through which we judge the purposiveness of this state. Allison writes, “as I read Kant, the intentionality of the feeling of pleasure in the pure judgment of taste is directed towards the subjective purposiveness
of the mental state (the harmony in free play) in an aesthetic reflection on an object” (Allison, 2003, p. 189). There are two levels here and two feelings of pleasure. First, there is an aesthetic reflection on an object, which, as aesthetic, involves a feeling of pleasure; second, there is the pleasure of the judgment of taste that is directed to the purposiveness of the mental state in reflection on an object.

Although Allison avoids Guyer’s causal account, which makes the feeling of pleasure only contingently connected to the activity of mere reflection, he nevertheless also allows the feeling of pleasure to be contingently connected to the activity of mere reflection, by emphasizing that it is what is about this activity. Since it need not be the case (at least on Allison’s account) that the intentional feeling of pleasure is necessary for such cognitive activity—it is only what is involved in a judgment about it—it would be possible for a skeptic to say that he is incapable of the pleasure of taste, yet still capable of cognition.

In opposition to Allison and Guyer, whom she sees as having a “two-order” or “two-act” interpretation of reflective judgment (Ginsborg, 1990, p. 71; 2003, p. 169), Ginsborg argues that the pleasure, which Kant in §9 says follows from the reflective judging, is also the same pleasure through which the judgment is made. Ginsborg writes that “to feel pleasure in an object’s beauty just is to take it to be beautiful, that is, to make a judgment of beauty about it” (Ginsborg, 2003, p. 166). According to Ginsborg, a judgment of beauty is a self-referential judgment about my mental state, namely that this mental state is one that is universally communicable. For Ginsborg, the pleasure in taste is therefore what I feel “in virtue” of making this judgment; “the formal and self-referential judgment that my present mental state is universally communicable is a feeling of pleasure” (Ginsborg, 1990, pp. 73–74).

Ginsborg’s aim in her account of reflective judgment is to argue that reflective judgment is “the capacity to take one’s mental state in perceiving a particular object to be universally valid with respect to that object” (ibid., p. 75). This capacity, which is governed by the principle of purposiveness, is involved in cognition as well as judgments of taste. It would thus seem that, with Ginsborg’s “one-act” discussion of reflective judgment, we have an account of the feeling of pleasure in taste according to which anyone who is capable of making a reflective judgment must also be capable of a feeling of pleasure in this merely reflective activity. But are pleasure and reflection connected in Ginsborg’s account in such a way that it would not be possible to reflect without also having a feeling of pleasure? According to Ginsborg, reflective judgments (empirical and aesthetic) are about the “rightness” or universal validity of our mental state. She writes: “As long as I perceive the object [. . .] I demand of myself that I remain in the same mental state as that in which I presently find myself. Correspondingly, my mental state at each moment consists in the awareness that I ought to be in that very mental state”, and this awareness is the feeling of pleasure (ibid., p. 73).
In my view, however, Ginsborg’s account, according to which the feeling of pleasure is the awareness of the rightness of our mental state, leaves an opening for the skeptic of taste. According to Ginsborg, a reflective judgment of taste is “manifested” in the feeling of pleasure (Ginsborg, 2003, p. 175; 1999, p. 73), which is the “phenomenology” of this judgment (Ginsborg, 1999, p. 74). Ginsborg’s view that we feel pleasure in the object “in virtue of making the judgment” (ibid., pp. 73, 74), would still allow a skeptic to claim that, while he does take his mental state to be valid with respect to an object, when he does so, this is not “manifest” to him as a feeling (unless we are just to stipulatively define the taking our mental state to be valid as the feeling of pleasure). The capacity to reflect and the capacity to experience this reflection phenomenologically can be two separate things. Ginsborg writes that “to feel pleasure [... ] is to be aware of being impelled by one’s representation of an object to continue in one’s present mental state” (ibid., p. 73). This may be so. But this provides no argument for why such a feeling would be necessary.

