Hire a Binghamton Ph. D.
Dissertation Title: Dangerous Delegation: Explaining the Rationales and Outcomes of State Sponsorship of Terrorism through the Principal-Agent Framework
Chair: Seden Akcinaroglu
Committee: Benjamin Fordham, Katja Kleinberg
Dissertation Synopsis: State sponsorship of terrorism, where a government deliberately provides resources and material support to a terrorist organization, is common in the international system. By conceptualizing state sponsorship as a relationship between a principal and agent, I develop a consistent theoretical model that explains why states pursue this foreign policy strategy, as well as how they rationally attempt to minimize the inherent risks of delegating to violent non-state actors. I test my model by using a novel dataset on sponsorship behaviors that improves on the range, detail, and temporality of previously used measurements. My dissertation is organized into three distinct papers, the first of which examines why states choose to delegate to terrorists, the second which organizations they are likely to support, and the third how they attempt to control these unpredictable actors.
Chair: David L. Cingranelli
Committee: Mikhail Filippov, Gregory Robinson
Chair: Michael D. McDonald
Committee: Jonathan Krasno, Gregory Robinson
Chair: David L. Cingranelli
Committee: Ekrem Karakoc, Jonathan Krasno
Chair: Wendy Martinek
Committee: Jeffrey Yates, Robin Best
Chair: Benjamin Fordham
Committee: David H. Clark, Ekrem Karakoc
Dissertation Title: Actors, Strategies and Coordination in Iranian Electoral Politics
Chair: Mikhail Filippov
Committee: Ekrem Karakoc, Gregory Robinson
Chair: Robin Best
Committee: William Heller, Ekrem Karakoc, Michael D. McDonald
Dissertation Title: "Behavioral Determinants of Voting Coalitions and the Consequences of Electoral Institutions"
Chair: Olga Shvetsova
Committee: William Heller, Michael D. McDonald
Dissertation synopsis: My dissertation focuses on the ways campaigning - a short-term behavioral factor of voting - interacts with voters' strategic incentives in the process of the formation of voting coalitions. Campaign events affect voters' decisions in a predictable way, thereby providing voters with exogenous information about future vote distribution. This exogenous information facilitates voters' strategic responses - strategic voting and rational abstention. Using the data from India and Canada, I show that more intense and more centripetal campaigns increase the predictability of voting patterns and facilitate coordinated voting. Further, I utilize the quasi-experimental settings created by the institution of rolling elections in India to study the effect of longer campaigning on strategic voting and rational abstention. I find evidence that the length of campaigning has an inverse U-shaped relationship with voters' propensity to abandon nonviable candidates.