In fact, rather than showing that pleasure is necessarily connected to the activity of reflection, Ginsborg’s argument comes close to making it superfluous. Indeed, must we have a feeling about the rightness of our own mental state? If my mental state is in fact the right one, then what would a feeling of this rightness contribute to cognition? In the Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant convincingly shows that we must be able to be self-conscious of our thought in order to be able to think at all. But must we be able to feel pleasure in our reflection in order to be able to reflect? In the next section, I will argue that feeling is in fact a condition of reflection. Ginsborg’s account, however, by identifying the feeling of pleasure with the phenomenological manifestation of the activity of reflection, stops short of arguing this; it allows the possibility that one could reflect and also to lack the capacity to feel this reflection manifested as pleasure.

Like Allison and Ginsborg, Zuckert also has an intentional account. According to Zuckert, pleasure is a “mental state that is about another mental state, specifically about the continuation in time of that mental state” (Zuckert, 2007, p. 233). Like Ginsborg, Zuckert argues against a two-act theory of judgments of taste (ibid., p. 322–26). Yet, whereas for Ginsborg, the pleasure in reflective judging is about its own universal communicability, for Zuckert the feeling of pleasure is a consciousness of the purposiveness of our mental state, by which she means a present mental state that is anticipatory of the future. For Zuckert, pleasure itself is the “unity of consciousness”, by which we ‘recognize’[... ] the ‘correspondence’ of a representation with a subjective principle of judgment (purposiveness)” (ibid., p. 318).6 As such, the feeling of pleasure is the “mark” of a judgment of taste, which “stands for” the fact that our representation of the manifold is “unified”, although not conceptually determined (ibid.).

On Zuckert’s account, the intentional content of the feeling of pleasure is richer than on Ginsborg’s. Rather than being of the mere “rightness” of a
mental state, for Zuckert, the feeling of pleasure is about the “openness” of a mental state that is purposive without a purpose. Indeed, for Zuckert, the feeling of pleasure is itself purposive (ibid., p. 366). Zuckert describes pleasure as having the same temporal structure that she attributes to purposiveness, that of being “future-directed”. Her account suggests that the feeling of pleasure is integral to aesthetic reflective judging. She writes that aesthetic pleasure is a representation that “pervades” our judging of the manifold as beautiful and “accompanies” each element of that manifold as we turn from one to another in play” (ibid., p. 318). Zuckert, however, also differs from Ginsborg in that, on her view, although all reflective judging is an activity of purposive judging without a purpose, only aesthetic judging that leads to judgments of taste involves a feeling of pleasure (ibid., pp. 358–59). For Ginsborg, the activity of “mere reflection” itself constitutes the pleasure in taste (Ginsborg, 1999, p. 75). According to Zuckert, unlike the aesthetic reflective judging involved in taste, which is “open”, there is a non-aesthetic reflective judging, which is not an intrinsically pleasurable experience since it ultimately comes to an end. From the many patterns of the manifold that it considers, it ultimately “settles” on one (Zuckert, 2007, p. 359).

Although Zuckert argues that the feeling of pleasure is integral to aesthetic judging as what “pervades” and “accompanies” our judging of the manifold as beautiful, she leaves an opening for the skeptic. Since, for her, the feeling of pleasure occurs as the “mark” of only aesthetic judgments of taste, rather than as what is connected to mere reflective judging as such, Zuckert leaves it open for the skeptic of taste to deny both that he is capable of this feeling of pleasure and that he is capable of judgments of taste, but still to assert that he can make cognitive judgments. Zuckert has not shown how the feeling of pleasure is integral to the entire system of the cognitive faculties.

III. Pleasure as a condition of reflection

None of the above accounts of the feeling of pleasure in “mere reflection” has been able to show that it is something that everyone who is capable of cognition must be capable of feeling. Yet, I believe it is possible to find in Kant an argument that demonstrates that the feeling of pleasure is a necessary condition of mere reflection itself and as such it is also necessary for cognition. It is my view that pleasure plays a necessary role in reflection for Kant, since it is by virtue of having this feeling that we stay in the cognitive state that we are in. Thus, contra Ginsborg, the feeling of pleasure is not merely the feeling that our mental state is the right one, but it is the feeling that makes us stay in this mental state. It is not a feeling we have “in virtue” of making a reflective judgment, as Ginsborg says, rather we make reflective judgments by virtue of having this feeling. When Kant writes that pleasure is “the consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject,
for maintaining it in that state” (5: 220), I suggest that we understand him to mean that this consciousness is not merely an effect of our reflection, as Guyer claims, nor merely intentional and about our state of mind, as Allison, Ginsborg and Zuckert claim, but that the consciousness of the causality of a representation is itself constitutive of this causality, and is that by which the representation maintains our mental state. In other words, the “causal power” of a representation to keep us in a certain mental state does not have its origin in a property of the representation itself, but rather originates from a particular form of our own consciousness of the representation, which is a feeling of pleasure. If we did not have the feeling of pleasure, then the representation would not be attributed with the causal power to maintain our mental state. As Kant says, the feeling of pleasure “has a causality in itself, namely that of maintaining the state of the representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without further aim” (5: 222).

Once we see that pleasure has a functional role in our mental activity—that of maintaining us in the particular mental state we are in—we can see how it can be a necessary condition of our reflective activity, without which we would not be able to reflect. It is a condition of our reflective activity because in order to reflect we must maintain our mental state for some duration of time. For Kant, the activity of reflection is complex: to reflect is “to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept that is thereby made possible” (20: 211). Such complex activity takes time.

In his lectures on logic, Kant describes this activity of “making a concept possible” in more detail than in the CJ. He also includes, in addition to reflection, both comparison and abstraction, and says that all three are different aspects of that single activity by which we sift and order various representations to produce an empirical concept (cf. Longuenesse, 1998, p. 116)—the activity that, in the CJ, Kant simply calls “reflection”. In his lectures on Logic, Kant explains,

In order to make our representations into concepts, one must [. . .] be able to compare, reflect, and abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and general conditions of generating any concept whatever. For example, I see a spruce, a willow, and a linden. In firstly comparing these objects, I notice that they are different from one another in respect of trunk branches and leaves, and the like; further, however, I reflect only on what they have in common, the trunk, the branches, the leaves themselves, and abstract from their size, shape and so forth; thus I gain a concept of a tree. (9: 94–95)

By comparing representations we note the differences. By reflecting, we note the similarities. Abstraction is the activity by which we separate the former
from the latter and thus isolate a concept—what the representations have in common. In the next paragraph, Kant explains that abstraction is only the “negative condition under which generally valid representations may be generated; the positive is comparison and reflection. For by abstraction no concept comes into being; abstraction only completes and encloses the concept within definite limits” (9: 95). Abstraction is thus the negating or canceling of what is not to be included in the concept. Reflection and comparison are what come up with what is to be included in the concept.

Elsewhere, however, Kant writes that the opposite of abstraction is attention. In *Negative Magnitudes*, he writes that abstraction is the “negative”, real opposite, of attention, since it cancels what is not the focus of attention. In the *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, Kant defines attention as the real opposite, or the positive side to the negative activity of abstraction. It is the act “through which only a single representation is made clear and all the remaining are obscured” (29: 878). Attention and abstraction occur together and are part of the same activity of making a representation clear. By abstracting away from some mental content I can pay attention to it, and by paying attention I can ignore what is not to be included. Indeed, in the passage from the logic above, reflection is similar to attention, since it focuses on what is common to the trees and makes possible the abstraction from what is not common to them.

That the activities of comparison and reflection are very closely related to each other in the *CJ* is indicated by Kant’s statement that “to reflect (to consider) is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible” (20: 211). Reflection just is comparing representations to each other, albeit with an eye to producing a general concept. In addition, I want to argue, a necessary component of this reflective/comparative activity must also be attention—which requires the “holding together”, referred to above, of the representations with others or with the cognitive faculty itself. In what follows, I will argue that, in the complex activity that in the *CJ* Kant labels “reflection”, the feeling of pleasure is what is responsible for the “holding together” of our cognitive faculties, which is required for the attentive component of reflection.

Let us look again at Kant’s discussion of aesthetic reflection. Kant writes that

A merely reflecting judgment about a given individual object can be aesthetic if (before its comparison with others is seen), the power of judgment, which has no concept ready for the given intuition, holds the imagination [. . . ] together with the understanding [. . . ] and perceives a relation of the two faculties of cognition which constitutes the subjective merely sensitive condition of the objective use of the power of judgment in general. (20: 223–24)
Here, again, Kant refers to the "holding together" of the faculties of imagination and understanding. What he has in mind with this image of "holding together", I suggest, is that the activity of these faculties is coordinated with regard to the same content. These faculties are "held together" so that during their activity no content is lost and no new content is brought in.

Although Kant’s discussion of the relationship between the imagination and the understanding in the *CJ* has been subject to numerous interpretations, I think that most would agree that the material on which these faculties work in their harmonious activity is fixed. Whatever the mind is doing when, by the power of judgment, it engages in the “reciprocally expeditious” activity of the imagination and the understanding (20: 224)—be it, through the play of the imagination, to “actively synthesize and alternate between given sensations in order to represent a manifold as such” (Zuckert, 2007, p. 286), or to come up with “proleptic unities”, forms of possible intuition that are imaginative constructions of the manifold (Rush, 1992, p. 60), or to have the imagination stimulate the understanding “by occasioning it to entertain fresh conceptual possibilities”, while the understanding directs the imagination to “conceive new patterns of order” (Allison, 2001, p. 171)—it is not bringing in new material. In reflection, even while the cognitive faculties are in a state of free play, the parameters of this activity are fixed by the particular manifold on which it works. By “holding together” the faculties in this way, the power of judgment ensures that its reflection is focused on a fixed content. And this is just what it means to pay attention—to keep the same representations in one’s consciousness while not letting others in. It is my view that what enables the power of judgment to hold these faculties together is the feeling of pleasure—that “sensitive condition” by which we maintain our mental state and avoid distraction.

In his lectures on anthropology Kant describes attention as follows:

> The endeavor to become conscious of one’s representations is either the *paying attention to* (attentio) or the turning away from an idea of which I am conscious (abstractio). The latter is not the mere failure and omission of the former (for that would be distraction (distractio)), but rather a real act of the cognitive faculty of stopping a representation of which I am conscious from being in connection with other representations in one consciousness. (7: 131)

Here, Kant describes attention as the endeavor to become conscious of one’s representations. This is also what Kant describes elsewhere as “making (a representation) clear” (29: 878). For Kant, a clear representation is one that is present to consciousness. An obscure representation, by contrast, is one that we have indirectly, but of which we are not conscious. Kant’s example is of seeing a person in the distance; we have a clear representation of a person, but an obscure representation of the eyes, nose etc. It should be noted that
for Kant obscurity is not the same as indistinctness. The distinction between
distinct and indistinct is in terms of whether or not a representation includes
the consciousness of all the partial representations and their connections. So to make something clear is not to make it distinct and to see all its parts
but rather to make it less obscure, to “become conscious of it”. For Kant, something can therefore be both clear and indistinct. Distinctness refers to
the content of that which we are conscious. Clarity refers to whether or not we are conscious of something in the first place. To pay attention to some-
thing is thus to make what is obscure clear and to “bring it to consciousness”; it is to see in the figure in the distance the eyes and nose, for example.

We can now see how attention is integral to the complex activity of reflection in which the imagination apprehends an intuition and the understanding tries to come up with a concept. Attention is that by which we “make out” the diverse particulars of the manifold in the first place. It is that by which, in the passage from the Logic cited above, it is possible to “notice” how the trees are different from each other and what they have in common. It should also be noted that this activity of attention is a gradual one. Kant describes attention as the “endeavor” to become conscious of a representation. Attention is not instantaneous, but a process in which what is obscure gradually becomes clear.

For Kant, reflection, which requires that the cognitive faculties be “held together”, implicitly includes the activity of attention by which we focus our mind on one and the same manifold for some time and make out what is there. And what maintains our attention is the feeling of pleasure. Pleasure is that component of the power of judgment by which our faculties can be held together for some time. If we did not feel pleasure, we would not linger over the manifold and take the time necessary for attention. We would become distracted. This is not to say that pleasure motivates us to pay attention to the manifold. It is not that we pay attention in order to feel pleasure. Rather it is because we have the feeling of pleasure we stay in the state we are in. This is just what it means to feel pleasure—to (freely) perpetuate the state we are in.

Indeed, the passage in the CJ where Kant refers to our “lingering” over the beautiful is part of his discussion of the causal role of the feeling of pleasure with regard to our cognitive activity. Kant writes, describing the pleasure in an aesthetic judgment:

The consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive powers of the subject in the case of a representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself, because it contains a determining ground of the activity of the subject with regard to the animation of the cognitive powers, thus an internal causality (which is purposive) with regard to cognition in general [. . .] [This pleasure] has a causality in itself, namely that of maintaining the state of the representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without further aim. We linger over the consideration of the beautiful because this
We linger over the manifold that we are to judge as beautiful and maintain our mental state because it gives us pleasure. In my view, what Kant means when he says that our “consideration” is strengthened and reproduced, is really that our attention is strengthened and reproduced—we focus more intently on more of the various aspects of the manifold. The feeling of pleasure is purposeful because it makes possible such a mental focus—“the occupation of the cognitive powers without further aim”. In fact, Kant here states that such lingering is analogous to the attention that occurs when we are charmed by an object. The difference between the two is that the attention involved in the consideration of the beautiful actively draws our mind further into its own reflective activity, whereas the form of attention that occurs with charm, and when the mind is passive, draws the mind away from itself to the sensation of an object. In both cases however, the mind considers its object for some time to the exclusion of anything else. And, in both cases, we linger over that object and give it our attention because it is what occasions our pleasure.

It should be noted that, just because attention is the endeavor to become conscious of a representation, this does not mean that attention necessarily involves a cognitive interest. The endeavor to become conscious of a representation is not the same thing as the endeavor to cognize a representation. Although attention, like reflection, is certainly a component of cognition, it can still occur on its own, independent of determinative judgment, as “mere attention”, so to speak. Attention can be disinterested and “merely contemplative” (5: 209) just as mere reflection can be. I think that such “mere attention” is what we have in mind when we urge someone who does not find something beautiful to “just look” or to “just listen”. By this we try to get them to have the work of art be the sole representation that is the object of their mental activity and to exclude everything else. We hope that by getting them to attend to the piece in this way, they will also feel the pleasure that is necessary for maintaining this “state of the representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without further aim”.14

Kant therefore has an answer to a skeptic who says that we are not all capable of the feeling of pleasure of taste. This is that we must all be capable of this feeling, since only if we can feel such pleasure can we attend to a manifold long enough for reflection. Whereas in Zuckert’s account, the feeling of pleasure “accompanies all aspects of the continuing representation of the object” (Zuckert, 2007, p. 319; my italics), on my account, the feeling of pleasure is what sustains our attention on the manifold that has been apprehended by the imagination. My account thus argues that the feeling of pleasure serves to structure the activity of reflection because it is the structure of the temporality considered.
of attention, not because it is the structure of the temporality of anticipation. Although both “anticipation” and “attention” connote the temporality of a kind of waiting that is suggestive of the feeling of longing that tinges the feeling of pleasure in beauty,\(^\text{15}\) attention, unlike anticipation, also plays a necessary role in concept formation. Only by understanding the temporality of pleasure in terms of attention is it possible to show how pleasure is necessarily connected to reflection as a condition of its activity of “making concepts possible”. Only in this way is it possible to forestall a skeptic of taste. Since such a skeptic cannot deny that he is able to come up with concepts, which would be to deny any empirical knowledge, he also cannot deny that he is capable of the feeling of pleasure in “mere reflection”.

This account of pleasure shows how pleasure is a necessary component of our judging rather than a psychological response to an object. There is indeed a faculty of feeling which is part of the system of our cognitive faculties. The question one ought to ask Kant of the “pleasure of reflection” is “what function does it serve?”. Not, “how does it arise?”. That we feel pleasure in a purposive form is taken for granted by Kant, just as are cognition and desire. It is not something for which he feels the need to argue, since this is just what the faculty of feeling is meant to do. Kant does not say how a purposive form causes a feeling of pleasure in us, he just assumes that it does. For Kant, there is no separate sense organ of pleasure on which reflection, or the power of judgment, has an effect, as, for example, a sense organ is affected by a stimulus that is distinct from it. Instead, the power of judgment itself is the faculty of feeling. Kant writes that pleasure is a “property of our faculty of cognition” (5: 213) and that the expression “aesthetic” is to be applied “only to the actions of the power of judgment” (20: 222). To ask why reflection on a purposive form results in the feeling of pleasure is thus the same as to ask why hearing something results in a sound—this is just what it means to hear. For Kant, what is important is that the pleasure of reflection is also necessary for reflection.\(^\text{16}\) And for this claim he has an argument.

**IV. Is everything beautiful for Kant?**

For Kant, then, anyone who is capable of reflection must therefore also be capable of the feeling of pleasure in “mere reflection” that is the pleasure in the beautiful, since this feeling is a condition of it. But if all reflection requires the feeling of pleasure, and reflection is necessary for the concept formation involved in cognition, then it would seem that the very same pleasure that is the pleasure of taste is also involved in all cognition. And, indeed, I believe that this is the case. But this does not mean that everything is beautiful. Although there must be some pleasure involved in reflection on empirical objects for the sake of finding a concept for them, there need not be very much pleasure, or time, involved in reflection on every object. Only purposive forms in which there is much that is obscure require lengthy reflection. On these we
linger, and hence feel much pleasure.\(^\text{17}\) My view is therefore that the difference between the pleasure involved in cognition and reflective judgments of taste is merely quantitative.\(^\text{18}\) Reflection that ends with cognition involves less time and attention than do judgments of beauty and hence less pleasure. This is because the reflection that is involved in cognition comes to an end. But there is also a sense in which the feeling of pleasure in a judgment of taste is qualitatively different from cognitive judgments. As Kant notes, the lingering over the beautiful strengthens and reproduces our consideration of it. As this occurs, the feeling of pleasure must itself become stronger and more intense in order to sustain such lingering. So in this sense the feeling of pleasure can be said to be more intense in a judgment of taste. This view, however does not rule out the possibility that those manifolds that we ultimately cognize could at one point be called beautiful before we come up with a concept for them and turn our attention to something else.

My view contrasts with Zuckert’s, for whom the temporal quality of judgments of taste—their open, anticipatory nature—indicates that they are different in kind from reflective judgments in which no pleasure is to be felt at all. According to Zuckert, in judgments of taste, we seek to see all the properties of an object as systematically connected. For Zuckert this is a process that is “open”. “Non-aesthetic” reflective judging, by contrast, at some point settles on one of the interpretations of the manifold proposed by the imagination and comes to an end. Zuckert writes that “reflective judging is, then, a less complete, less self-sustaining act of purposive judging. It is not therefore an intrinsically pleasurable experience, a judgmental activity of which we are conscious by pleasure or express in claims concerning pleasure” (Zuckert, 2007, p. 359). For Zuckert, the feeling of pleasure is distinctive of aesthetic reflection (judgments of taste) because aesthetic reflection is a more complete and self-sustaining act of purposive judging than reflective judging.

But why, on Zuckert’s view, would a less self-sustaining act of purposive judging produce no pleasure at all?\(^\text{19}\) Wouldn’t it just produce \textit{less} pleasure than an “open” activity of reflection, as my own account suggests? In my view, as acts of purposive judging, or “mere reflection”, they both must be connected to a feeling of pleasure. On Zuckert’s view, like mine, the pleasure is related to the “openness” of the reflection and the fact that it is “self-sustaining”.\(^\text{20}\) But on Zuckert’s account, then, we would also have to feel pleasure in what she calls non-aesthetic reflective judging, that is, \textit{until} we “settle” on a pattern of the manifold as a new genus. Zuckert clearly wants to avoid the “everything is beautiful” problem. Yet, by arguing that reflective judging differs \textit{in degree} (of completion and self-sustenance) from aesthetic judging, it is hard to see how she can say that the pleasure associated with the latter judgment differs \textit{in kind} from the former, where, on her view, the feeling of pleasure does not exist at all. For Zuckert, at what point does the pleasure begin?

It should be noted that, on my view, once we arrive at a concept or a “pattern” for the manifold, the activity of reflection and the feeling of pleasure are
at an end. There is thus a sense in which cognition does not involve pleasure, since once we cognize an object we are no longer “merely reflecting” on it. In judgments of beauty, however, the reflection, and the pleasure, continue. This is perhaps one reason why Zuckert argues that the feeling of pleasure is the “mark” of judgments of beauty. But this does not mean that we do not also feel pleasure in the reflection that comes up with a concept—until it comes up with a concept (cf. Longuencesse, 2003, p. 146). For Kant, then, anything could be beautiful if it requires our sustained attention. But this does not mean that everything is beautiful. And in fact I think this is the case.

V. Conclusion

I have argued that for Kant the feeling of pleasure is connected to the activity of reflection as a condition of its possibility. If we did not have the feeling of pleasure, then we would not be able to “make concepts possible”. Since, in Kant’s view, we are all able to make concepts possible, that is, we are all able to have empirical knowledge, we must all be capable of the pleasure of “mere reflection”, which is the same pleasure that we feel in judgments of taste. According to Kant, then, we are all capable of a feeling of pleasure in “mere reflection” on a purposive form and hence of apprehending objects with feeling, because the faculty of reflection—or “the power of judgment” —that is necessary for cognition requires the feeling of pleasure for its activity. The feeling of pleasure is what makes it possible for our mental faculties to be held together for some time so that our mind can pay attention to the manifold on which it is reflecting.

Taste is thus a “universal human sense”. Indeed, insofar as attention involves noticing nuances and detail, attention is indeed a kind of sensitivity. We can understand the attentive sensitivity of taste as an active form of sensibility, rather than a passive, receptive one, since it is we who affect the manifold with our attention by making it more clear. We can also begin to see how the attention that is involved in reflective judgment makes it possible for reflective judgment to be related to moral feeling. According to Kant, the experience of beauty improves our propensity to moral feeling because it “prepares us to love something, even nature, apart from interest” (5: 267) (cf. Guyer, 1990, p. 140). One can easily see how the disinterested pleasure in beauty can prepare us to have a disinterested relation to objects, such as moral objects. But how does the experience of beauty prepare us for love? It does this by teaching us to pay attention, which is a kind of concern that is required for morality as well as cognition.

We can now see how the feeling of pleasure that is connected to “mere reflection”, has its origin in the “faculty of feeling” that Kant refers to as one of the three faculties that form a complete system of the mind. For Kant, these powers of the mind are all related in their “vocation” (20: 244), which is the moral autonomy of man. Once we understand the role of the feeling of pleasure as “what causes us to maintain our mental state” and to pay...
attention to what is before us, we can begin to see how this faculty contributes to our vocation in a way that we cannot do without.26

Notes

1. Hereafter CJ. All references to Kant’s works are given in the text by volume and page number of the Akademie edition, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900). Citations of the Critique of Pure Reason utilize the customary format of ‘A’ and/or ‘B’ to refer to the first and/or second edition.

2. See Allison (2001, p. 69), “that the judgment of taste involves reflection is only one side of the story; equally significant is the fact that it is based on feeling. Indeed, since Kant tends to argue from rather than to this thesis, whereas he does endeavor to explain how such judgments can nevertheless explain reflection, the aesthetic nature of judgments of taste may be viewed as the most basic underlying presupposition of his whole account”. See also Rind (2000, p. 79).

3. In what follows, I will merely refer to the feeling of pleasure. This is both for the sake of brevity and also because, in his discussions of taste, Kant himself mostly refers to the feeling of pleasure. I think that my argument also holds for the feeling of displeasure. See note 17.

4. Allison writes of Guyer’s view that if the pleasure of taste is merely the effect of the free harmony of the faculties, then “the pleasure on this view must be regarded as an inference ticket, from which the free harmony is then inferred. But in that event [...] the judgment of taste (becomes) an empirical causal claim and a rather problematic one at that” (2001, p. 54).

5. Rather than finding two orders of the feeling of pleasure in Allison’s account, as I do, Ginsborg finds two orders of the free play of the faculties. For Allison’s response to Ginsborg, see Allison (2003, p. 191). Allison argues that rather than there being two orders of free play, there is, first, the free play of the imagination and the understanding, and then the aesthetic appraisal of this relationship by the reflective power of judgment. Allison argues that reflection is something distinct from the activity in which the imagination and the understanding are engaged in their free play. Although I agree with Allison that reflection is something distinct from the free play of the imagination and the understanding, I do not think that it relates to it merely as an object for its appraisal.

6. Zuckert is citing Kant (20: 226).

7. “Every abstraction is simply the canceling of certain clear representations; the purpose of the cancellation is normally to ensure that what remains is that much more clearly represented. But everybody knows how much effort is needed to attain this purpose. Abstraction can therefore be called negative attention. In other words, abstraction can be called a genuine doing and acting, which is opposed to the action by means of which the representation is rendered clear” (2:190).

8. See Lectures on Anthropology (7: 131).


10. “If I am conscious to myself of the representation it is clear, if I am not, it is obscure” (9: 33).

11. See (7: 135) also (9: 34).

12. See (7:135). Clear representations, such as the Milky Way, can be either distinct (when we see all the stars) and indistinct (when we do not) (see 9: 35).

13. Zuckert (2007, p. 48) writes: “If we do not have any way of sorting, making salient or intelligible, the diverse, contingent aspects of natural objects [...] any coherent experience will be impossible”. It is my view that attention is what makes possible the “salience” that Zuckert refers to. See also Zuckert (2007, pp. 127, 128, 222, 224).

14. I am grateful to a referee for emphasizing that I clarify this point.
Melissa Zinkin

15. See Nehamas (2007, pp. 130–31): “Beauty, which draws us forward without any assurance of success, is [. . .] a call to look attentively at the world and see how little we see”.

16. (Whereas hearing a sound is not necessary for hearing in the same way.)

17. Here we can say that the feeling of displeasure is what makes us overlook an object or aspects of it. Displeasure is thus what makes distraction possible, that is, it causes us to consider something else. One could object here that, on this account, it would be impossible to have cognition of anything that is unpleasant, since we would not maintain our mental state long enough for cognition. How could I ever cognize a rotten egg, for example? But here it should be noted that what Kant refers to as the “pleasure of mere reflection”, which is the kind of pleasure under consideration here, is not the “pleasure of enjoyment”. It is therefore possible that even the cognition of objects we do not find enjoyable still requires the pleasure of “mere reflection”. There is still something worth considering, and purposive for reflection, in a rotten egg. My account also suggests that for Kant nothing can be judged to be aesthetically ugly. Rather, we find things to be either disgusting (disagreeable) or morally abhorrent. I am grateful to Tommy Hanauer, Charles Goodman and a referee for making me think about these points.

18. I think my view here is consistent with Guyer’s “multicognitive” approach to the harmony of the faculties in which our experience of beauty is what “goes beyond anything required for or dictated by satisfaction of the determinate concept or concepts on which the mere identification of the object depends” (Guyer, 2006, p. 183).

19. Zuckert (2007, p. 360) notes that Kant does attribute a feeling of pleasure to successful reflective judging. However, this is “not the necessary concomitant to an ongoing self-sustaining judging, but reflects our recognition that we have accomplished a cognitive purpose [. . .] (v: 184)”. It is not the pleasure of “mere reflection”. I agree.

20. Although on my account it is pleasure that sustains the reflection, whereas for Zuckert it is reflection that sustains itself.

21. By sustained attention, I mean the activity by which we try to find a concept for a given manifold, while focusing on this manifold. Thus, even though we might spend a lot of time trying to figure out a mathematical problem, this is not an activity that requires attention. In solving math problems, we “bring in” new information, make analogies, etc. This is different from being drawn into a given object through attention.

22. See Barchana-Lorand (2002, p. 311). According to Barchana-Lorand, pleasure is a priori because it “depends on the conditions of perception and is therefore provoked by every object, rather than just certain objects”.

23. This does not mean, however, that the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging. Rather, it structures or “maintains” it. Similarly, the a priori intuition of space does not precede our empirical experience. Rather it provides its form.

24. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes that it is by means of attention that the understanding affects inner sense: “I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this” (B156n).

25. The above comments are merely suggestive. Lack of space prevents a fuller treatment of the connections between beauty, attention, love and morality in Kant. Velleman, in “Love as a moral emotion”, referring to Murdoch’s discussion of love as a form of attention—“really looking”—, points out that attention translates to Achtung, which is Kant’s term for the motive of morality (Velleman, 1999, p. 343). Velleman does not refer to Kant’s CJ. Murdoch, who does discuss Kant’s aesthetics in relation to morality, writes: “the shortcomings of Kant’s aesthetics are the same as the shortcomings of his ethics. Kant is afraid of the particular” (1999, p. 214). It should be clear from the above that I disagree with Murdoch.

26. I would like to thank Charles Goodman, Robert Guay, David Hills, Tommy Hanauer, Theodore Kinneman, Clinton Tolley, Rachel Zuckert, and two excellent reviewers for making insightful comments on various drafts of the paper.
References


